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It is no hyperbole to say that the criticalissues of human
liberty in this country today are not issues of rights, but of
remedies. The American citizen has had a right to a
desegregated school since 1954 and to a desegregated jury
since 1879, but schools and juries throughout vast areas of
the country remain segregated. The American citizen has
a right of free expression, but he may be arrested, jailed,
fined under guise of bail and put to every risk and rancor
of the criminal process if he expresses himself unpopularly.
The "right" is there on paper; what is needed is the machinery to make the paper right a practical protection.tt
• This Article grows out of my study of problems to which I was initially exposed
in the preparation of a manual published by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund for the use of civil rights lawyers. Much of the underlying research
was done in that connection. I have also represented and now represent in various
pending litigation state criminal defendants, prosecuted on charges growing out of
civil rights activity, whose cases raise some of the issues treated in general form in
the Article.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1957, Haverford College; LL.B. 1960, University of Pennsylvania. Member, District of Columbia
Bar.

ft Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 17-18, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 377 U.S. 976 (1964) (No. 941, 1963 Term;
renumbered No. 52, 1964 Term) (noting probable jurisdiction).
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE THESIS

A. The Problem
Summer 1964, or 1965, or 1966.

In a Mississippi town, popula-

tion 10,000, several hundred locally resident Negroes meet at 9:00 a.m.
in a Negro church. They will pray; a voter registration worker and
several local Negro leaders will speak to them; then groups of them
will walk to the county courthouse to attempt to register to vote.
Negroes going alone to the registrar's office have been beaten by white
citizens on the streets of this town. Negroes who have reached the
office have been denied registration for failure to satisfy the registrar
that they are able to give a reasonable interpretation of his chosen
section of the Mississippi constitution, a prerequisite to registration
whose federal constitutionality has been challenged by the United
States in a civil action presently pending in the Supreme Court, on
appeal from a ruling of a three-judge federal district court which
sustained the provision.' The United States has also sued the county
registrar for an injunction against discriminating racially in the
administration of Mississippi's registration provisions, asking the
federal district court to infer discrimination from the fact that in a
county having 7,000 whites and 7,000 Negroes of voting age more
than 5,000 whites but less than a dozen Negroes are registered.2 This
suit is dragging through the district court with all deliberate procrastination,3 but the civil rights organizations have pressed a voter
registration drive in the county and more than forty Negroes in the
church this morning will attempt to register. They will walk to the
courthouse in small groups, each group composed of ten registration
applicants and a half-dozen Negro minors bearing placards protesting
discrimination in registration. The minors plan to remain on the
'MISS. CoNsT. art. 12, §244 (challenged and sustained in United States v.
Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (three judge district court), rezfd
without reaching the constitutional issue, 33 U.S.L. WmK 4258 (U.S. March 8, 1965).
Recitation of the pendency of such a litigation in connection with my hypothetical
case for 1965 and thereafter is not an anachronism. Experience suggests it is not
unlikely, in the event of invalidation of. present § 244, that constitutional amendments
will bring new problems to the courts. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) ;
United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963) (three judge district
court), aff'd, 33 U.S.L. W=EK 4262 (U.S. March 8, 1965); cf. Davis v. Schnell,
81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.) (three judge district court), aff'd mem., 336 U.S. 933
(1949). [The Supreme Court's decisions in the Mississippi and Louisiana litigations,
supra, were handed down after this Article was set in type. Although the Court
did not reach the constitutional merits in Mississippi, its decision striking down a
"constitutional interpretation" requirement in Louisiana appears conclusive of the
unconstitutionality
of Miss. CoNsr. art. 12, § 224.]
" 2 See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964).
8 See Conunent, JudicialPerformance its the Fifth Circuit,73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963).
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sidewalk outside the courthouse while the applicants enter the registrar's office.
Lining the street outside the church are more than a hundred
armed blue-helmeted law enforcement officers. A first group of less
than twenty Negroes leaves the church and proceeds double-file along
the sidewalk toward the courthouse. The group occupies half the
width of the sidewalk and goes in silence. A few of the minors hold
up their placards. The police move in.
A local police officer tells the Negroes that they are violating an
ordinance prohibiting parading without a license. He orders them
to go back where they came from. A member of the group says that
they are not parading, that they are going to register to vote. The
minors fold their placards. The Negro who has spoken asks the
officer if they may continue to the courthouse in groups of three or
four, provided that the signs are put away. The officer replies that
they may not, that more than one nigger in this town is a parade. A
number of Negroes come out of the church into the churchyard to
watch what is going to happen in the street. The Negroes outside are
outnumbered better than two to one by the police. The leader of the
Negro group on the sidewalk asks again whether they may go in
small groups to register. The officer says no. Police advance on the
Negroes in the churchyard.
The Negro leader on the sidewalk says then they will have to go
together. A few minors lift their placards. The police officer waves
an arm, says they are under arrest, and a police-driven open truck
topped with a chicken-wire pen pulls to the curb. The Negroes on the
sidewalk are jostled into the truck; Negroes in the churchyard murmur;
police wade into the churchyard swinging billy clubs; another truck
pulls up; twenty Negroes are dragged out of the churchyard by police
and thrown into it. At the jail the first group of Negroes is charged
with (1) parading without a license under a local ordinance which is
clearly unconstitutional on its face by force of the first and fourteenth
amendments; ' (2) willfully obstructing a public sidewalk by impeding
passage thereon under a state statute valid on its face but whose
4 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Schneider's case); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313
(1958); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600-03 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), 611, 615
n.5 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (1942), vacated and previous dissenting opinions adopted
per curiar, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (Jones' case). The ordinance authorizes the licenser
to consider the "character" of applicants and the "general order and welfare of the
community" and thus is well without the scope of Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941), and Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
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application to the facts described above (provided that the court which
tries the charge finds those to be the facts) is impermissible under the
same amendments; ' and (3) resisting arrest, a charge which falls
on federal grounds together with the preceding two charges.6 Conviction would also be federally precluded because these charges have
the design and effect of enforcing the state officers' policy of racial
discrimination in access to the public street, thereby violating the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,7 of racial disenfranchisement violating the fifteenth,8 and of impeding the federal
privilege of voting in national elections.' (To sustain these defenses,
of course, a trier of fact would have to find the facts as they were.)
The Negroes arrested in the churchyard are charged with (1) creating
a disturbance in a public place by loud and offensive talk, an accusation
which the State cannot without perjury support by any evidence
sufficient to satisfy the due process clause, 10 and (2) conspiracy to
commit an act injurious to public morals, to wit: to curse and insult
law enforcement officers in the performance of their duty, a charge
vulnerable to the same federal objection and in addition laid under
a statute arguably void for vagueness. 1 Bond is set at $500 per man
per charge.
If these prosecutions are now to be processed under ordinary
Mississippi practice, the following proceedings will be had. (A) Defendants will be represented by one of the three members of the
6
The statute is Miss. CODE ANN. § 2296.5 (Supp. 1962), enacted in 1960. Maximum punishment is $500 fine and six months in jail. The conclusion that it is unconstitutional as applied to the hypothesized facts is supported by Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963) (per
curiam) ; Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam). On other facts
the statute would doubtless be sustained. See Cox v. Louisiana, 85 Sup. Ct. 453,
463-65 (1965).
o Resisting a lawful arrest is punishable under Miss. CODE ANN. § 2292.5 (Supp.
1962), enacted in 1960, by a maximum fine of $500 and six months in jail. "Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an
officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution." Wright v. Georgia,
373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963) ; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962).
7Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963) ; Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
8 Consider the cases cited in note 7 minpra in connection with, e.g., United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
9 Consider the cases cited in note 7 .rupra in connection with, e.g., United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
10The statute is Miss. CODE ANN. § 2090.5 (1956), enacted in 1956, having a
maximum penalty of $500 fine and six months in jail. Its application to the hypothesized facts is forbidden by Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) ; Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248
(1963) (per curiam) ; Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
"1The statute is Miss. CODE ANN. § 2056(6) (1956), as amended in 1954, punishable by fine of not less than $25 or imprisonment not less than one nor more than
six months, or both. Its unconstitutionality is suggested by State v. Musser, 118
Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950), voiding the statute criticized for vagueness in Musser
v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
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Mississippi bar (all Negroes) who are willing to handle civil rights
cases,1 or by one of a handful of outstate civil rights lawyers.18 Whatever valid state-law defenses individual defendants may have on the
facts of their cases will be abandoned by their counsel, for counsel have
no time to develop such matters and know that particular defendants'
stories will disappear in the bog of mass trial. Severance, even could
a right to sever be established, is an impossibly time-consuming luxury
to lawyers already grievously overworked; in any event, state-law
defenses are futile because they are at the mercy of local judges and
juries. (B) Defendants will be convicted on all charges by a justice of
the peace, and (C) after some delay convicted again at a trial de novo in
the circuit court for the county by a jury from which Negroes have
been systematically excluded by reason of race. The justice of the
peace and circuit judge will flout the Constitution of the United States
by holding court in segregated courtrooms in segregated courthouses 14
and by addressing Negro defendants, witnesses, and often lawyers by
their first names; 15 these officials are elected, frequently following
12 There appear to be only four Negroes admitted to the Mississippi bar, of
whom three handle civil rights cases. White Missisippi lawyers will not touch such
cases. I appreciate that this last statement is contradicted by the Mississippi State
Bar Ass'n, Resolution, July 15, 1964, p. 2, which asserts that the members of that
bar have always been ready to represent all persons "popular or unpopular . . . and
regardless of race, creed, [etc.] ....
" and resolves that they will continue to
represent such persons. Perhaps this resolution will be followed. I cannot help,
however, but be struck by the characteristics which it shares with Hamlet's royal
mother, and I find its timing interesting. The resolution was passed fast on the heels
of (1) the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lefton v. Hattiesburg, 333 F2d 280 (5th Cir.
1964), which clearly told the federal district courts in Mississippi that outstate
counsel must be permitted to represent state criminal defendants attempting removal
to the district courts in any case in which local counsel would not serve; (2) the
beginning of inclusion as a regular matter in removal petitions of the allegation that
Negro defendants could not effectively assert their federal rights in the state courts
of Mississippi because only a few lawyers were willing to take such cases and these
few were overworked; and (3) the passage by the Mississippi legislature of a statute
precluding the appearance of outstate counsel before a Mississippi court when challenged by petition of any two members of the Mississippi bar. Absent a convincing
appearance that local counsel are available, the unconstitutionality of this last statute
in a criminal case is clear. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13 There are now about a half-dozen outstate lawyers more or less permanently
established in Mississippi working in cooperation with the three members of the
Mississippi bar who handle civil rights cases. Another handful of outstate lawyers
-for example, staff lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fundcome into Mississippi from time to time to handle special matters. During the
summer of 1964, a considerably larger number of outstate volunteer lawyers entered
Mississippi, most for a two-week hitch. Their departure at the. end of the summer
left the few permanent civil rights lawyers in the State a workload more staggering
than ever.
Outside Mississippi the shortage of legal manpower to defend persons charged
with crime arising out of civil rights activities is less starkly evident but, throughout
the South, pervasive. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
14 See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
15 See Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964)
(per curiam) (reversing
contempt conviction of Negro witness who refused to answer prosecutor's questions
so long as prosecutor addressed her by first name) ; Silver, Mississippi: The Closed
Society, 30 J. SounRlizN HIsToY 3, 18 (1964).
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segregationist campaigns, by local electorates from which Negroes
again have been systematically excluded by reason of race, electorates
which are rabidly hostile to Negro voter registration or any other
civil rights activity. (D) Following further delay, defendants' convictions will be affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court which will,
if possible, avoid the federal issues by reliance on state procedural
grounds-a tactic in which it will be aided by the overwork of local,
and the inexperience of outstate, counsel for the defense. (E) Defendants will ask the Supreme Court of the United States to dig
their federal contentions out of a thornbush of adequate and independent state grounds and to reverse their convictions on a record
in which every factual issue has been resolved against them.
Provided that the Court can best the thornbush, 6 convictions
under statutes unconstitutional on their faces will now be reversed,
but federal challenges to the application of facially constitutional statutes will probably fail by reason of adverse fact findings." Even if
federal claims succeed, their vindication will have been delayed by
years,' 8 at enormous cost. Defendants will have done time in a
Mississippi jail, sometimes a few hours or days, sometimes more.
To buy their freedom pending trial and each separate appeal they will
have posted cash bail-the only means of release for civil rights defendants in Mississippi, where sureties will not or cannot write bonds
in civil rights cases ' 9 -bail set in amounts calculated to bankrupt the
'- Resourceful, the Supreme Court has sometimes succeeded in extricating the
federal issue. E.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) ; Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964). Often, inevitably, it has failed. E.g., Arceneaux v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 336 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963)
(per curiam), 378 U.S. 539 (1964) (per curiam) ; cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 85 Sup.
Ct. 564 (1965).
17 See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
Is See Lusky, Racial Discriminationand the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63 COLUm. L. RF v. 1163, 1179-85 (1963) [hereafter cited as Lusky];
Brown v. Rayfield, 320 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 902 (1963), discussed
in Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 78, 100-01 (1964). Elapsed time between arrest and reversal of
demonstration defendants' convictions in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963), was a week shy of two years; in Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44
(1963), where the Supreme Court deferred to state justice by an initial remand for
reconsideration in light of Edwards, the time was more than three and a half years;
in Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964), which took the same course as Fields,
it was more than four years.
19 Recently Negro defendants charged with state offenses arising out of civil
rights activities in Mississippi have been able to obtain professional bonds by arrangements made with a bonding company out of the State after their removal of the
prosecutions to a federal district court. To my knowledge, the Mississippi state
courts have never accepted any but cash bonds in civil rights cases. Outside Mississippi Southern state courts have from time to time required cash bail in sit-in and
demonstration cases. In other cases they have frustrated release on bail by demanding
bond in forms which could not practicably be obtained: e.g., unencumbered realty
bonds On occasion, state bail-setting authorities (ordinarily sheriffs or chiefs of
police) have retained arrested sit-ins or demonstrators for days by demanding first
professional bonds, then realty bonds, then cash bonds, then professional bonds again.
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civil rights organizations. 20 (If commercial bonds were available,
these would present the defendants an unattractive alternative: payment of repeated fines, in the form of irrecoverable bond premiums, as
the price of liberty while litigating their federal claims state court by
state court.) In addition to appearance bonds, appeal bonds in substantial amounts will be demanded, and although the latter may be
waived on filing of a proper pauper's oath, forma pauperis practice is
both costly and dangerous. Countless lawyer's hours are spent obtaining the required affidavits-(in Mississippi and often elsewhere in the
South notaries will not notarize forms in civil rights cases, or will
make the process of notarization impracticably inconvenient)-and
the filing of any affidavit with a state court in Mississippi (and in some
other regions of the South) is an invitation to subsequent perjury
charges. In any event unresolved criminal charges hang over defendants for years, affecting their mobility, their acceptance at educational or other institutions,2 their eligibility for state benefits such as
unemployment compensation,' and, most important, their willingness
to risk repeated exercise of federally guaranteed rights. So long as the
controversy remains unsettled, state power is confidently asserted, and
only the hardiest of souls will dare do what the defendants have done
and risk following them into the tangles of Mississippi justice. Beyond
these risks, these hardships, these repressions and delays, the ultimate
message of the state court process to the Negro comes through loud
and clear: "litigation is not a meaningful avenue to the enjoyment of
federal rights." ' He is no Cassandra who sees that there can be
but one response to such a message.
20 The

studies of the reporters of FEED & WALD, BAIL

1964--A REPORT

IN THE UNITED STATES:
To THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 53

(1964) led them to conclude that high bail had been employed in civil rights cases
"as punishment or to deter continued demonstrations." See, with respect to exorbitant amounts of bail demanded, Galphin, Judge Pye and the Hundred Sit-Ins, The
New2 1Republic, May 30, 1964, 8, 9; Lusky 1180, 1185.
Miss. Laws, 1st Extra. Sess. 1962, ch. 6, at 14 makes ineligible for admission
to any Mississippi institution of higher learning any person who has pending against
him any criminal charge of moral turpitude "whether or not the prosecution under
such case may have been continued or stayed by the court of original jurisdiction or
any other court," and punishes by maximum penalty of $300 fine and one year in
jail any attempt by such a person to enroll. In other States, schools appear to have
institutional rules of similar tenor. For example shortly after the matriculation of
Sarah Louise McCoy, a Negro woman, at white Northeast Louisiana State College
under a preliminary integration order of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
McCoy v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 332 F2d 915 (5th Cir. 1964), Miss McCoy
allegedly was assaulted by 15 or 20 white adults, beaten, and subsequently charged
with battery on the son of one of her white assailants. Three days later she was
informed by the dean of student services that, without notice or hearing, she had
been indefinitely suspended from the college pending the outcome of proceedings
against her, purportedly pursuant to a regulation requiring automatic suspension
who have been arrested and incarcerated.
of students
22
See, e.g., Lewis v. Bennett, reported with Baines v. City of Danville 337 F.2d
Cir. 1964).
579 2(4th
3
Lusky 1182.
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B. The Thesis
My purpose in this Article is to demonstrate that federal trial
courts can and must put a stop to state criminal prosecutions such as
those against these Mississippi Negro defendants at or before the time
of state court trial. This power and obligation of federal courts to
intervene exists whether one views the state criminal process in these
cases as one enormous malignant conspiracy of all official state organs
leagued in massive resistance and dedicated to the destruction of federal
civil rights, or merely as the product of prosecutorial perversity coupled
with the heavy-fisted clumsiness and inefficiency that is characteristic of
American state criminal administration (and not alone in the South),
or as the mindless and inevitable, unhappy creature of pervasive
bigotry and popular intolerance, tugging along alike state prosecutors,
juries and judges (again, not alone in the South), or sometimes one
or another or a combination of these things. Only very far from
practicality and from the necessity of proof are such distinctions meaningful. I do not know myself-but do know I could not show as a fact
to a federal district judge for the Southern District of Mississippithat Mississippi justice is conspiratorial rather than incompetent. I
do not know that the Supreme Court of the United States itself would
be willing formally to find Mississippi justice either conspiratorial or
incompetent, were such a finding required as a condition of authorizing
timely federal intervention into state criminal prosecutions destructive
of federal rights. But I do not need to try these factually and
politically untriable issues in order to conclude that in its normal
processes Mississippi justice too unbearably clogs the freedoms indispensable to a free society. In this regard it differs only in degree
from the justice administered in other southern States, and in States
outside the South.
For, institutionally, the processes of state criminal administration
are designed to ignore or destroy such federal guarantees of civil
liberty as free speech, free resort to the ballot, free access to the streets.
Realistically, these and kindred guarantees are guarantees only to castoffs and undesirables, deviates, Negroes. In essence all are guarantees
of equal protection of the laws. The mayor and the chief of police of
Canton, Mississippi or Chicago, Illinois would never be arrested if they
picketed a courthouse. Of course, the mayor and the 'police chief
never will picket the courthouse; ' therefore the problem presented
when Negroes are arrested for picketing the courthouse does not seem
2

A Among generalizations, one would suppose this one of the least likely to have

its exceptions.

But cf. Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961).
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at first blush to be an equal protection problem. Nevertheless, the
forces which assure that if the mayor and police chief picketed the
courthouse they would not be arrested are the same forces which
assure that the mayor and police chief will never be the sort of men
who will want to picket the courthouse, and that whatever the mayor
and police chief want done in the courthouse will be communicated to
the courthouse in other and more effective ways than picketing.
Although abstractly accurate, it is perfectly absurd to say that
the mayor and police chief have federally guaranteed immunities to
make a speech, cast a vote, or walk the sidewalks of their towns. They
do not need these immunities. The Constitution gives them nothing.
Such protection as the Constitution gives, it gives to those in sore
need, those whom other protections have failed, who are so defenseless
that society may arrest them or charge them with crime. They are
the powerless, the unpopular; once it is known that a man is within
this class-and the fact of his prosecution is sufficient evidence of ithis fate before a state jury, an elected justice of the peace, or circuit
judge is substantially decided. Prosecutors know this fact and can
laugh at philosophies which ignore it. Defense counsel know it who
have tried without success to make state trial judges read an opinion
from the United States Reports before ruling on a motion for acquittal
in a free speech case. True, state courts are competent to administer
federal law, and they may by self-denial act to vindicate federal liberties.
Theory casts them in this protective role, 25 but the battle is not over
theory. The battle is for the streets, and on the streets conviction now
is worth a hundred times reversal later.
Here the state authorities have the jump on the Constitution.
They have the power in the streets. The Constitution purports to
limit state power, but power speaks immediately and effectively until it
is effectively stopped. State arrests and state prosecutions are the
voice of state power. They may voluntarily cease to speak, in obedience to higher law. But where the higher law is a law for unpopulars,
the probability that the popular organs of state prosecution will voluntarily cease to speak is small. In time, from locality to locality, these
organs may unlearn old prejudices, but predictably they will learn
new ones. In time they may unlearn some of the fear and ignorance
and interest which underlie all prejudices; but federal guarantees
25 See Ex parte Royall, 117

U.S. 241, 248 (1886)

(quoting Robb v. Connolly,

111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)) : "[Ulpon the State courts, equally with the courts of the

Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or
secured by the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them."

See also cases cited note 164 infra.
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predictably will also develop with time, 6 and insofar as they are
needed those guarantees will always represent the gap between the
evolving ideal of freedom and the capacity of the representatives of
power to let men be free. The matter is not one for dogmatism, but
so far as one can predict, the probability is that the popular organs of
state prosecution will never effectively protect federal civil liberties;
that they will remain instruments for harassment, not vindication, of
persons who dare to exercise freedoms to which the United States
is Constitutionally committed, but which its majorities who speak in
the state process are not constitutionally built to accept.
It is precisely to protect against probabilities of this sort that
federal trial courts have been created 27 and much of their jurisdiction
given. Since the inception of the Government, those courts have been
employed in cases "in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be
impartial and unbiassed," 28 for, as Hamilton wrote in The Federalist,
"[T]he most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes." ' The federal question jurisdiction of the
federal district courts in civil cases rests largely on the assumption that
federal judges "are more likely to give full scope to any given Supreme Court decision, and particularly ones unpopular locally, than
are their state counterparts." " The federal diversity jurisdiction has
recently been authoritatively justified in terms of "the possible shortcomings of State justice," inter alia, the localization of trial in small
2

6Professor Henkin has recently spoken of "the direction of growth of the
Constitution to embody flexible standards permitting the increase of individual safeguards with the growing enlightenment of contemporary civilization." Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Antendinent, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 88 (1963);
cf. RosTow,
THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 124-27 (1962).
2
7In
the federal convention, just before Madison and Wilson, pursuant to Dickinson's suggestion, successfully moved the Committee of the Whole to authorize the
national legislature to create inferior federal courts, 1 FARAuN, THE REcoRDS OF THE
FEDER.A CONvENTION OF 1787, at 125 (1911),
Mr. [Madison] observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed
throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would
be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not
in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts
in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge,
or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a
new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme
bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so

distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment

commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government
without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body

without arms or legs to act or move.
Id. at 124.
28

THE FOERA.IST No. 80, at 429 (Warner ed. 1818) (Hamilton).
29Id. No. 81, at 439.
80 Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L.

157, 158 (1953).
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constituencies where "justice is likely to be impeded by the provincialism of the local judge and jury, the tendency to favor one of
their own against an outsider, and the machinations of the local 'court
house gang.' "'
Particularly, in civil cases involving civil rights,
"Congress has declared the historic judgment that within this precious
area, often calling for a trial by jury, there is to be no slightest risk
of nullification by state process." 32 I believe that Congress made the
same judgment in criminal cases; that here, too, it saw and acted on
the probability that state courts would not adequately protect federally
guaranteed civil rights; that here, too, it authorized and commanded
federal trial courts to anticipate and supersede state court trials for
the complete and timely enforcement of interests "of the highest
national concern." Two grants of jurisdiction to the federal district courts are
specifically addressed to the problem: the civil rights removal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958), and the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958). The lower federal courts, with
some support in Supreme Court decisions, are giving unduly narrow
scope to both. In cases like that of the Mississippi Negro defendants
described above, federal district courts have disallowed removal and
refused to entertain habeas corpus. Section 1443 is plagued by unlikely
constructions which leave it impotent to cope with any state infringements of civil rights save those which state ingenuity outgrew threequarters of a century ago. Section 2241, disfigured by the doctrine
requiring exhaustion of state remedies, has become largely the exclusive prerogative of long-term state felony convicts claiming trial
error. I shall attempt to minister to these ills. I mean to study the
background of the two jurisdictional grants (part II infra), then to
discuss the appropriate scope of removal (part III infra) and habeas
corpus (part IV infra) in civil rights cases. I shall not treat questions
of substantive law concerning the federal constitutional guarantees
which these two jurisdictions implement,34 or questions of procedure in
removal or habeas corpus cases. 5 Nor shall I discuss as independent
matter the third major source of federal trial court power which might
S1 ALI STUDY OF THE DmsioN OF JURISDICTION BETEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, Commentary, General Diversity Jurisdiction, at 41 (Tent Draft No. 1, 1963).
3 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw

& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).

33 Ibid.
34 The substantive issues posed at notes 4-11 supra are a fair sample of the sort
of issues involved in the cases with which I shall be concerned.
35 1 have considered procedural matters in detail in AMSTERDAM, THE DEFENSIVE
TRANSFER OF CIvIL RIGHTS LITIGATION FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS 116-55,
371-413 (1964) [hereinafter cited as AMSTERDAm].
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be made effective to protect my Mississippi Negroes and others
similarly situated: the federal equity power to enjoin state prosecution.3 6 Like removal and habeas corpus, the civil rights injunction
jurisdiction presently suffers assorted doldrums, among which the
most devitalizing are the abstention principle (whose present status is
more than a little obscure) " and the doctrine of Douglas v. City of
Jeannette s (which is in the same mire)."

These deserve a separate

article." I shall speak here of the injunction only to the extent necessary to round out my consideration of removal and habeas corpus.
My principal thesis is that under the federal removal and habeas
corpus statutes a petition filed before state trial by a state criminal
defendant making a colorable showing that the conduct for which he
is prosecuted was conduct protected by the federal constitutional guarantees of civil rights 41 authorizes and requires the appropriate federal
district court to entertain and dispose of his federal contention (in the
case of habeas corpus) or of the whole prosecution against him (in
the case of removal) in advance of state trial-and this without regard
to whether he also claims that the state courts are hostile, biased, conspiratorial, or incompetent. I would allow removal in certain other
cases as well,' although I am less sure about the fit result in such
cases. For those who cannot accept my principal thesis in its full
breadth, I suggest possible narrower alternatives,' but I should be
sorry to see them adopted. I appreciate that some will regard my
3628 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958) ; Ray. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
37
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), and McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963), have made inroads of undefined contour and interrelationship
into the abstention principle.
38 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
39 The Fifth Circuit thought in Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102, cert. denied,
356 U.S. 968 (1958), that Douglas had been substantially modified by subsequent
per curiam decisions of the Supreme Court. A divided Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit disagreed in Baines v. Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 591-92 (1964).
40 The Supreme Court will face abstention and Douglas v. City of Jeannette
problems in Dombrovski v. Pfister, 377 U.S. 976 (1964) (No. 941, 1963 Term;
renumbered No. 52, 1964 Term) (noting probable jurisdiction). Doubtless review
by that Court will also be sought of Baines v. Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
Other significant cases are on the horizon. E.g., NAACP v. Thompson, No. 21741,
5th Cir., 1964.
41 The phrase "civil rights" is used advisedly here, despite the possibility of
unclarity at its fringes, to designate what Mr. Justice Stone described as a "right
or immunity . . . of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518, 531 (1939) (plurality
opinion on the point). Justice Stone was defining the scope of the civil rights jurisdiction given federal trial courts by the Ku Klux Act of 1871, now codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1443(3) (1958), and his definition is as good as any to describe the principal
concern of Reconstruction legislation (including the civil rights removal and habeas
corpus statutes) designed to implement the post-War amendments. Congress has
more recently used the words "civil rights" with, apparently, the same meaning.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1958).
42 See p. 912 infra.
43 See discussion of the range of possible constructions at pp. 908-09 infra.
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proposal as an end of federalism. I fully share their concern for the
preservation of an appropriate federal balance, but I think the complaint
exaggerated. 44 I am also concerned by the opportunities for abuse
which extension of pretrial federal intervention may allow state criminal defendants whose cases do not come within the scope of allowable
removal or habeas corpus as I understand those jurisdictions, but who
may attempt to use federal petitions as a means for delaying or disrupting state trials. I think that the danger of these abuses may be
minimized," and so much danger as remains is a price I am willing to
pay for protection of federal constitutional liberties. More to the
point, I think the price is one which Congress was willing to pay.4"
II.

BACKGROUND:

STATUTORY HISTORY AND THE PATTERN OF

FEDERALISM IN MATTERS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

A. Statutory History
During more than seventy years following the First Judiciary Act,
of 1789," Congress acted substantially on the principle "that private
litigants must look to the state tribunals in the first instance for
vindication of federal claims, subject to limited review by the United
States Supreme Court." " It was not then supposed that the necessary
and proper place for the trial litigation of all issues of federal law was
in the lower federal courts, and no general federal question jurisdiction
was given those courts. 49 Original civil diversity jurisdiction was
given,"' and civil removal jurisdiction was allowed in three classes of
cases " where it was particularly thought that local prejudice would
impair national concerns.52" But care was taken to exclude the federal
44 See pp. 833-40 infra.
45

See p. 832 infra.

46 See notes 173, 476-77, 489-90 infra and accompanying text.
47

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.

48 HART & WECESLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDEaL SYsTxa

727

(1954).
49 Except by the short-lived federalist Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat.
89, 92, repealed by the Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
5 oAct of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
51 Prior to 1887, judiciary legislation stated the requisites for removal jurisdiction
independently of those for original federal jurisdiction. The Act of March 3, 1887,
ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, amended to correct enrollment by the Act of Aug. 13, 1888,
ch. 866, 25 Stat 433, inaugurated the present pattern of federal removal jurisdiction,
which in general authorizes removal of cases over which the lower federal courts
have original jurisdiction (with minor exception) and, in addition, of special classes
of cases particularly affecting national concerns. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-44 (1958).
52 The Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat 79, authorized removal in the
following classes of cases where more than $500 was in dispute: suits by a citizen
of the forum state against an outstater; suits between citizens of the same state in
which the title to land was disputed and the removing party set up an outstate land
grant against his opponent's land grant from the forum state; suits against an alien.
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trial courts from involvement in the state criminal process,O and
section 14 of the Judiciary Act expressly excepted state prisoners from
the federal habeas corpus power.54
From time to time, however, limited incursions were made in
criminal cases where there was more than ordinary reason to distrust
the state judicial institutions. In 1815, in the face of New England's
resistance to the War of 1812,"" Congress provided in a customs act
for removal of suits or prosecutions
against any collector, naval officer, surveyor, inspector, or

any other officer, civil or military, or any other person aiding
or assisting, agreeable to the provisions of this act, or under
colour thereof, for any thing done, or omitted to be done,
as an officer of the customs, or for any thing done by virtue
of this act or under colour thereof. 6
In 1833 it enacted the celebrated Force Act, designed to crush
South Carolina's opposition to the tariff.

7

That act gave the President

extensive power to use the military forces of the United States to
protect federal customs officers and suppress resistance to the customs
laws; 68 it extended the civil jurisdiction of the federal courts to all
cases arising under the revenue laws; 1 it authorized removal of any
suit or prosecution
against any officer of the United States, or other person, for
or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the
United States, or under colour thereof, or for or on account
of any right, authority, or title, set up or claimed by such
officer, or other person under any such law of the United
States; 0'
The first two classes were specifically described by Hamilton as situations "in which
the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial," THE FEDERALIST No. 80,

at 432 (Warner ed. 1818). Madison, speaking of state courts in the Virginia convention, amply covered the third: "We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get
justice done them in these courts . . . ." 3 ELLOT'S DEBATES 583 (1836).
GsIndeed, considerable furor was aroused by Supreme Court assumption of
jurisdiction to review federal questions in state criminal cases as late as 1821. See
the discussion of Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821), in 1 WARum,
THE SUPREmE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 547-59 (rev. ed. 1932).
54 Save where it was necessary to bring them into court to testify. Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat 81.
b5 See 1 MORISON & COMMAGER, GROWTH OF THE AmERIcAN REPUBLIC 426-29
(4th 6 ed.
1950).
6
Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198; Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 93, § 6,
3 Stat 233. Both enactments were temporary legislation. Their removal provisions
were extended four years by Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 109, § 2, 3 Stat 396.
57 See 1 MORISON & COMMAGER, op. cit. supra note 55, 475-85.

of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, §§ 1, 5, 4 Stat 632, 634.
59 Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 2, 4 Stat. 632.
60 Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat 633. Section 2 of the act envisioned
that under certain circumstances private individuals, as well as federal officers, might
take or hold property pursuant to the revenue laws.
68 Act
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and it added to the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts
and judges
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a
prisoner or prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or
they shall be committed or confined on, or by any authority
or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or
decree, of any judge or court thereof."'
Congressional discussion of the jurisdictional provisions of the act
was scant, but the clear purpose of the lot seems to be wholly to
supersede state court jurisdiction in cases affecting the tariff 02 and to
give the federal courts power effectively to enforce the tariff against
concerted state resistance, including state judicial resistance; for, as
Mr. Wilkins, who reported the bill and was its manager in the
Senate,' said in the debates concerning the grant of federal civil
jurisdiction, it was "apparent that the constitution of the courts in
South Carolina makes it necessary to give the revenue officers the
right to sue in the federal courts." "
61 Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634.
WThis purpose is apparent as respects the removal jurisdiction, which in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), was sustained against constitutional complaints
that "it is an invasion of the sovereignty of a State to withdraw from its courts into
the courts of the general government the trial of prosecutions for alleged offenses
against the criminal laws of a State." Id. at 266. The revenue officer removal
provisions were continued in successive judiciary acts until 1948, when they were
extended to encompass all federal officers and persons acting under them. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1) (1958). As for the habeas corpus grant, continued in substance in
present 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2) (1958), this has always been construed as directing
the federal courts to entertain petitions for the writ in advance of state trial in cases
where federal officers are prosecuted, see the authorities collected in the briefs and
opinion in It re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) ; e.g., Reed v. Madden, 87 F.2d 846 (8th
Cir. 1937); In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900); United States ex rel.
Flynn v. Fuellhart, 106 Fed. 911 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901); United States v. Lipsett,
156 Fed. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1907) ; Ex parte Warner, 21 F.2d 542 (N.D. Okla. 1927) ;
Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1944) ; Lima v. Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446
(E.D. Va. 1945) (writ allowed after justice court conviction); or where private
citizens acting under federal officers are prosecuted, Anderson v. Elliott, 101 Fed.
609 (4th Cir. 1900), appeal dimnissed, 22 Sup. Ct. 930 (1902); West Virginia v.
Laing, 133 Fed. 887 (4th Cir. 1904). Discharge of federal officers has sometimes
been denied after evidentiary hearing where the evidence did not preponderately show
that the officer was acting within the scope of his federal authority. United States
ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906); Birsch v. Tumbleson, 31 F.2d 811 (4th
Cir. 1929) ; Castle v. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (8th Cir. 1918) ; Ex parte Tilden, 218 Fed.
920 (D. Idaho 1914). The evidentiary standard is discussed in Brown v. Cain, supra,
and Lima v. Lawler, supra. These cases ao not reflect hesitation to use the federal
writ to abort state trial in any case in which the interests of the federal government
are affected; they indicate only that, in each case, the federal interest was not sufficiently shown on the facts. See In re Matthews, 122 Fed. 248 (E.D. Ky. 1902);
In re Miller, 42 Fed. 307 (E.D.S.C. 1890) ; cf. Ex parte United States ex rel. Anderson, 67 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Fla. 1946) (decided on same grounds without a hearing).
63 See 9 CoNG. Dun. 150 (Jan. 21, 1833), 246 (Jan. 28, 1833). Hereinafter all
citations to CONG. DEB., CONG. GLOBE, and CONG. REc. are to the bound volumes with

the specific dates of the debates. A date will not be indicated when it is the same
as that in the preceding citation.
6M. at 260 (Jan. 29, 1833). See also id. at 329-32 (Feb. 2, 1833) (remarks
of Senator Frelinghuysen).
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The habeas corpus jurisdiction was extended again in 1842 to
authorize federal release of foreign nationals and domiciliaries held
under state law or process on account of any act claimed to have been
done under color of foreign authority depending on the law of
nations. 5 This extension was occasioned by People v. McLeod,6 6
in which the New York courts provoked considerable international
friction by refusing to relinquish jurisdiction over a British subject
held for murder who claimed that he had acted under British authority.
McLeod was acquitted at his trial, but the need for an expeditious
federal remedy to abort the state court process in such cases was
strongly felt: "If satisfied of the existence in fact and validity in law
of the [plea in] bar, the federal jurisdiction will have the power of
administering prompt relief." 67 Again, as in 1815 and 1833, the
scope of federal intrusion was narrow. And so things stood until the
Civil War.
During and after the War, Congress multiplied the intrusions.
When, by the Act of March 3, 1863, chapter 81,6" it authorized
presidential suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and immunized
from civil and criminal liability persons making searches, seizures,
arrests, and imprisonments under presidential orders during the existence of the rebellion, it provided in section 5 of the act for removal of
all suits and prosecutions
against any officer, civil or military, or against any other
person, for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to
be done, at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or
under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or
under the President of the United States, or any act of
Congress.6"
The debates on passage of this 1863 act reflect congressional concern
that federal officers could not receive a fair trial in hostile state courts,
and that the appellate supervision of the Supreme Court of the United
States would be inadequate to rectify the decisions of lower state
0

5 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.

6625 Wend. 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
67 CoNG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 444 (April 26, 1842) (remarks of Senator
Berrien). Mr. Berrien, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported and
managed the bill which became the act. Id. at 443. See the discussion of the act
in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 71-72, 74 (1890).
68 12 Stat. 755.
6912 Stat 756.
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tribunals having the power to find the facts." The act was to be
broadened and procedurally strengthened in 1866.71
By acts of 1864 and 1866," Congress also extended the customsofficer removal provisions of the 1833 Force Act " to cover civil and
70A provision confirming the application of the act to criminal as well as civil
proceedings was added by amendment on the Senate floor after the favorable reporting
of the House Bill, as amended (so substantially as to amount to a substitute bill)
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The House Bill is set out at CoNG.
GLOBE_, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (Dec. 8, 1862), as introduced, id. at 20, and as passed,
id. at 22. The bill as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, id. at
321 (Jan. 15, 1863), is set out, id at 529 (Jan. 27, 1863). Senator Harris moved to
amend it by adding to the removal provision, qualifying the description of removable
actions, the words: "civil or criminal." Id. at 534. The chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Senator Trumbull, did not support the amendment. Ibid. Senator Clark,
who did, supposed the case of state officers killed by the federal marshal in an attempt
to execute state-court habeas corpus process in respect of a prisoner held by the
marshal under authority of the Secretary of War; "what sort of fair trial could
the marshal have had in the State court, where the authorities of the State were
arrayed on one side and the United States on the other?" Id. at 535. Senator
Cowan also supported the amendment in the brief debate which immediately preceded
its adoption. Hypothesizing the case of a federal officer who killed a man he was
attempting to arrest under presidential warrant, Cowan took the view that the officer
ought to have the right to remove a state indictment. Id. at 537-38. Senator Carlile
inquired why a trial in the state court, subject to a right of review in the Supreme
Court of the United States, would not suffice to protect the officer. Id. at 538.
Senator Cowan replied:
Mr. President, only the indictment goes into the court upon a special allocatur. The testimony could not go; nothing but the indictment and the
simple plea would go; and upon that the court could not determine the character of his defense. Besides, the character of this defense is one of fact
to a great extent, and might depend on probable cause, and that has to be
passed upon by a jury under the direction of the court; because if the court
could pass upon the question of fact, there is an end of it; no appeal lies
from a tribunal which is intrusted with the determination of questions of
fact. In the first place, the question on which the defense rests must exist
in criminal cases, as a general rule, in parol-this order of the President
may have been by parol-and it must be submitted to the jury, and determined
by the jury under the direction of the court, with authority to try it. I do
not undertake to say that the criminal might not submit himself to that
jurisdiction, because the jurisdiction of the United States is not exclusive.
He might submit to it; but if he was desirous to have the question determined in the courts of the United States, he has unquestionably a clear right
to have it so determined.
Ibid. (Senator Cowan is reported as voting against the amendment, ibid., although
he voted for passage of the bill as amended, id. at 554.)
71 See text accompanying notes 114-19 infra.
72 Act of March 7, 1864, ch. 20, § 9, 13 Stat. 17; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173,
§ 50, 13 Stat. 241; Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98. By the 1866 act Congress (a) generally amended the revenue provisions of the Act of June 30, 1864;
(b) in § 67, 14 Stat. 171, authorized removal of any civil or criminal action
against any officer of the United States appointed under or acting by
authority of [the Act of June 30, 1864, and amendments thereto] . . . or
against any person acting under or by authority of any such officer on account
of any act done under color of his office, or against any person holding property or estate by title derived from any such officer, concerning such property
or estate, and affecting the validity of [the revenue laws] . . . ;
and (c) in § 68, 14 Stat 172, repealed the removal provisions (§ 50) of the Act
of June 30, 1864, and provided for the remand to the state courts of all pending
removed cases which were not removable under the new 1866 removal provisions.
73 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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criminal cases involving internal revenue collection. In their final
1866 form, these provisions authorized federal removal of suits and
prosecutions "against any officer of the United States appointed under
or acting by authority of [the revenue laws] . . . or against any
person acting under or by authority of any such officer on account of
any act done under color of his office," or against persons claiming
title from such officers, where the cause concerned the property and
affected the validity of the revenue laws.74
During the last months of 1865 and early in 1866, Union military
commanders in the defeated South transferred from the state courts
to national military tribunals civil and criminal jurisdiction over cases
involving Union soldiers, loyalists, and Negroes. 75 April 9, 1866,
Congress enacted the first major civil rights act.7
Its third section,
the progenitor of the present civil rights removal jurisdiction codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958), provided:
SEc. 3.
And be it further enacted, That the district
courts of the United States, within their respective districts,
shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States,
cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the
provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit
courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the
courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they
may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section
of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,
has been or shall be commenced in any State court, against
any such person, for any cause whatsoever, or against any
officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or
imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by
virtue or under color of authority derived from this act or
the act establishing a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and
Refugees, and all acts amendatory thereof, or for refusing to
do any act upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with
this act, such defendant shall have the right to remove such
cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court in the
manner prescribed by the "Act relating to habeas corpus and
regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases," approved
March three, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and all acts

74 See note 72 supra.
75 See General Sickles' order, set out at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1834
(April 7, 1866), providing that military courts "shall have, as against any and all
civil courts, exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where freedmen and other persons
of color are directly or indirectly concerned, until such persons shall be admitted
to the State courts as parties and witnesses with the same rights and remedies
accorded to all other persons," unless the Negroes concerned filed a written stipulation submitting the proceeding to the state court. Cf. id. at 320 (Jan. 19, 1866)
(General Grant's order) ; note 102 infra.
76Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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amendatory thereof. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal
matters hereby conferred on the district and circuit courts of
the United States shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where such laws are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offences against law, the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of the cause, civil or
criminal, is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern said courts in the trial and disposition
of such cause, and, if of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.77
The pertinent congressional materials 7 do not illuminate the
intended scope of this removal provision.79 The broad purpose of the
77Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
78The bill was S. 61 of the Thirty-ninth Congress. It was introduced by
Senator Trumbull, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and referred to
his committee. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Jan. 5, 1866). Senator
Trumbull reported the bill from committee, id. at 184 (Jan. 11, 1866), in the form
in which it is set out id. at 211-12 (Jan. 12, 1866), and managed it on the Senate
floor. See id. at 474 (Jan. 29, 1866). The Senate debated, id. at 474-81, 497-507,
522-30, 569-78, 594-606 (Jan. 29, 1866 to Feb. 2, 1866), and passed the bill, id. at
606-07 (Feb. 2, 1866). Referred to the House Judiciary Committee, id. at 646
(Feb. 5, 1866), it was brought to the House floor by means of a motion by Representative Wilson, the Judiciary Committee chairman, to reconsider the reference,
id. at 688 (Feb. 6, 1866), which motion was agreed to, id. at 1115 (March 1, 1866).
After debate of the merits, id. at 1115-25, 1151-62, 1262-72 (March 1, 1866 to
March 9, 1866), the bill was recommitted, id. at 1296 (March 9, 1866), reported
by Wilson from the committee with amendments, id. at 1366 (March 13, 1866), and
passed by the House, id. at 1366-67, with the amendments. Only one amendment is
enlightening, and that in a minor regard. See note 79 infra. The House amendments were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, id. at 1365, from which
Trumbull reported them with the recommendation that the Senate concur, id. at
1376 (March 14, 1866). The Senate concurred. Id. at 1413-16 (March 15, 1866).
President Johnson vetoed the bill in a message which is set out id. at 1679-81
(March 27, 1866), 1857-60 (April 9, 1866). After debate, id. at 1755-61, 1775-87,
1801-09 (April 4, 1866 to April 6, 1866), the Senate passed it over the veto, id.
at 1809 (April 6, 1866). The House did the same without debate. Id. at 1857-61
(April 9, 1866).
79
Except for the words which now appear as the last clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443(2) (1958), allowing removal of actions or prosecutions "for refusing to do
any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with [federal] . . . law
[providing for equal civil rights]."
The language "or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act!' was added to the Senate bill by a House amendment. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1366 (March 13, 1866); see id. at 1413 (March 15,
1866). Compare id. at 211 (Jan. 12, 1866) (original Senate bill). The purpose of
the amendment was stated by Representative Wilson, House Judiciary Committee
chairman and floor manager of the bill, in reporting it from his committee, as follows:
Mr. WILSON, of Iowa.
I will state that this amendment is intended to enable State officers, who
shall refuse to enforce State laws discriminating in reference to these rights
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1866 act was, of course, to repudiate Dred Scott " by declaring the
Negroes citizens, to affirm as an incident of that citizenship "the same
right" to contract, hold property, etc., and "to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property"
as was enjoyed by whites (section 1),81 to deter by criminal penalties
the deprivation of that "right" (section 2),' and to give the Negroes
access to the federal courts for protection of the right (section 3).3
Since the right secured was conceived basically as one of equal treatment under state laws and proceedings," it was natural to summarize
the federal judicial jurisdiction given as jurisdiction "over the cases
of persons who are discriminated against by State laws or customs," '
persons "whose equal civil rights are denied [them] . . . in the State

courts," 6 -and this was the description offered of section 3 by
Senator Trumbull,' 7 who speaks with particular authority on the
meaning of the legislation and who gave the only systematic exposition
of its judiciary provision to be found in the debates. Trumbull, howon account of race or color, to remove their cases to the United States courts
when prosecuted for refusing to enforce those laws ....
Id. at 1367 (March 13, 1866). There was no other pertinent discussion of the provision.
80 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
81
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
82 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, made it criminal for any person,
acting under color of law, to subject another to deprivation of any right secured or
protected by the act (see § 1, note 81 supra), or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties by reason of race, color, or previous servitude. The section is the forbearer
of present
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
83
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, see text accompanying note 77
supra.
84 See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?,
2 STAN. L. R-v. 5, 15-18, 37-41 (1949) ; Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legislation
and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 363, 367-68 (1953). But
since the grant to Negroes of the "same right" to certain basic protections as enjoyed
by whites doubtless supposed that the States would preserve those protections to
whites, I would agree with tenBroek's broader statement that the 1866 act "effected
a complete nationalization of the civil or natural rights of persons." tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV.
171, 187 (1951).
85 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (Jan. 29, 1866) (remarks of Senator
Trumbull).
86 Ibid.

87 See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. These are passages from
Trumbull's speech opening debate on the bill in the Senate. A fuller discussion of
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ever, appears quite clearly to have used this language to paraphrase
only the grant of original and removal jurisdiction respecting persons
"who are denied or cannot enforce" their rights in the state courts
(section 3, supra, now 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1958), p. 843 infra) ;"
the Senator said nothing to clarify the additional grant of removal
jurisdiction in suits and prosecutions against persons "for any arrest
§ 3 is found in Trumbull's key speech urging the bill's passage over the veto. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (April 4, 1866) :
The President objects to the third section of the bill . .

.

. [H]e insists

[that it] gives jurisdiction to all cases affecting persons discriminated against,
as provided in the first and second sections of the bill; and by a strained
construction the President seeks to divest State courts, not only of jurisdiction
of the particular case where a party is discriminated against, but of all cases
affecting him or which might affect him. This is not the meaning of the
section. I have already shown, in commenting on the second section of the
bill, that no person is liable to its penalties except the one who does an act
vhich is made penal; that is, deprives another of some right that he is entitled
to, or subjects him to some punishment that he ought not to bear.
So in reference to this third section, the jurisdiction is given to the Federal courts of a case affecting the person that is discriminated against. Now,
he is not necessarily discriminated against, because there may be a custom
in the community discriminating against him, nor because a legislature may
have passed a statute discriminating against him; that statute is of no validity
if it comes in conflict with a statute of the United States; and it is not to be
presumed that any judge of a State court would hold that a statute of a
State discriminating against a person on account of color was valid when
there was a statute of the United States with which it was in direct conflict,
and the case would not therefore rise in which a party was discriminated
against until it was tested, and then if the discrimination was held valid he
would have a right to remove it to a Federal court-or, if undertaking to
enforce his right in a State court he was denied that right, then he could go
into the Federal court; but it by no means follows that every person would
have a right in the first instance to go to the Federal court because there was
on the statute-book of the State a law discriminating against him, the presumption being that the judge of the court when he came to act upon the case,
would, in obedience to the paramount law of the United States, hold the State
statute to be invalid.
If it be necessary in order to protect the freedman in his rights that he
should have authority to go into the Federal courts in all cases where a custom
prevails in a State, or where there is a statute-law of the State discriminating
against him, I think we have the authority to confer that jurisdiction under
the second clause of the constitutional amendment, which authorizes Congress
to enforce by appropriate legislation the article declaring that "neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or in any
place subject to their jurisdiction." That clause authorizes us to do whatever
is necessary to protect the freedman in his liberty. The faith of the nation
is bound to do that; and if it cannot be done without, would have authority
to allow him to come to the Federal courts in all cases.
88 It will be noted that the structure of § 3 is (1) to create original federal
jurisdiction in the case of persons who are denied or cannot enforce their § 1
rights in the state courts; (2) to create removal jurisdiction in cases where any
"such person" is sued or prosecuted in a state court; and (3) to create additional
removal jurisdiction over suits or prosecutions against persons on account of wrongs
committed under color of the 1866 act or the Freedmen's Bureau Acts. Trumbull's
language quoted in the text accompanying note 85 supra, taken in context, appears
to refer to the original, not removal jurisdiction (case 1 supra), and his language
quoted in the text accompanying note 86 supra tracks the statutory phraseology
common to original and removal jurisdictions (cases 1 and 2 wtpra). Similarly, his
speech quoted in note 87 supra covers without distinction original and removal
jurisdiction and seems to speak only of those statutory provisions (cases 1 and 2
supra) common to them.
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or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue
or under color of authority derived from this act" or the Freedmen's
Bureau Acts (section 3 supra; now 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2) (1958),
p. 843 infra). Thus we are told little about one half the removal grant
of section 3, and nothing at all about the other half.
But if the debates fail to provide building materials for an
affirmative construction of this far from self-explanatory statute (what
conditions, for example, establish that a person is "denied or cannot
enforce" rights in a state court? when is a wrong "committed by virtue
or under color of authority derived from" the act?), they do provide
a few bricks to be tossed through the windows of the one construction
which, as we shall see, the Supreme Court was later to put on a
portion of the statute. In what I shall call the Rives-Powers line of
cases,8' decided between 1880 and 1906, the Court gradually developed
the principle that, in order to come within the removal provision
respecting persons "who are denied or cannot enforce" their rights, a
state criminal defendant must show that some state constitution or
statute on its face infringes his federal guarantees. Now, it is doubtless
true that the first wave of Southern resistance to emancipation and
Reconstruction took the form of Black Codes-laws of the Southern
legislatures directed expressly against the freedman." It is also true
that a major purpose of the act of 1866 was to counteract the Black
Codes,"' and although the Rives-Powers doctrine has never been put
explicitly on this ground, congressional concern over the Codes might
be thought to support the doctrine. I think that it does not, for
several reasons.
In the first place the Black Codes were viewed by the 1866 Congress as convincing evidence that the Southern States, unless restrained by the federal government, would discriminate against the
Negro and deprive him of his rights; in this light they were discussed
92
as proof of the need for federal action, but not as its exclusive target.
See particularly Mr. Cook's speech in the House:
89 See pp. 843-50 infra.
00 For typical Black Code provisions, see 2 COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 2-7 (6th ed. 1958); 1 FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 273-312 (photo reprint 1960) ; McPHERsoN, POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29-44 (1871).
91 The Codes were often referred to in debate. In the Senate: CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866) (Trumbull), 602 (Feb. 2, 1866) (Lane),
603 (Wilson), 605 (Trumbull), 1759 (April 4, 1866) (Trumbull); in the House:
id. 1118 (March 1, 1866) (Wilson), 1123-24 (Cook), 1151 (March 2, 1866) (Thayer),
1160 (Windom), 1267 (March 8, 1866) (Raymond).
See also id. at 340 (Jan. 22,
1866) (remarks of Senator Wilson on the amendatory freedmen's bureau bill).
92 See the portions of the debates cited in note 92 supra, especially CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603, 605, 1118, 1160. See also id. at 744-45 (Feb. 8, 1866)
(remarks of Senator Sherman on the amendatory freedmen's bureau bill).
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Can any member here say that there is any probability, or
any possibility, that these States will secure him in those
rights? They have already spoken through their Legislatures; we know what they will do; these acts, which have
been set aside by the military commanders, are the expressions of their will.

...
. Every act of legislation, every expression of
opinion on their part proves that these people would be
again enslaved if they were not protected by the military arm
of the Federal Government; without that they would be
slaves to-day.9 3
Congress anticipated massive Southern resistance to the thirteenth
amendment, resistance not alone by legislation but by every means at
southern state command.
It was easy to foresee, and of course we foresaw, that in
case this scheme of emancipation was carried out in the
rebel States it would encounter the most vehement resistance
on the part of the old slaveholders. It was easy to look far
enough into the future to perceive that it would be a very
unwelcome measure to them, and that they would resort to
every means in their power to prevent what they called the
loss of their property under this amendment. We could
foresee easily enough that they would use, if they should be
permitted to do so by the General Government, all the powers
of the State governments in restraining and circumscribing
the rights and privileges which are plainly given by it to the
emancipated negro. 4
Second, the Black Codes which concerned Congress were not all
discriminatory and hence unconstitutional 9 5 on their face. Much mention was made in the debates of the Southern vagrancy laws 96 and
particularly of the vagrancy law of Virginia,97 for example, which was
93 Id. at 1124, 1125 (March 1, 1866).

Id. at 503 (Jan. 30, 1866) (remarks of Senator Howard).
95 The legislators who enacted the 1866 act regarded discriminatory legislation

as unconstitutional by force of the thirteenth amendment. ,
96 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1123-24 (March 1, 1866) (remarks
of Representative Cook), 1151 (March 2, 1866) (remarks of Representative Thayer).
97Id. at 1160 (March 2, 1866) (remarks of Representative Windom), 1759
(March 4, 1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull). The speech in which Trumbull
refers to the Virginia vagrancy law was his speech as floor manager asking the
Senate to pass the bill over presidential veto-a critical speech for the bill's passage.
It is also apparent that the vagrant law described but not identified in Thayer's
speech, cited note 96 smpra, is Virginia's.
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a color-blind statute 9 whose evil lay in its systematically discriminatory administration.9 9
Third, there is affirmative evidence that Congress was aware of
and intended to redress nonstatutory denials of federal constitutional
rights. Senator Trumbull told the Senate in his principal speech urging passage of the bill over President Johnson's veto:
In some communities in the South a custom prevails by
which different punishment is inflicted upon the blacks from
that meted out to whites for the same offense. Does [section
2 of the 1866 act] . . . propose to punish the community
where the custom prevails? Or is it to punish the person
who, under color of the custom, deprives the party of his
right? It is a manifest perversion of the meaning of the
section to assert anything else.'0 0
As Congress knew, the military commanders in the Southern States had
already recognized that Southern laws which were fair on their face
were susceptible of unfair and discriminatory application, and had
taken steps to protect the freedmen against such maladministration.
One of these steps was the provision of military courts to supersede
Congress itself made
the civil courts in cases involving freedmen.'"
See Acts of Virginia, 1865-1866, at 91 (1866) (Act of Jan. 15, 1866).
19 Senator Wilson told the Senate that General Terry, as commander in Virginia,
"seeing that the vagrant laws of that State were used to make slaves of men whom
we have made free," had prohibited the enforcement of the law against Negroes.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (Feb. 2, 1866). Terry's order is found in
MCPHERSON, op. cit. supra note 90, at 41-42.
100 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (April 4, 1866). See also id. at 623
(Feb. 3, 1866) (remarks of Representative Kelley on the amendatory freedmen's
bureau bill).
101 Particularly significant is an order of General Terry in Virginia, March 12,
1866, set out at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1834 (April 7, 1866). The
Virginia legislature on February 28, 1866, had passed a statute providing that all
laws respecting crimes, punishments, and criminal proceedings should apply equally
to Negroes and whites, and that Negroes should be competent wituesses in all cases
in which Negroes were involved. General Terry's order thereupon restored to the
civil courts the jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the military tribunals in all
criminal matters affecting the freedmen, but provided an elaborate system of protection to assure that the Virginia laws would be fairly administered as they were
written. Under part III of the order, assistant superintendents of the Freedmen's
Bureau were required to attend in person all criminal trials or preliminary hearings
in which Negroes were parties or witnesses. Under part IV, the duties of the
assistants were spelled out: they were not to interfere with the court, or act as
attorneys, although they might make friendly suggestions to the Negroes concerned.
"They will, however, make immediate report of any instance of oppression or injustice
against a colored party, whether prosecutor or defendant, and also in case the evidence
of colored persons should be improperly rejected or neglected." Under part V,
the assistants were to examine and report if in any instance a prosecutor, magistrate,
or grand jury had refused justice to a colored person by improperly neglecting a
complaint or refusing to receive a sworn information, so that by reason of partiality
a trial or prosecution was avoided. Part VI required the assistants to make monthly
detailed reports concerning the effect of the order on the interests of Negroes,
"whether they have been treated with impartiality and fairness, and the law respecting
their testimony carried out in good faith or otherwise." General Grant's order of
98
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the same provision by the Amendatory Freedmen's Bureau Act of
July 16, 1866,1°' and it is implausible to imagine that in the removal
provisions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress intended to give
the freedmen less substantial protection."" Section 3 provided that
removal might be had by persons "who are denied or cannot enforce in
the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may
be any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act."
(Emphasis added.) This reference to locality strongly suggests that
something less than statutory obstruction to the enforcement of federal
rights in the state courts was thought sufficient to support removal. 10 4
January 12, 1866, had directed the commanders to protect Negroes from prosecution
in the rebel States "charged with offenses for which white persons are not prosecuted
or punished in the same manner and degree." Id. at 320 (Jan. 19, 1866). Senator
Trumbull, questioned concerning Grant's order, said that he did "indorse the order
and every word in it." Ibid.
102Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 176. Concerning supersession of
state civil and criminal jurisdiction by military tribunals under the act, see DuNNiNG,
ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 147, 156-63 (1898).
103 Section 14 of the Amendatory Freedmen's Bureau Act, note 102 sipra,provided
that in every State where "the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been
interrupted by the rebellion," or where the State's "constitutional relations to the
government have been practically discontinued by the rebellion," certain enumerated
rights-an enumeration substantially identical to that of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
-should be secured to all citizens without respect to race or color. Where the
course of judicial proceedings had been interrupted, the President through the Freedmen's Bureau was to "extend military protection and have military jurisdiction over
all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights,"
this jurisdiction to cease in every State when the state and federal courts therein
were no longer disturbed in the peaceable course of justice, and after the State was
restored to its constitutional relations and its representatives seated in Congress.
The jurisdiction appears of slightly different scope than that given by the first amendatory freedmen's bureau bill, S. 60 of the Thirty-ninth Congress, a companion bill to
the civil rights bill, see note 286 infra, which failed of passage over President Johnson's
veto. The predecessor bill authorized military jurisdiction over all cases affecting the
Negroes, but only when in a State the ordinary course of judicial proceedings had
been interrupted by the rebellion and the same enumerated rights were discriminatorily
denied to Negroes; this jurisdiction to cease "whenever the discrimination on account
of which it is conferred ceases," and in any event so soon as the state and federal
courts were no longer disturbed and the State's constitutional relations were restored.
In debate on the first bill, Senator Trumbull, who introduced, reported, and
managed it, CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Jan. 5, 1866), 184 (Jan. 11, 1866),
209 (Jan. 12, 1866), resisted attacks on the jurisdiction by repeated insistence that
the bill operated only where the civil courts were overthrown. Id. at 320-22 (Jan.
19, 1866), 347 (Jan. 22, 1866), 937-38 (Feb. 20, 1866). In this he manifested no
deference to the state courts, for the principal attack was upon the institution of
military tribunals, as distinguished from federal civil tribunals, see, e.g., the President's veto messages set out id. at 915-17 (Feb. 19, 1866), 3849-50 (July 16, 1866),
and it was to this attack that Trumbull replied, see id. at 322 (Jan. 19, 1866), 937-38
(Feb. 20, 1866). He explained that the civil rights bill applied, and could be enforced,
only in parts of the country where the civil courts were functioning; that the amendatory freedmen's bureau bill applied only where they were not. Id. at 3412 (June 26,
1866) (debate on the second bill). See also id. at 2773 (May 23, 1866) (remarks
of Representative Eliot, who reported and managed the second bill, id. at 2743 (May
22, 1866), 2772 (May 23, 1866)). And in a speech concerned with both the civil
rights and first amendatory freedmen's bureau bills, Trumbull appears to view them
as having substantially similar scope. Id. at 322-23 (Jan. 19, 1866).
104 The "locality" provision was rephrased in Rv. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148
infra, which turned removal on the inability to enforce federal rights "in the judicial
tribunals of the State, or in the part of the State where such suit or prosecution is
pending .

.

.

."

This wording was carried forward in § 31 of the Judicial Code
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The rights enumerated in section 1 included "full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . , any law, statute, ordinance, regula-

(Emphasis
tion, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding."
added.) '-5 "Proceedings" was certainly intended to add something
to "laws," and the inclusion of reference to "custom" was not inadvertent. Senator Trumbull several times told the Senate that it was
intended to allow removal "in all cases where a custom prevails in a
State, or where there is a statute-law of the State discriminating
against [the freedmen] .

106

*."..

The Senator expressly said that

it was not the existence of a statute, any more than of a custom discriminating against the freedman, that constituted such a failure of
state process as would authorize removal; but in each case, custom, or
statute, it was the probability that the state court would fail adequately
to enforce federal guarantees. 1 7 Senator Lane of Indiana similarly
said that the evil to be remedied was not unconstitutional state legislation, but the probability that the state courts would not enforce the
constitutional rights of the freedmen.'
As we shall soon see, this
Thirty-ninth Congress thoroughly distrusted the State courts and
expected nothing from them but resistance and harassment.
of 1911, and appears in 28 U.S.C. § 74 (1940).

In the 1948 revision it was "omitted

as unnecessary," Reviser's Note, note 150 infra, presumably on the theory that one

who may remove from "a State court" may thereby remove from the court of any
locality of a State. The omission tokens no substantive change in the statute.
105 Section 1 of the 1866 act was re-enacted, with its "notwithstanding" clause,
by §§ 16 and 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144.
It appears in REv. STAT. § 1977 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958)), without the "notwithstanding" clause. A similar clause was omitted by the revisers in carrying
forward § 1 of the Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, as Rzv. STAT. § 1979 (now 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1958)).
In neither case does any intention appear to effect a substantive change. The "notwithstanding" clauses, although indicative of legislative
purpose in respect of some applications of the statute-as here-never were effective
provisions, since the supremacy clause of the Constitution made them unnecessary.
106 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (April 4, 1866) ; id. at 475 (Jan. 29,
1866); cf. id. at 1758 (April 4, 1866). See also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1871).
10
7See note 87 supra.
108 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 602-03 (Feb. 2, 1866). I can reproduce
here only a small portion of a speech which should be read in full:
One of the distinguished Senators from Kentucky [Mr. GUTHRIE] says that
all these slave laws have fallen with the emancipation of the slave. That, I
doubt not, is true, and by a court honestly constituted of able and upright
lawyers, that exposition of the constitutional amendment would obtain.
But why do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because we fear
and have reason to fear that the emancipated slaves would not have their
rights in the courts of the slave States. The State courts already have jurisdiction of every single question that we propose to give to the courts of the
United States. Why then the necessity of passing the law? Simply because
we fear the execution of these laws if left to the State courts. That is the
necessity for this provision.
See also id. at 1265 (March 8, 1866) (Representative Broomall's condemnation of
the state courts).
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The habeas corpus jurisdiction which is now codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (c) (3) (1958) is also legislation of the Thirty-ninth Congress.
The Act of February 5, 1867, chapter 28,09 in its first section, extended the federal habeas power to "all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States . . .

made elaborate pro-

,"

vision for summary hearing and summary disposition by the federal
judges, and provided that
pending such proceedings or appeal, and until final judgment
be rendered therein, and after final judgment of discharge in
the same, any proceeding against such person so alleged to
be restrained of his or her liberty in any State court, or by
or under the authority of any State, for any matter or thing
so heard and determined, or in process of being heard and
determined, under and by virtue of such writ of habeas
corpus, shall be deemed null and void.1 1
Its second section gave another and different remedy to state criminal
defendants having federal constitutional defenses: review of the
highest state court judgment by the Supreme Court of the United
States on writ of error.' 1
In view of the juxtaposition of these
remedies, the inclusion of provisions expressly recognizing that federal
habeas corpus courts would anticipate and forestall state judicial
processes, and the pre-1867 usage with the writ, one need hardly plumb
the legislative debates to conclude, as the Supreme Court recently
has, that
Congress seems to have had no thought

.

.

.

that a state

prisoner
abide state
court predicate
determination
of hisreview
constitutionalshould
defense-the
necessary
of direct
109 14 Stat. 385.
110Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386. The successor to this provision is present 28 U.S.C. §2251 (1958), which authorizes any federal justice or
judge before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, to "stay any proceeding
against the person detained in any State court or by or under the authority of any
State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding," before judgment,
pending appeal, or after final judgment of discharge in the habeas case. State proceedings after granting of a stay are declared void, but if no stay is granted state
proceedings are "as valid as if no habeas corpus proceedings or appeal were pending."
"'11Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, §2, 14 Stat. 387. The changes which this
statute made in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by the first
Judiciary Act are shown in FRANKFURTER & SHULMAN, CASES ON FEDERAL JUisDicrioN AND PROCEDURE 627-28 (rev. ed. 1937).
There is no need to discuss them
here, save to say that while I think Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875), was wisely as well as shrewdly decided, I have serious doubt (as did the
Justices) whether the result in that case was purposed by Congress; and this very
doubt whether Congress might not have meant to turn Supreme Court review into
a sort of post hoc removal suggests the extreme disfavor in which the Thirty-ninth
Congress held the state courts. (The holding in Murdock, turning as it does on
circumstances unique to Supreme Court review, cannot of course be regarded as a
wholesale judicial repudiation of the congressional attitude.)

820

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113:793

by [the Supreme Court] . . .- before resorting to federal
habeas corpus. Rather, a remedy almost in the nature of
removal from the state to the federal courts of state prisoners'
constitutional contentions seems to have been envisaged.'-"
The legislative materials, however, tend to support the Supreme Court's
view.
The genesis of the act was a resolution offered by Representative
Shellabarger shortly after the convening of the Congress in December
1865 and immediately agreed to by the House:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be
directed to inquire and report to this House, as soon as
practicable, by bill or otherwise, what legislation is necessary
to enable the courts of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wives and children of soldiers of the United States
under the joint resolution of Congress of March 3, 1865, and
also to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation
of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery." 3
There is no pertinent "joint resolution" of "March 3, 1865," and the
evidence is persuasive that the "March 3" action referred to is the Act
of March 3, 1863, chapter 81,-4 a statute protecting Union officers and
other persons from civil or criminal liability for acts or omissions
during the rebellion under presidential order or law of Congress, and
authorizing removal from the state to federal courts of civil or criminal
actions against such persons. That this was Shellabarger's reference
appears from the House Judiciary Committee's subsequent reporting of
a bill "1rwhich became the Act of May 11, 1866, chapter 80,16 substantially amending the removal procedures of the 1863 act to prevent
"12 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963).
113 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 87 (Dec. 19, 1865).
114 See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 476 n.80
(1963), also reaches this conclusion. March 3, 1865, was the date of House concurrence in a Senate concurrent resolution requesting the President to transmit the
proposed thirteenth amendment to the executives of the States, CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1416 (March 3, 1865), but Shellabarger could hardly have meant to
refer to this resolution, which had no substantive import. March 3, 1865, was also
the date of enactment of the Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, but matters
involving implementation of that act would doubtless have been referred to the House
Select Committee on Freedmen, established by resolution, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (Dec. 6, 1865), and which reported, for example, the Amendatory Freedmen's Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2743 (May 22, 1866).
115The bill was apparently numbered H.R. 238 of the Thirty-ninth Congress,
although some pages of the Globe refer to it as H.R. 298. It was the product of
a House Judiciary Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute to a bill
introduced by Representative Welker. Introduced at CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 196 (Jan. 11, 1866); reported id. at 1368 (March 13, 1866); taken up id. at
1387 (March 14, 1866).
11614 Stat. 46.
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their obstruction by the state courts,"' an act which was in turn
amended by the Act of February 5, 1867, chapter 27,"" authorizing
the issuance of writs of habeas corpus cum causa by the federal courts
to bring before them the bodies of defendants whose cases had been
removed from the state courts under the 1863 removal provisions." 9
On March 15, 1866, in debate on the bill which became the May
11 act, Shellabarger returned to what appears the theme first sounded
in his resolution of the preceding December:
Mr. SHELLABARGER. I wish to inquire of some member of the Judiciary Committee whether they intend by this
bill, or any other which they may have in preparation, to
provide for such cases as one which I am about to describe,
a case which came to my knowledge about the time of the
convening of this Congress, and which I now state in order
to attract to it the attention of the committee, as it is one
of a very large class of similar cases.

In Grant county, I believe, in the State of Kentucky, a
provost marshal of the United States ordered certain citizens
117 Section 1 of the Act of May 11, 1866, declared that any act or omission under
authorized military order came within the purview of the sections of the act of 1863
which made acts or omissions under presidential order immune from civil and criminal
liability and allowed removal to the federal courts by defendants charged in state
courts in respect of such acts. 14 Stat. 46. The section was responsive to state court
decisions requiring that a defendant produce an order from the President himself in
order to come within the 1863 act. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1387 (March
14, 1866) (remarks of Representative Cook, who reported the bill, id. at 1368 (March
13, 1866), and was its floor manager, id. at 1387 (March 14, 1866)). Section 2 of the
1866 act specified the means by which the military order relied on might be proved.
Section 3 extended the time for removal up to the point of empaneling a jury in the
state court, and eliminated the 1863 requirement of a removal bond. Section 4 directed
that upon the filing of a proper removal petition all state proceedings should cease,
and that any state court proceedings after removal should be void and all parties,
judges, officers, or other persons prosecuting such proceedings should be liable for
damages and double costs to the removing party. 14 Stat. 46. Section 5 directed
the clerk of the state court to furnish copies of the state record to a party seeking
to remove, and permitted that party to docket the removed case in the federal court
without attaching the state record in case of refusal or neglect by the state court
clerk. 14 Stat. 46. These latter provisions were intended to alter procedural requirements upon which the state courts had seized to obstruct removal. E.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1387-88 (March 14, 1866) (remarks of Representative Cook), 2054 (remarks of Senator Clark, who reported the bill, id. at 1753
(April 4, 1866), and was its floor manager, id. at 1880 (April 11, 1866)).

118 14 Stat. 385.

119 The act was reported by the Judiciary Committee in each house. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4096 (July 24, 1866) (House), 4116 (Senate). Its
purpose was to take from state custody defendants whose cases had been removed
into the federal courts, id. at 4096 (July 25, 1866) (remarks of Representative Wilson,
who reported the bill and was its floor manager, ibid.); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess. 729 (Jan. 25, 1867) (remarks of Senator Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, who reported the bill, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 4116 (July 24,
1866), and was its floor manager, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 729 (Jan. 25,
1867) ), and thereby to permit the federal court to determine the validity of the defendantes detention under the arrest, ibid. (remarks of Senator Johnson).
It should be remembered that the civil rights removal provisions of the Act of
April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, pp. 810-11 supra, adopted the procedures of the
1863 removal sections "and all acts amendatory thereof."
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to take to the jail of that county two persons who were
arrested and held as notorious guerrillas. While executing
this order the persons in charge of these guerrillas, in order
to prevent their attempted escape, were obliged to fire at
them; and by that volley one of the guerrillas was killed
and the other wounded. The persons who took part in that
transaction have been indicted by the grand jury of the county
for murder in the first degree; and one or two of them, in
order to avoid trial and the conviction which they regarded
as inevitable in1 20that county, have been compelled to escape
from the State.

On July 25, 1866, Representative Lawrence of Ohio explicitly referred to Shellabarger's resolution of the preceding December in reporting from the House Judiciary Committee the bill which was subsequently to be enacted as the habeas corpus Act of February 5, 1867,
chapter 28. Questioned concerning a passage in the bill which excluded from its operation certain military prisoners, he said:
Mr. LAWRENCE, of Ohio. I will explain. On the 19th
of December last, my colleague [Mr. SHELLABARGER] introduced a resolution instructing the Judiciary Committee to
inquire and report to the House as soon as practicable, by
bill or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the
courts of the United States to enforce the freedom of the
wife and children of soldiers of the United States, and also to
enforce the liberty of all persons. Judge Ballard, of the district
court of Kentucky, decided that there was no act of Congress
giving courts of the United States jurisdiction to enforce the
rights and liberties of such persons. In pursuance of that
resolution of my colleague this bill has been introduced, the
effect of which is to enlarge the privilege of the writ of
hobeas [sic] corpus, and make the jurisdiction of the courts
and judges of the United States coextensive with all the
powers that can be conferred upon them. It is a bill of the
largest liberty, and does not interfere with persons in military
custody, or restrain the writ of habeas corpus at all. I am
satisfied there will not be a solitary objection to this bill if it
is understood by the House. 2

The bill passed the House without further explanation.
In
the Senate it was reported by Senator Trumbull from his Judiciary
Committee.'2 3 As in the House, the question was raised of the bill's
120

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1426 (March 15, 1866).
at 4151 (July 25, 1866).

12, Id.

122 Ibid.
123

Id. at 4228 (July 27, 1866).

1965]

REMOVAL AND HABEAS CORPUS

exception of military prisoners from its scope.124
replied:

Senator Trumbull

I will state to the Senator from Kentucky, which he is
probably aware of, that the habeas corpus act of 1789, to
which this bill is an amendment, confines the jurisdiction of
the United States courts in issuing writs of habeas corpus
to persons who are held under United States laws. Now, a
person might be held under a State law in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and he ought to
have in such a case the benefit of the writ, and we agree that
he ought to have recourse to United States courts to show
that he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 25
This was the only discussion of the bill's substance in the upper house.
The Senate passed it with a procedural amendment in which the House
concurred without debate. 2 6
Floor discussion of the act of 1867 was thus quite limited. But its
proponents told the Congress all that seemed necessary when they
explained its purpose to give "recourse to the United States courts"
in cases of federally illegal detention, and to expand the habeas corpus
jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. There was no need to canvass
again the many reasons why the state courts could not be trusted to
enforce federal rights, or the many needs for a supervening, imperative
federal judicial remedy. Those matters had recently been debated
extensively in consideration of the Act of May 11, 1866, supra. The
condition of affairs in the state courts was well known. "Now, it so
happens, as the rebellion is passing away, as the rebel soldiers and
officers are returning to their homes, that I may say thousands of suits
are springing up all through the land, especially where the rebellion
prevailed, against the loyal men of the country who endeavored to put
the rebellion down." 127 "[S]uits are springing up from one end to
4229 (remarks of Senator Davis of Kentucky).
12 5Id. at 4229.
128 Senator Johnson, who favored the bill, showed concern over the absence of
territorial limitations on the power of the federal judges to issue habeas corpus.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (Jan. 25, 1867). To meet his objection,
the bill was amended to restrict the habeas grant to the courts and judges "within
their respective jurisdictions." Id. at 790 (Jan. 28, 1867). It was so passed by the
Senate, ibid., and the House concurred in the amendment without debate, id. at 899
(Jan. 31, 1867).
-127 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2021 (April 18, 1866) (remarks of Senator
Clark). The excerpts of debate cited in this and notes 128-34 infra are on consideration of the Act of May 11, 1866, pp. 820-21 supra. Senator Clark reported and
managed the bill which became the act. Note 117 supra.
The oppressive volume of state litigation against Union men was frequently noted
in debate. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1880 (April 11, 1866) (remarks
of Senator Clark), 1983 (April 17, 1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull, Chairman
124Id. at
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the other; and these rebel courts are ready to decide against your
Union men and acquit the rebel soldier." 128 "A great many vexatious
suits have been brought, and they are still pending, and instances have
been known-they exist now-where Federal officers have been pushed
very hard and put to great hardships and expense, and sometimes
convicted of crime, for doing things which were right in the line of
duty, and which they were ordered to do and which they could not
refuse to do." "s In Kentucky, "they are harassing, annoying, and
of the Judiciary Committee). It was said that there were over 3000 cases pending
in Kentucky alone. Id. at 1526, 1529 (March 20, 1866) (remarks of Representative
McKee, of Kentucky), 1983 (April 17, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark), 2021
(April 18, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark), 2054 (April 20, 1866) (remarks of
Senator Wilson).
128 Id. at 2021 (April 18, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark).
MId. at 1880 (April 11, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark). Recognition that
the cost of defending suits and prosecutions might itself be ruinous to defendant
Union men found strong expression in the comments of Senators Edmunds, id. at
2063, 2064 (April 20, 1866), and Howe, id. at 2064, in debate of an amendment offered
by Edmunds providing that the Secretary of War should defend all actions within
the scope of the bill at government expense, and should indemnify the individual
defendant for damages, costs, fines, and expenses. The amendment was opposed on
the ground that it would overburden the Government's financial resources, encourage
litigation, encourage collusive actions, result in larger jury verdicts in damage actions,
and that defendants could be adequately protected by private indemnifying bills. Both
Edmunds' amendment and one by Howe providing for government defense of removed
actions, were defeated. Id. at 2064-66. Apart from questions of expense, the injury
to state-court defendants resulting from delay in the vindication of their federal rights
was pointed up by the debate between Senators Doolittle and Hendricks, who opposed
the provision making state judges civilly liable for proceeding after removal of a
cause to the federal court, and Senators Stewart and Clark, who supported it.
Senator Doolittle said that it should not be presumed state judges would flout the
federal removal statute. Senator Stewart asked, in effect, what relief there was for
an indicted defendant if the state court did flout removal, pointing out that a state
judge could force an indictment to trial even without the cooperation of the state
prosecutor:
Mr. HENDRICKS. The Senator as a lawyer knows that this will be the
effect of it: if the application takes away the jurisdiction of the State courts
then the remedy, of course, if the plaintiff persists in the case, is in the appellate courts, and finally, on an appeal, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, inasmuch as the validity of this law, an act of Congress, would be in
question.
Mr. STEWART. But suppose the judge goes on and convicts the man and
sends him to the pentitentiary, he must lie there until the case can be heard
in the Supreme Court, three or four years hence.
Mr. DooLIrTLE. How can he send him to the pentitentiary? No officer
is allowed to do it. Will the judge put him there himself?
Mr. STEWART. The judge can order the officer to put him there.
Mr. DooLITTLE. What if he does if the officer cannot put him there?
If every officer to execute a decree of the court is made responsible, how
can the judge do it?
Mr. STEWART. The judge has jurisdiction over the officer, and he can
order him to do it, and if he does not do it the judge can call upon the power
of the State if he has jurisdiction.
Mr. CLARK. I desire to make but one suggestion in answer to the Senator
from Wisconsin, and that is one of fact. He says if it were necessary that
these judges should be proceeded against he would not object. I hold in my
hand a communication from a member of the other House from Kentucky,
in which he says that all the judicial districts of Kentucky, with the exception
of one, are in the hands of sympathizing judges. They entirely disregard the
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even driving out of the State the men who stood true to the flag by
suits under the legislation and judiciary rulings of Kentucky. There
no protection is guaranteed to a Federal soldier." 130 "[I]n another
county of that State the grand jury indicted every Union judge,
sheriff, and clerk of the election of August, 1865. In addition to that
every loyal man who had been in the Army and had, under the order
of his superior officer, taken a horse, was indicted." 131 Discrimination
against the Union' men "is the rule in Kentucky, except in one solitary
district, and the Legislature at its last session inaugurated means of
removing that judge, simply because he dared to carry out this act of
the Federal Congress [the 1863 removal statute]." 132 "There must be
some way of remedying this crying evil, and these men who have been
engaged in the defense of the country cannot be permitted to be
persecuted in this sort of way. Their life becomes hardly worth having,
if, after having driven the rebels out of their country and subdued
them, those rebels are to be permitted to return and harass them from
morning until night and from night till morning, and make their life
a curse for that very defense which they have given your country." 13
It is impossible to read these debates of the Thirty-ninth Congress
without concluding that the federal legislators were intensely aware of
the hostility and anti-Union prejudice of the Southern state courts 134
and of the use of state court proceedings to harass those whom the
Union had an obligation to protect.
act to which this is an amendment They refuse to allow the transfer, and
proceed against these men as if nothing had taken place. Here is not the
assumption that these judges will not do this; here is the fact that they do not
do it, and it is necessary that these men should be protected.
Id. at 2063 (April 20, 1866). Senators Stewart and Clark prevailed in the vote on
an amendment seeking to strike the provision making the state judges liable. Ibid.
1301d. at 1526 (March 20, 1866) (remarks of Representative McKee, of Kentucky).
131Id. at 1527 (remarks of Representative Smith, of Kentucky); see id. at
1526 (remarks of Representative McKee, of Kentucky).
132 Id. at 1526; see id. at 2063 (April 20, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark).
133 Id. at 2054.
134 E.g., id. at 1526 (March 20, 1866) (remarks of Representative McKee, of
Kentucky), 1527 (remarks of Representatives Garfield and Smith, of Kentucky),
1529 (remarks of Representative Cook, who reported the bill and was its floor manager, see note 117 supra), 2054, 2063 (April 20, 1866) (remarks of Senator Clark).
Clark pointed out that hostile state legislatures could not be looked to for redress
of the discriminations practiced by hostile state judges. Id. at 2054. The only relief
for the Union men was access to the federal courts: "There is where they are most
likely to have their rights protected. There is where local prejudices are frowned
down." Id. at 1526 (March 20, 1866) (remarks of Representative McKee, of Kentucky) ; see id. at 1528 (remarks of Representative Smith, of Kentucky), 1529-30
(remarks of Representative Cook) ; cf. id. at 1387 (March 14, 1866) (remarks of
Representative Cook). See also the debates on the amendatory freedmen's bureau
bills: id. at 320 (Jan. 19, 1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull), 339 (Jan. 22, 1866)
(remarks of Senator Cresswell), 744 (Feb. 8, 1866) (remarks of Senator Sherman),
941 (Feb. 20, 1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull), 657 (Feb. 5, 1866) (remarks
of Representative Eliot), 2774-77 (May 23, 1866) (remarks of Representative Eliot).
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Three and four years later, Congress enacted the Second and
Third Civil Rights Acts. 35 The 1870 statute was concerned principally with enforcing the fifteenth amendment; it declared the right
of all otherwise qualified citizens to vote without racial discrimination, 136 penalized various acts of interference with the exercise of the
franchise, 137 and created federal civil and criminal jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the act.'
In its sixteenth and seventeenth sections, it reenacted with some extensions the first and second sections
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; ' and in its eighteenth section, it
reenacted by reference the whole of the 1866 act, "sections sixteen and
seventeen hereof [to] . . . be enforced according to the provisions of

said act." 140 The 1871 statute also adopted the remedial provisions
of the 1866 act, but put them to broader uses, enacting in its first
section:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress;
such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or
circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies
provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of
the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixtysix, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their
vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases."'
13 5 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
17 Stat 13.
136 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat 140.
137 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§2-7, 16 Stat 140.
138Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §8, 16 Stat 142.
13 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16-17, 16 Stat 144. Section 1 of the 1866
act is set out in note 77 supra. Section 2 of that act is described in note 82 supra.
140 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
141 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. These provisions are carried
forward in part in present 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958) ; REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). Section 2 of the 1871 act, 17 Stat 13, imposed criminal liability
for conspiracies to overthrow the Government of the United States, oppose its authority
by force, hinder the execution of its laws by force, intimidation or threat, etc.; to
deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws, prevent or hinder state authorities from
securing to all persons the equal protection of the laws, impede, hinder, obstruct, or
defeat the due course of justice in any State, with intent to deny any citizen the
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The legislative background of the statute is canvassed in the opinions
in Monroe v. Pape,42 where the Court concluded that its purpose was
the creation of a broad civil rights jurisdiction superseding state
judicial processes without respect to exhaustion of state remedies,
"because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." 141
Again in 1871, Congress amended the Second Civil Rights Act of 1870
by adding extensive provisions for the enforcement of voting rights,
and in so doing authorized removal of suits or prosecutions against
1 44
officers or persons acting under the amendatory statute.
In 1875 the last major Civil Rights Act of the century was passed,
purporting to assure Negroes equal access to places of public accommodation and containing, like its predecessors, jurisdictional provisions which made the federal trial courts the agencies of its enforcement. 145 In the same year the Judiciary Act created general federal
question jurisdiction in original and removed civil actions 140 and
thereby for the first time wrote permanently into national law the
provision of a federal trial forum for every litigant engaged in a significant civil controversy based on a claim arising under the federal
constitution and laws.147 The Revised Statutes of 1875 thus carried
forward extensive new grants of federal trial jurisdiction created
during the preceding dozen years, among them the civil rights removal
statutes codified with some change of language in section 641,148 and
due and equal protection of the laws, etc.

Any person injured by an act in further-

ance of such conspiracies was given a right of civil action for damages, "such action
to be prosecuted in the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with
and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies
provided in like cases in such courts under the provisions of the act of April ninth,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication."' 17 Stat
14. These latter provisions are carried forward in part in 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958) ;
28 U.S.C. § 1343(1), (2) (1958) ; REv. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1958).
142365 U.S. 167 (1961).
14 3 Id. at 180. The purpose of the 1871 act to provide a federal forum for the

vindication of federal civil rights notwithstanding failure to exhaust state remedies
was reaffirmed in McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (alternative
ground).
144 Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 16, 16 Stat. 438.
145 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
146 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470.
147 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (1958).
148 SEc. 641. When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in
any State court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is denied
or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the part of the
State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right secured to him by
any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, or against any
officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment or
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the 1867 habeas corpus statute codified with some change of language
in sections 751 to 753.49 These provisions were to remain substantially unchanged thereafter.'."
B. The Pattern of Federalism in Matters of Civil Rights
From this sweep of history it appears the Civil War radically
altered the view which the national legislature had previously taken,
that generally the state legislatures, courts, and executive officials were
the sufficient protectors of the rights of the American people. The
assumption was abandoned that the state courts were the normal place
for enforcement of federal law save in rare and narrow instances where
they affirmatively demonstrated themselves unfit or unfair. Now the
federal courts were seen as the needed organs, the ordinary and natural
agencies, for the administration of federal rights. This is apparent
in the grant of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875.151 But
it is in the realm of civil rights, prime concern of the Reconstruction
Congresses and to them the patent sempiternal battleground of state
and national authority, that the reversal of attitude was complete and
completely expressed in law. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments wrote into the Constitution broad new guarantees of
liberty and equality in which the federal government committed itself
to protect the individual against the States. The four major civil
rights acts undertook to elaborate and effectively establish the new
other trespasses or wrongs, made or committed by virtue of or under color
of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid, or
for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law, such suit or prosecution may, upon the petition of such defendant,
filed in said State court at any time before the trial or final hearing of the
cause, stating the facts and verified by oath, be removed, for trial, into the next
circuit court to be held in the district where it is pending. Upon the filing
of such petition all further proceedings in the State courts shall cease, and
shall not be resumed except as hereinafter provided.
REv. STAT. §641 (1875).

149 The Revised Statutes carry forward substantially unchanged the language of
the jurisdictional grants of 1789, 1833, 1842, and 1867. REV. STAT. §§ 751-53 (1875).
150 In 1911, in the course of abolishing the old circuit courts, Congress technically repealed REv. STAT. §641 (Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, §297, 36 Stat.
1168), but carried its provisions forward without change (except that removal jurisdiction was given the district courts in lieu of the circuit courts) as § 31 of the Judicial
Code (Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096). Section 31 verbatim
became 28 U.S.C. § 74 (1940), and in 1948, with changes in phraseology, it assumed
its present form as 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958), pp. 842-43 inlra. The reviser's note to
§ 1443 indicates that no substantive changes were intended. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A134 (1947).
REV. STAT. §§ 751-53 remained basically unchanged until recodified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1958), pp. 882-83 htfra, in 1948. The reviser's note to the 1948 revision indicates
that again the changes in phraseology intended no substantive change. H.R. REP.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A177-78 (1947). The alteration of the stay procedure
in 1934 and the addition in 1948 of present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), are discussed at
pp. 902-04 infra.
151 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREmE CoURT 64-65 (1928).
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liberties and, significantly, each of the acts contained jurisdictional
provisions making the federal courts the front line of federal protection.
Power was given those courts in civil actions to enjoin or redress
every deprivation by the States of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution," using every remedial device known to
federal law.152 Habeas corpus, "the most celebrated writ in the
English law," 153 "the great and efficacious writ in all manner of
illegal confinement," '-" was given the federal judges "in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law." "I "It is impossible to
widen this jurisdiction." ' No longer chary of interfering in state
criminal prosecutions which had proved potent instruments of harassment, Congress enacted criminal removal statutes in 1863 and 1866
covering cases arising out of the War, in 1864 and 1866 covering
cases arising out of enforcement of the wartime revenue acts, in 1866
covering cases of all persons prosecuted for acts under color of
authority of civil rights law and all persons who could not enforce
their newly given civil rights in the state courts, in 1871 covering
voting enforcement cases. Indeed, in 1866, it took the extraordinary
step of opening the federal courts to original criminal prosecutions
under state law where the prosecutions affected persons who could not
enforce those rights in the state courts. 15 7
The sum of this legislation is eloquent as respects the meaning
of its parts. I shall come to detailed questions of statutory construction in the next two sections of this Article. The questions are
difficult, and I am not confident of their answers. But I come disposed to resolve fair doubts in favor of the assumption of federal
trial jurisdiction and its timely, efficacious exercise to protect the
freedoms secured against state action by the post-War amendments.
Ample extension of such protective jurisdiction was the critical concern of the Reconstruction Congresses. In matters of civil rights, it
was their considered resolution of the federal problem. One may
agree or disagree with their conception of the appropriate relationship
152 Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, text accompanying note 141 mpra.
See also the broad authorization of REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958),
deriving from § 3 of the First Civil Rights Act, text accompanying note 77 mtpra;
Lefton v. Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d
401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961) ; Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153
(8th Cir. 1961).
1533 BLACKSTONF, COMMENTARIES *129.

at 154.
155 Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
109-10 supra.
16 Ex parte McCardle, 73
157 Section 3 of the First
see Blyew v. United States, 80
1Id.

ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat 385, text accompanying notes
U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 326 (1867).
Civil Rights Act, text accompanying note 77 supra;
U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1871).
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of the Nation and the States. Nonetheless, under the Constitution
Congress is given primary responsibility ...for designing the shape
of American federalism and for defining the role of the federal courts
in effectuating its goals.'
This responsibility forbids winking away
the plain nationalizing purposes of the Reconstruction legislation, even
on the firm conviction-which the Supreme Court has sometimes not
quite managed to conceal '8 --that bad Tad Stevens and his rads were
a bit of a transient aberration not to be taken seriously.
The bad Tad attitude must be constantly guarded against because
it is insidious and the more persuasive as it remains the less conscious.
Doubtless it has had its effect on judicial developments, but I do not
pretend to write off on so simple a ground the series of Supreme Court
decisions beginning in the 1880's and continuing into the twentieth
century which severely restrained the exercise of the several federal
civil rights jurisdictions. The restrictive construction of the civil
rights removal statute in the Rives-Powers opinions 181 and the expanding development of the exhaustion doctrine-that modem-day alias
and pluries 182 of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction-following Ex
parte Royall '6 are aspects of a more general reluctance of the Court
to allow federal judicial involvement in state criminal administration
until state prosecutions have gone to ultimate conclusion in the state
courts.'
Clearly, there are excellent, often compelling, reasons for
the reluctance.
Most important is that leaving federal defensive issues to the
state criminal courts in the first instance gives those courts a promising
opportunity for partnership in the administration of federal law. Hopefully, engagement in that partnership will cause the state courts to look
upon the developing register of federal protections to the individual
less as alien decrees imposed from distant Washington and more as
158 U.S. CONST. arts. I, III, § 1, amend. XIV, § 5.
159 Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to intrude the federal
courts into matters of state concern are not involved in the constructions I would
put on the federal removal and habeas corpus statutes. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U.S. 257 (1879) ; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
1.0 For an example of this attitude, see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656-58

(1951).

161 See pp. 843-50 infra.
162 See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135, describing the early alias and
pluries practice among the "many . . . vexatious shifts" obstructing the function
of the great writ prior to the Habeas Corpus Act.
163 117 U.S. 241 (1886); see pp. 887-89 infra.
164 See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (disallowing federal

injunction of threatened state prosecutions claimed to infringe the plaintiffs' federal
rights of free speech and religion) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951);
Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963)

(disallowing federal suppression of evidence

claimed obtained in violation of federal rights and proposed to be offered at state
criminal trial) ; Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (requiring that a federal
district court, asked to hold state criminal laws federally unconstitutional, abstain
pending testing of the construction and validity of the laws in the state courts).
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indispensable conditions for the integrity of local justice, for which
they bear responsibility.61 Considering federal guarantees, as the state
courts must, in conjunction with cognate state-law guarantees, those
courts may be impelled to developments of state law which give better
than federal constitutional protection.1 6 Developments of this nature
are essential to the evolution of civilized state criminal administration,
for, in many of its restrictions upon the state criminal process, the
federal constitution purports only to guarantee against outright
barbarism."6 7
Denying federal intervention into unconcluded state criminal proceedings also avoids possibly unnecessary decisions of federal constitutional law. 1 Some number of cases will be resolved in defendants'
favor on informal or state-law grounds in the state process, and in
still other cases the course of state proceedings will simplify or narrow
federal issues. The same state winnowing process will decrease the
bulk volume of litigation with which the federal courts must occupy
themselves. And it will thereby decrease the number of potential
points of friction between the federal courts and state authorities.
Finally, it is undeniable that the interlocutory intrusion of federal
process may be used or abused by state criminal defendants to disrupt
orderly state proceedings. Federal removal procedure is particularly
susceptible of this sort of abuse, since by filing a removal petition,
defense counsel can unilaterally stop the state prosecution in its
tracks.'69 Filed on the eve of trial,' the petition is a relatively sure
165 Cf. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners, 32 F.R.D. 88, 93-98
(1963).
166See the encouraging decision of a division of the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964), reversing conviction of
a white civil rights worker on grounds of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
jury list
The decision appears to be put on both state and federal grounds.
167 Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1961). The progressing
incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment, of course,
makes it somewhat less true, even in theory, that the due process clause embodies
only minimum standards of justice. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), with Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). But the Bill of Rights
guarantees themselves frequently enforce substantially lower standards of criminal
administration than enlightened procedure allows, e.g., in matters of speedy trial or
competency of counsel.
168 See the discussion and authorities collected in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
502-05 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) ; cf. Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 115 (1960).
169Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1958), filing of a removal petition with the
appropriate federal district court, followed by filing of a copy of the petition with
the clerk of the state court and service of a notice of removal on the opposing party
ousts the state court of jurisdiction without action by the federal judge. See, e.g.,
Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 842 (1957) ; Adair
Pipeline Co. v. Local 798, Pipeliners Union, 325 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1963). Filing
of a federal habeas corpus petition, by contrast, does not affect the validity of subsequent state court proceedings against the petitioner, unless the federal judge entertaining the petition orders those proceedings stayed. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1958).
170 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1958), a removal petition in a criminal case
may be filed at any time before state trial.
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bet for at least a short continuance, at the expense of any certainty
in the state court calendar.
These are considerations of moment to which I have only partially satisfying answers. The danger of improper disruption of
state by federal process is not so great in federal habeas corpus as in
removal, because the pendency of a federal habeas petition does
not effect the state proceedings unless and until the federal judge
entertaining the petition acts affirmatively to issue a stay. 7' If the
bounds of the federal anticipatory habeas jurisdiction can be defined
with tolerable clarity, and made to turn on as few and as easily
litigable issues of fact as possible, the likelihood that stays will issue
in any substantial number of cases not rightfully within those bounds
is slight, for the federal district judges are ordinarily anxious to
avoid unnecessary interference with the state courts. As for the
unilateral power to stop state proceedings given to defendants by
federal removal procedure, the danger of abuse is to some extent
inherent in the procedure and not markedly increased by broadening
the scope of the removal jurisdiction. So long as any civil rights
removal jurisdiction remains on the statute books, however narrowly
construed, resourceful counsel will file petitions in some cases without
(but arguably within) the jurisdiction, and unscrupulous counsel will
file petitions in cases still further out. The practice is difficult to
police, because the possibility that the Supreme Court at any time may
overturn old books and broaden the scope of the jurisdiction effectively insulates petition-filing counsel from charges of professional
impropriety, and imposition of costs is an insignificant deterrent where
considerable numbers of removal petitioners are rightfully proceeding
Here again, as with habeas corpus, the best
in forma pauperis. 7 2
bulwark against abuse is the clearest practicable definition of the scope
of the federal jurisdiction, coupled with procedures in the federal
courts which assure a quick ruling on removability and remand of
cases not properly removed. The risk of unjustified state court disruption remains, but it is a risk perfectly obvious and obviously acceptable as the least of evils to the Congress which enacted the automatic
stay procedure. In civil rights removal cases Congress has recently
signified its willingness to accept the risk of substantial delays to state
73
proceedings by expressly affirming the appealability of remand orders.
171 See note 169 mipra.

17228 U.S.C. § 1915 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. IL, 1961).
The Fifth Circuit has recently held-rightly, I think, for the reasons stated in its
opinion-that no filing fee or cost bond is required in criminal removal cases. Lefton
v. Hattiesburg, 333 F2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
173 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 901, 78 Stat. 266, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(1958), expressly to authorize appellate review of remand orders in cases removed
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With regard to those undesirable results which, it may be
thought, will likely follow the suppositious increase in volume of
federal litigation if the scope of federal interlocutory intrusion is
broadened-congestion in the federal courts, premature federal constitutional decision, greater incidence of federal-state friction-certain
unknown factors affect the underlying dire prognoses. The decision
whether federal judicial proceedings should be permitted to abort
prospective or pending state prosecutions is not, of course, a choice
between interlocutory federal litigation and no federal litigation. It is
a choice between various forms of interlocutory federal litigation and
litigation in the form of United States Supreme Court review of state
17 4
conviction proceedings and/or federal postconviction habeas corpus.
By delaying the exercise of federal jurisdiction until the termination of
state court proceedings, the federal courts are undeniably disembarrassed of whatever number of prosecutions end favorably to the defendant in the state courts. This number is a function of uncertain
probabilities, and there is reason to suspect that the state-court probabilities are strongly stacked against the defendants in prosecutions
under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958). Prior to the 1964 act, it was commonly believed that
remand orders in criminal cases removed under § 1443 were within the broad appeal
bar of § 1447(d). See Lusky 1189-90. Arguably, that belief was wrong because
(1) various savings clauses exclude civil rights removals from the appeal bar;
and (2) the appeal bar does not apply in criminal removal cases. Argument (1)
was rejected in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), where the
Fourth Circuit overlooked, see id. at 597, sections 294 and 297 of the Judicial Code
of 1911, 36 Stat. 1167, 1169. Argument (2) is summarized in AMsTERDAm 147-49,
and both arguments (1) and (2) are fully developed in Brief for Respondents
Rachel et al. in Opposition, Georgia v. Tuttle, 377 U.S. 987 (1964), following filing
of which the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the
Fifth Circuit from hearing a criminal civil rights removal appeal.
The risk and inconvenience of disrupting state proceedings during the possibly
extended period of appeal from a remand order was vigorously argued to Congress
by the opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, e.g., 110 CONG. Ruc. 1517-20 (Feb. 1,
1964) (remarks of Representative Tuck), and the argument evidently failed.
174The evolution from Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1890), through Justice
Holmes' dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915), through Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), through Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944),
through Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), to Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
has now arrived at the point where it is clear that all federal defenses available to
a state criminal defendant and not intentionally waived by him in the state prosecution, see Henry v. Mississippi, 85 Sup. Ct. 564 (1965), may be raised on postconviction federal habeas corpus. This development is traced in e.g., AMSTERDAM
204-16; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963) ; Brennan, Judicial Supervision of Criminal
Law Administration, 9 CRIME & DELiNQgENCY 227 (1963) ; Brennan, Federal Habeas
Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961);
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Tern,
73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 101-21 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961); Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REV. 461 (1960) ;
Note, The Freedon Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARv.
L. REv. 657 (1948) ; Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation
Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78 (1964). The Supreme Court's opinions in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), are exhaustive.
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arising out of activities which arguably claim federal civil rights
protection.1 5 The federal courts are also disembarrassed of the cases
in which, by reason of the hardships and vicissitudes of state court
litigation, 76 the state criminal defendant is exhausted before his state
court remedies are. Obviously, this sort of disembarrassment is no
justification for delay in federal remedial action; it is the strongest
reason for action without delay. True, by delay the federal courts may
sometimes be relieved of the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing
in cases which end unfavorably to the defendant since, under present
practice, a postconviction federal habeas corpus court is authorized to
rely on the state court transcript wherever its petitioner received a "full
and fair evidentiary hearing" in the state court.177 I tend to doubt the
propriety of this practice generally 1s and, again, I am more than a
little skeptical concerning the number of state prosecutions for arguably
fourteenth-amendment protected activity in which an appropriately
solicitous federal district judge could conclude with some assurance
that the state trial was "full and fair." However this may be, the
argument that delayed federal relief diminishes the volume of federal
litigation leaves out of account the strong possibility that many
prosecutions which now pass through the state courts to the Supreme
Court or into federal habeas corpus would never be brought if the
prosecutor knew that they would have to be tried, in whole or in
part, in the first instance in a federal district court. Prosecutions
maintained for harassment or public relations purposes are not likely to
be pressed where it appears they will be quickly and definitively lost;
and it is not so comfortable or convenient for the prosecutor to take
his case to the district courthouse as to the justice of the peace or
state circuit court across the hall. The extent to which an anticipatory
federal jurisdiction would repress the commencement of prosecutions
that should not responsibly be brought 17 9 is, of course, speculative;
but I am not prepared to assume that the decrease in litigation-and
1 5 See pp. 800-02 supra.
176 See pp. 796-99 supra.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
178 See note 193 infra.
179 Of course, the relative inconvenience of proceeding in a federal district court
might also repress some prosecutions whose institution and maintenance are well
justified. This does not seem to me a considerable argument against anticipatory
federal jurisdiction. On the whole, the prosecution holds the great balance of advantage throughout criminal proceedings, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960) ; the decision
177

to prosecute is made by the State at far less cost than it entails to the defendant; to
increase this cost somewhat in a limited class of cases potentially deserving federal
protection, while leaving the ultimate decision to the prosecutor's enlightened selfinterest, is not an unreasonable price to pay for the extension of a protective federal
jurisdiction otherwise deemed advisable for the protection of substantial federal rights.
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in federal constitutional decision-which might thereby come about is
insufficient to counterbalance whatever increase is occasioned by the
exercise of the jurisdiction in some cases which would wash out in
the state court process.
Nor do I think it follows that, if the number of federal court
intrusions is increased by anticipatory action, federal-state friction is
necessarily increased. Not all intrusions are equally abrasive. The
diversity and federal question jurisdictions of the federal district courts
intrude considerably upon the state courts, and the assumptions supporting these jurisdictions are a quite unpleasant reflection on the
state judiciary."8
Yet state judges do not appear to be affronted
when a diversity or federal question case is tried in federal court.
Those sorts of cases are clearly, cleanly, and completely excluded from
the state courts' ken (at the election of a party); federal jurisdiction
is assumed without making waste time of prior state proceedings or
engaging in a touchy inquiry into whether the state judges did or
could fairly try and correctly decide issues before them. Postconviction federal habeas corpus, on the other hand, has been an
incessantly high-voltage source of irritation to the state courts. Much
of the irritation is due to the substantive law administered in the postconviction cases, and much to the consideration that whatever law
the federal courts administer operates against the august authority of
the State to deal with "criminals," but a good part of irritation comes,
too, from the postconviction timing of the writ: its characteristic as a
sporadic intermeddler into provinces which by habit, .blessed by the
exhaustion doctrine,' 8 ' the state courts regard as uniquely theirs; its
potential for obliterating solemn state judicial proceedings; its presumption in reviewing and holding in error the decisions of the state
judges."
I mean to express nothing stronger than conjecture in this
regard; however, it surely is not self-evident that a carefully delineated
180 See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
181 See pp. 884-92 infra.
1

82

The enduring grievance of state judges against federal habeas corpus has

been the "overruling" of state judicial decisions-particularly state appellate decisions
-by the federal trial judges. See, e.g., Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 18 Am. L. Rxv. 1 (1884); the resolution of the Conference of State Chief
Judges, quoted in Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of
Chief Justices, 1954, in H.R. Rx. No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1958) ; Report
of the Habeas Corpus Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United States, appended to H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1959) ; Testimony of Hon.
John Parker, Hearings on Habeas Corpus Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary,84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 4-5 (1955) ; Testimony of
Hon. Orie Phillips, Hearings on Habeas Corpus Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 20 (1959) ; Testimony of Hon. Luther Swygert, id. at 24; Testimony of Professor Louis Pollal,
id. at 28. See also Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 466, 513-16 (1960).
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anticipatory federal jurisdiction, working to remove early and entirely
from the state process " a class of criminal cases defined without
patent affront to the state courts and judges, would occasion greater
federal-state friction than do postconviction federal review and habeas
corpus.184

The argument which asserts the value of maintaining a partnership of state courts in the administration of federal rights is, I think,
the most persuasive and least easily rebutted objection to federal
judicial action anticipating state process. Nevertheless, enthusiasm
for the partnership as an ideal ought not to obscure recognition that
it is an ideal which state judges will never more than imperfectly
approximate-and probably more imperfectly than elsewhere in cases
where fourteenth amendment protection is invoked to insulate unpopular activity from the power of the States to restrain." 5 Stated
as an unqualified preference for state administration of federal law
which takes its shape within a matrix of state law regulation, the
argument evidently proves too much; for every congressionally created
federal trial jurisdiction constitutes to some extent a subordination
of that value to the values of federal law enforcement by nationally
responsible tribunals. And if it is true that constitutional restrictions
on the state criminal process present a particularly fertile field for
valuable interaction of federal and state law in the state courts, it is
also true that they present a particularly strong adversity of state and
federal interests, and hence a particularly strong risk that federal
rights will suffer if left in state hands.
The argument undoubtedly counsels caution in taking entirely
out of the state courts federal defensive contentions which become
isolable at interlocutory stages, particularly where those federal con183 Unlike the collateral sniping device condemned in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951), federal removal takes a case out of the state system before trial
and disposes of it definitively without return to the state courts. Anticipatory federal
habeas corpus, in the use recommended by this Article, see pp. 882-912 infra, tests the

authority of the State to proceed in the prosecution and thus also ends the matter
once for all by federal decree if the habeas petitioner succeeds. If he fails, he returns
to the state courts, which may then proceed without interruption in the matter.
184 Reporting in the Senate the bill which became the Force Act of 1833, see
pp. 806-07 supra, Senator Wilkins said of its removal provision: "It gives the right
to remove at any time before trial, but not after judgment had been given; and thus
affects in no way the dignity of the State tribunals." 9 CONG. DEB. 260 (Jan. 29,
1833). Cf. Senator Choate, in debate on the 1842 habeas corpus bill, p. 808 supra:
The single question submitted to the national tribunals . . . may as well
be extracted from the entire case, and presented and decided in those tribunals
before any judgment in the State court, as it can be revised afterwards, on
a writ of error. Either way, they pass on no other question. Either way,
they do not administer the criminal law of a State. In one case as much as
in the other, and no more, do they interfere with the State judicial power.
CoNG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 541 (May 1842).

185 See pp. 800-02 supra.
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tentions arise out of the state judicial procedures themselves (e.g.,
racial discrimination in jury selection, failure to accord the defendant
a speedy trial, jury prejudice by reason of inflammatory publicity).
However, where the federal contention is that the activity underlying
the criminal charges is federally immune from state inhibition, the
importance and the practicability of preserving a role for the state
courts as federal law enforcers are considerably diminished, and the
countervailing need for interlocutory federal intervention considerably
increased. If this sort of federal immunity is to be made reasonably
effective, the State must eventually relinquish or be deprived of the
power to begin criminal proceedings which repress it. Arrest, charge,
pretrial detention, or release on bond to compel appearance for hearing
are effective methods of repression even where the charge is dismissed
or dropped at the first court appearance. These repressive devices
can be disarmed only if the state prosecutor and the chief of police
can themselves be brought into the federal partnership, impressed with
their responsibility for the protection or at least the recognition of
federal guarantees. Ideally, the state justice of the peace or circuit
judge might impress them with this responsibility. But among state
judges he is the least likely and the least capable to do the job, however
prodded by his appellate superiors. The direct power of the state
appellate courts is limited in this regard, reaching the prosecutor only
some considerable time after he has secured his conviction, and the
police chief not at all. The likely willingness of the state appellate
courts to assume the function is also limited: their judgments on
particular federal issues and the general sensitivity to federal rights
which grows out of the sum of particular judgments-and out of
impressions concerning the factual contexts in which federal rights
operate-are the creatures of cold records shaped by the state trial
courts. For these reasons it is dubious wisdom to look to the state
court system for efficient schooling of the prosecutor and police chief
in their federal responsibilities; the necessary lesson can best be
transmitted through the knowledge that both may be required to
appear in a federal district court, at the outset of a prosecution, to
justify the charges within federal constitutional requirements. 6 Fed186 In saying this, and throughout this Article, I am not making the naive assumption that all federal district judges are appropriately sympathetic to the enforcement
of all or any federal rights. I am well aware that some are more hostile to certain
federal rights than the mine run of state judges; and, of course, there are individual
state judges who are more sensitive to federal rights than the mine run of the federal
district bench. Institutions must be designed in view of generalities; as a generality,
I have no doubt that the federal judges are more enlightened concerning, more tolerant
toward, and more courageous to protect, federal rights than are their state counterparts. And, were this not so now, the means by which federal and state judges
respectively are selected and educated give national concerns decidedly better likely
future audience in the national courts.
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eral anticipatory jurisdiction demands of the State's attorney that he
think in terms of federal law from the inception of proceedings, not
merely when he is called upon to sustain an easy conviction on
appeal; and it demands of the police chief that he appear and testify
before a court whose very authority in the case demonstrates the
immediacy of federal law.
Such an anticipatory federal jurisdiction would not, in any event,
strip the state courts of all cases within its scope. The jurisdiction
could be exercised only on application by the state defendant; substantial considerations of convenience would ordinarily discourage
application except where reason existed for defense counsel to fear
that federal claims would in fact receive short shrift from the state
judges."' I suppose that at the present time most civil rights lawyers
would take as many prosecutions as possible out of the southern state
courts-with good reason. Enough cases will certainly remain to
test the temper of those courts, and if their actions restore confidence
in the adequacy of state process, a balance will probably be struck at
what is in fact, as well as theory, concurrent state and federal trial
jurisdiction. Any estimate is guesswork: but again, the possibility
exists that in the long run this sort of concurrent jurisdiction would
provide a healthier climate for the growth of both state and federal
law in the state courts than would the entire exclusion of federal intervention at preliminary stages of the state process.
Let me stop here for summary and an aside. In the arguments
and counterarguments, speculations and counterspeculations of the immediately preceding pages, I have attempted to state and to evaluate
in a general and preliminary way all of the material objections to a
federal anticipatory jurisdiction.
The objections have substantial
thrust which will inevitably and properly affect interpretation of the
pertinent judiciary legislation, and to which I shall return later. But
on the whole, even when considered in isolation from the case in chief
for an anticipatory jurisdiction, these objections emerge without the
overwhelming force that one might expect them to display. Surely
the undisturbed functioning of the state criminal courts-that most
charismatic object of the federal mystique: .-- has some stronger
support than I have allowed it. Have I not understated its claims?
187 Transfer of the locus of trial to the nearest federal district courthouse is
ordinarily as great an inconvenience to the defense as to the prosecution. And it is
the defense which bears the paperwork burden of initiating the federal removal or
habeas corpus proceedings-a burden usually greater than that involved in disposing
of a petty prosecution informally in a tolerably sympathetic state court.
188 As good a recent example as any of the mystique is the framing of the
issue of removability in New York v. Galamison, Nos. 29166-75, 2d Cir., Jan. 26,
1965, at s.o. 965 [hereinafter cited to slip opinion (s.o.) page in short citation form],

1965]
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I think I have not; for while I admit having adopted a pair of
understating perspectives, I believe their use is wholly justified.
First, I have accepted as given the existence in its present form of postconviction federal review of state criminal judgments, both by the
Supreme Court and by the lower federal courts on habeas corpus.
Each of these methods of review has been assailed, time out of mind,
by varied, vociferous criticism. If they were again opened to debateif the question encompassed reconsideration root and branch of the
institution of federal review in state criminal cases-the spectrum of
argument over a federal anticipatory jurisdiction would of course be
broadened. It would then be in order to discuss the large issue
whether it is not too unseemly that a sovereign State, pursuing by its
highest officers a criminal against its own peace and dignity, should be
required to ask leave of a United States court to dispose of its
prisoner. But where federal questions are involved, at least since
1821 state criminal cases have been subject to the oversight of the
Supreme Court,"' and since the 1940's or 1950's, of the district
courts. 19 I am not going to reopen those decisions. 9 ' To the extent
that the fabled noli me tangere of the state criminal courts suffers by
recognition of the obvious embrace in which the federal judges already
hold state prosecutions, I prefer to forget the fable, not ignore the
embrace.
Of course, an anticipatory federal jurisdiction would to some extent tighten that embrace. Although it might occasion no increased
frequency of federal adjudication, it would increase federal judicial
involvement, federal presence, in the States' affairs. Precisely to the
discussed infra at notes 267-360. To Judge Friendly, "one choice [denying removal]
may somewhat impair expectations entertained by persons of good will whose objectives we admire, and the other [allowing removal], in our view, would do violence
to institutions and relations we hold equally dear, the continued efficient functioning
of which has far greater long-run importance to minorities than the special relief
here sought." Id. at 970. This latter allusion is thought self-explanatory; it is the
only arguably pertinent concept to escape analysis in a characteristically incisive
opinion. But escape analysis it does-and prevails.
189 See note 53 supra.
190 See note 174 su5pra.
191 First, like Margaret Fuller, I accept the universe. Second, I do not see how

American federalism, as it has evolved since the Civil War, could survive in any
universe which did not make some provision for the sort of thorough-going federal
court review of state criminal convictions which is presently supplied by "direct!'
Supreme Court review plus federal habeas corpus. Cf. Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, in 21 DicrioN RY OF AmERicAN BIOGRAPHY 417, 423 (Supp. 1, 1944). I
have elsewhere indicated my disagreement with Professor Bator in this regard. See
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 378,
379-80, 384-85 n.33 (1964) (discussing Bator, supra note 174). In my view, Bator
neglects the overriding purpose of the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, supra notes 109-11,
to give all state prisoners both a federal trial forum and access to the Supreme Court
for litigation of their federal claims, whatever those claims might be.
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extent that it serves the function of protecting federal liberties, it would
curb state independence, state sovereignty. So do the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments insofar as these are enforced. What
is at issue here is the balance to be struck between degrees of effectiveness in their enforcement and the impingment on state sovereignty
which varyingly effective degrees of enforcement entail.
Second, throughout these last pages, I have taken up a "show
me" method of argumentation whose effect is to throw the burden of
persuasion on the party objecting to federal intervention. In view of
the strong historical evidence of a hundred-year-old determination by
Congress to intervene, I have no doubt that is exactly where the
burden belongs. I can show concretely enough the need for federal
intervention, and am disposed to demand that any objections to it be
shown with some concreteness as well. Rumblings of a vague federal
armageddon are not dismaying; we have got to the point, I think, in
bearing of the ills we have, where it behooves us try the shape of
others that we know not of.
The ills we have-the reasons for a federal anticipatory jurisdiction-I have tried to put in microcosm in the hypothetical Mississippi prosecution described at the opening of this Article. There are
thousands of such prosecutions in the South today. There are fewer
outside the South, but not few. Today the defendants are Negroes.
Thirty years ago they were Jehovah's Witnesses or labor union
organizers. Sixty years ago, Orientals on the Coast. Before that, the
Unionists, the Cherokees-the condition is not of recent coinage.
These defendants depend on the federal constitution faute de
mieux. Its guarantees turn on questions of fact. The defendants are
tried in state courts, and the facts are found against them. It was
known that the facts would be found against them, and they are. If
this were an end of factfinding, the Constitution would be worthless.
Worthless is not too strong a word. I have given civil rights
demonstrators advice before a demonstration. I have told them what
I thought they might permissibly do within the limits marked by
Supreme Court decisions for the exercise of their liberties to assemble
and protest. Then I have told them that the cop might lie, the magistrate would believe the cop, and they had better steer far clear the
limits or have their bail premiums arranged. How should this result
be different? The magistrate is a familiar of the cops, but knows the
Supreme Court only through the newspapers.
For these reasons, doubtless the state court trial cannot be an
end of factfinding. After the ritual of state appeals, any imprisonment
of the defendants which the State is not wise enough to terminate
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prior to a federal habeas corpus hearing 192 will entitle them to a full
evidentiary trial of federal questions in the district court. Although
this last proposition is not now as clear in law as it should be," I
shall assume it to be accurate. How should that affect the advice I
give my demonstrators? Time is still entirely against them. They
must still steer far clear or face the immediate consequences.
The county attorney of a north Mississippi town presses charges
for a time under a handbill ordinance identical with one the Supreme
192 State prosecutors seem understandably loath to be tested in the federal district
courts. A classic recent example of avoidance is the Dresner litigation, involving
prosecution of ten freedom-riding clergymen for unlawful assembly, i.e., refusing to
leave a Tallahassee, Florida airport where their presence attracted hostile crowds.
Convicted in the Tallahassee Municipal Court and sentenced to $500 or sixty days,
the clergymen appealed to the circuit court for the county, which affirmed over federal
first amendment, equal protection, and commerce clause contentions. Further direct
review proceedings failed on procedural grounds, see Dresner v. City of Tallahassee,
375 U.S. 136 (1963) (questions of law certified to Florida Supreme Court), cert.
dismissed, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); the clergymen surrendered for service of sentence
and filed a federal habeas corpus petition; the district court denied relief on grounds
of failure to exhaust state remedies; the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard
an expedited appeal and modified the judgment to allow hearing on the claims raised
by the federal petition unless a state court discharged the petitioners or released
them on nominal bail within three days. "Dresner v. Stoutamire, No. 21802, 5th Cir.,
Aug. 5, 1964. Thereupon, the Municipal Court of Tallahassee sua sponte reconsidered
the sentences which it had imposed, reduced them to the time already served, and
discharged the prisoners, thus mooting the habeas proceeding.
193 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), restricts considerably the circumstances under which a federal postconviction habeas court can dispose of its petitioner's claims by relying on his state court record. Townsend nevertheless allows
the district judges "discretion" to refuse an independent evidentiary hearing whenever
they are satisfied that previous state court hearing of the issue has been full and fair.
See text accompanying note 177 supra. This position doubtless reflects the Court's
concern lest the district courts be flooded with prisoners' hearings. I share that
concern, but reluctantly think the position wrong, and that an evidentiary hearing is
required on every well-pleaded federal contention raising a factual dispute. I am
persuaded by the reasoning in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964) (holding that where a plaintiff who invokes the original
federal question jurisdiction of a United States District Court to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute is remitted to the state courts under the abstention doctrine,
he may return to the district court for trial de novo following adverse state court
decision) :
Limiting the litigant to review here [the Supreme Court] would deny him
the benefit of a federal trial court's role in constructing a record and making
fact findings. How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of
federal claims. "It is the typical, not the rare, case in which constitutional
claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual issues." Townsend v.
Samn, 372 U.S. 293, 312. "There is always in litigation a margin of error,
representing error in fact finding . . . ." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525. . . . The possibility of appellate review by this Court of a state court
determination may not be substituted, against a party's wishes, for his right
to litigate his federal claims fully in the federal courts.
I find inconvenience no answer against the imperative of this logic, and I fail to see
why it does not (1) compel a full evidentiary hearing following abstention (an issue
not posed in England) ; and (2) compel the same result in habeas corpus following
exhaustion of state remedies. A footnote in England seems to offer the explanation
that in habeas corpus, as distinguished from a civil federal question litigation, the
federal issues are "inthe first instance" for the state courts. Id. at 417 n.8. If this
is so, it is so by virtue of the exhaustion doctrine only; exhaustion, like abstention,
being a court-created practice to delay the exercise of a congressionally given jurisdiction.
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Court voided in 1938.'94 This will break the back of a boycott now,
put the civil rights leaders at a disadvantage in negotiations during
this summer; and when, in a few years, the ordinance is held invalid,
it will require two hours to convene the council and ordain a slightly
different one. The slightly different version is already in effect in a
machine-run municipality in a northern State. There the prosecutor
admits sotto voce that it is unconstitutional, but says he will continue
to enforce it for a time until a court tells him to stop. So, with the
closing date for voter registration five weeks off, he prosecutes
pamphleteers of the opposition party. I forego multiplying examples
and pass to possible remedies.

III.

REMOVAL

9

'

A. The Statute ""

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958) contains the recodified 19 civil
rights removal provisions based on the Act of April 9, 1866, chapter
31, § 3,1" as subsequently extended. The section reads:
§ 1443. Civil rights cases.
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the
defendant to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
194 1 have not by any means chosen the most shocking available examples.
See,
e.g., Aelony v. Pace, 32 U.S.L. W=an 2215 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 1963) (prosecution
on nonbailable capital charge of insurrection under the same statute held void on its
face by the Supreme Court in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)).
195 Removal is a procedure by which an entire litigation is taken from a state
trial court into a United States district court, where it proceeds for virtually all
purposes as though it were a litigation initially commenced in the federal court.
The posture of the parties, the nature of the issues, and, in general, the law applied
to the controversy remain the same as they would have been if the case were tried
in the state court. For discussion of the nature of the jurisdiction and of the minor
choice-of-law problems raised by REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958),

and FaD. R. CRim. P. 54(b) (1), see

AmSTRPDAm

45-52.

196 The extant removal provisions of the Judicial Code are collected in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-50 (1958). See note 51 supra. It is possible that in a rare handful of criminal prosecutions coming within the concerns of this Article removal might be sought
under § 1442(a) (1), survivor of the aged federal-revenue-officer removal statutes,
pp. 806-10 supra, which were broadly enlarged in 1948 to reach any
civil action or criminal prosecution . . . against . . .
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any
right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
Apart from this handful-characterized by the colorable involvement of a federal
officer and too rare to merit further discussion-the only serviceable section is § 1443.
197 See notes 148, 150 supra.
198 See pp. 810-11 supra.
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(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot
enforce in the courts of such State a right under any
law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction
thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived
from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing
to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
938.)
Obviously, here is a text of exquisite obscurity.
B. The Cases
The removal provision which is now subsection 1443 (1) first
reached the Supreme Court in 1880.'
Strauder v. West Virginia2
sustained its constitutionality and held that under it a sufficient case
for removal was stated by the petition of a Negro indicted for murder
in a West Virginia court, which alleged that by reason of an 1873
West Virginia statute restricting eligibility for jury service to white
males, Negroes were excluded from grand and petit juries in the
courts of that State. This seems a plausible enough case of a person
"denied" or who "cannot enforce" his civil rights. But surely the
result is not evident under the statute. Strauder's removal petition
was filed (as it had to be) before state trial; 201 it was sufficient, if ever,
at that time; yet how could it then be said that West Virginia had
199 The provision was then Rtv. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148 supra. In the
concept presently material-the concept of a person "denied or [who] cannot enforce"
rights in the state courts-the statute has remained unchanged from 1866 to the present.
200 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
201 REv. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148 supra, required that a petition for removal
be filed "at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause." Present 28
U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1958) requires filing "at any time before trial," apparently with
the same meaning. See AmSTRDAM 116-20. This pretrial character of the removal
procedure, which played a significant part in the construction given the civil rights
removal statute in and following Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), appears
not to have been an incident of the procedure authorized by the original 1866 act.
That act, set out in text accompanying note 77 supra, contained no independent procedural provisions, but adopted by reference the removal procedures of the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756, discussed in
text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. The 1863 act had authorized removal either
before trial, 12 Stat. 756, or after judgment, 12 Stat. 757; and it seems from the
1866 language that both of these forms of removal were meant to be carried over to
civil rights cases. See Senator Trumbull's speech set out in note 87 supra. The
Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 46, discussed in notes 116-17 and accompanying text supra, amended the 1863 procedures to authorize pretrial removal at
any time before empaneling of a jury in the state court, and this seems to be the
procedure intended to be codified in Rzv. STAT. § 641 (1875). But although the Act
of May 11, 1866, explicitly provided that it did not affect postjudgment removal,
REv. STAT. § 641 failed to carry that form of removal forward in civil rights cases.
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"denied" Strauder anything? 202 How could it then be said that he
could not enforce his rights in the state courts? The state judges of
course could avoid the unconstitutional state legislation; the supremacy
clause obliged them to do so; why should it be assumed that they
would not? The Strauder opinion resolves these difficulties by ignoring them.
Glimmerings of the difficulties appear, however, in Virginia
v. Rives,2 0 3 decided the same day, and which was to become a critical
case in the evolution of the removal statute. In Rives a federal trial
court assumed removal jurisdiction on a petition alleging that petitioners were Negroes charged with murder of a white man; that there
was strong race prejudice against them in the community; that the
grand jury which indicted them and the jurors summoned to try them
were all white; that the prosecutor and judge had refused petitioners'
request that one-third of the trial jury be composed of Negroes; that,
notwithstanding the state laws required jury service of males without
discrimination of race, Negroes had never been allowed to serve as
jurors in the county in any case in which their race was interested.
The State of Virginia sought a writ of mandamus in the Supreme
Court to compel the lower federal court to remand the case, and the
Supreme Court issued the writ. Its opinion, read narrowly, found
that petitioners' allegations "fall short of showing that any civil right
was denied, or that there had been any discrimination against the
defendants because of their color or race. The facts may have been
as stated, and yet the jury which indicted them, and the panel summoned to try them, may have been impartially selected." 204 There was
wanting, as a matter of pleading (in those early days before the
Court's experience in the trial of jury discrimination claims bred the
"prima facie" showing doctrine),2° 5 an allegation of purposeful or
intentional discrimination, and the Court said that this might have
202 True, Strauder had been indicted by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury.
But indictment "denied" him nothing until his trial and final judgment of conviction
on it. It does not appear from the Court's opinion whether or not, prior to filing
his petition for removal, Strauder had filed an unsuccessful motion to quash the
indictment. I would not, in any event, attribute much force to the interlocutory
ruling denying such a motion as establishing that the defendant has been "denied"
his equal civil rights, for the ruling is subject to reconsideration on posttrial motions
and state appeal. In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) ; Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); and Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883), motions to quash, made and denied prior to filing
of the removal petitions, were not seen by the Court as adding anything to the petitioners' claims that they were denied or could not enforce their rights in the state
courts.
203 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
2 0
4 Id. at 322.
205 See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584 (1958) ; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
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been supplied by averment that a statute law of the State barred
Negroes from jury service. "When a statute of the State denies his
right, or interposes a bar to his enforcing it, in the judicial tribunals,
the presumption is fair that they will be controlled by it in their
decisions; and in such a case a defendant may affirm on oath what is
necessary for a removal." 206 Thus, by reason of the requirement of
factual showing under the removal statute that a defendant could not
enforce his federal rights in the state court,20 7 the Court said that the
inability to enforce federal rights of which the removal statute speaks
"is primarily, if not exclusively, a denial of such rights, or an inability
to enforce them, resulting from the Constitution or laws of the State,
rather than a denial first made manifest at the trial of the case." 208
So construed, Rives holds no more than that the removal petitioners' allegations were insufficient to state a case of unconstitutional
jury discrimination under the standards then prevailing, and its comments on the existence or nonexistence of discriminatory legislation
are merely speculation on sorts of allegations which would be sufficient.
But the case may also be read rather loosely as saying that unless a
state constitution or statute on its face denies a defendant's federal
constitutional rights, his case is not removable under present subsection
1443 (1).209 Without adequate consideration of the point, the Court
in Neal v. Delaware2 1 took this latter view of Rives. Like Rives, the
Neal case involved a Negro defendant indicted for a capital offense.
His removal petition alleged that Negroes were systematically excluded
from grand and petit juries in the state courts, and that this exclusion
was by reason of an 1831 constitutional provision of the State of
Delaware disqualifying Negroes as electors, hence as jurors. The
Delaware court in which, pursuant to the removal practice then in
force, Neal filed his removal petition 211 took the view that the 1831
206

100 U.S. at 321.

in the absence of constitutional or legislative impediments he cannot
swear before his case comes to trial that his enjoyment of all his civil
rights is denied to him. When he has only an apprehension that such rights
will be withheld from him when his case comes to trial he cannot affirm that
they are actually denied, or that he cannot enforce them. Yet such an affirnmation is essential to his right to remove his case.
Id. at 320. Elsewhere the Court treats the problem as one of showing that defendant's
rights are denied "in the judicial tribunals of the State," id. at 321 (emphasis in
original), within the meaning of the statute; this is evidently merely another manner
of stating the same concern.
207 But

208 Id. at 319.
209 Following the sentence quoted in text accompanying note 298 supra, the Court

concludes: "In other words, the statute has reference to a legislative denial or an
inability resulting from it." Id. at 319-20. See also note 207 mtpra.
210 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
211 Prior to 1948 removal procedure differed under the various federal removal

statutes. In a civil rights case the petition for removal was filed inthe state court
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provision had been rendered void by the supervention of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments, so that, if there were any jury discrimination
in Delaware-which, in any event, the Delaware court found that
Neal had failed to prove--such discrimination was unauthorized by
state constitution or statute. On writ of error to the Delaware court,
the Supreme Court of the United States disagreed that Neal had
failed to show systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury,
and it reversed Neal's conviction for error in overruling his motion
to quash the indictment and jury panels. But the Supreme Court
agreed with the court below that this discrimination was unauthorized
by statute and, in extended dictum, sustained denial of the removal
petition. As the Court read Strauder and Rives, those cases held
that the constitutional amendment was broader than the provisions of sect. 641 [present subsection 1443 (1) ] .

.

.

; that

since that section only authorized a removal before trial, it did
not embrace a case in which a right is denied by judicial action
during the trial, or in the sentence, or in the mode of executing the sentence; that for denials, arising from judicial action,
after the trial commenced, the remedy lay in the revisory
power of the higher courts of the State, and, ultimately, in
the power of review which this court may exercise over
their judgments, whenever rights, privileges, or immunities,
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, are
withheld or violated; and that the denial or inability to enforce in the judicial tribunals of the States, rights secured by
any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, to which sect. 641 refers, is, primarily, if not
exclusively, a denial of such rights, or an inability to enforce
them, resulting from the Constitution or laws of the State,
rather than a denial first made manifest at the trial of the
case. We held that Congress had not authorized a removal
where jury commissioners or other subordinate officers had,
without authority derived from the Constitution and laws
of the State, excluded colored citizens from juries because
of their race.2"
in which the case originated. See REv. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148 supra, continued
by Judicial Code of 1911, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096. If the state court declined to allow the
removal, exception to that ruling could be preserved for examination by the Supreme
Court of the United States on review of the final state court judgment, as in Neal.
Alternatively, petition could be made to the federal trial court to which removal had
been sought and disallowed by the state court; and that court might effect the removal
by issuance of process which terminated the state proceeding, as in Rives. See the
description of similar procedures in Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S.
563 (1941). The 1948 Code revision made removal practice uniform; under the
uniform procedure the petition for removal is filed in the first instance in the federal
district court to which removal is sought, and this filing (with appropriate service
on the state court and opposing party) effects removal, ousting the state court of
jurisdiction unless and until the federal court remands. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446-47 (1958).
212 103 U.S. at 386-87.
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"The essential question, therefore," said the Court, was whether
Negroes were excluded from Delaware juries "by reason of the Constitution and laws of Delaware"; 213 and, finding that "the alleged discrimination in the State of Delaware, against citizens of the African
race, in the matter of service on juries, does not result from her
Constitution and laws," 214 the Court ruled removal unauthorized.
This ruling was repeated in a series of substantially identical cases
at the end of the nineteenth century.2 15
213 Id. at 387.

Id. at 389.
215In each case the defendant was a Negro charged with murder in a state
court and based his removal petition upon allegations of systematic exclusion of
Negroes from the grand and petit juries. In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565
(1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); and Murray v. Louisiana, 163
U.S. 101 (1896), it was alleged that this exclusion was practiced by local officials
without authority of statute or state constitution. Smith and Murray moved to quash
the indictment, petitioned the state court for removal, and challenged the venire or
panel of trial jurors, all on the same equal protection grounds. Gibson did not move
to quash the indictment but did petition for removal and challenged the petit jury.
In all three cases the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, sustaining denial of
the removal petitions on the ground that no state statute or constitution denied the
defendants their equal civil rights, and sustaining denial of the respective motions to
quash or challenges to the petit jury on the ground that no sufficient case of discrimination was established. The Gibson and Murray opinions repeated substantially
the passage from Neal quoted in text accompanying note 212 supra, and Smith rested
briefly on Gibson.
In Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883), the exclusion of Negro jurors was
allegedly practiced under an 1873 Kentucky statute making only whites competent
to serve as grand and petit jurors. Motions to quash the indictment, petitions for
removal, and a challenge to the panel of petit jurors (the last being formally inadequate to raise a federal claim) were made and overruled. The Supreme Court found
that prior to Bush's indictment and trial the Kentucky Court of Appeals had declared
the 1873 statute unconstitutional and void; this put Bush in a posture identical to
Neal's in Delaware, and the Court sustained denial of the removal petition on authority
of Neal. As in Neal, the Court found the claim of grand jury discrimination supported on the record and reversed the conviction for error in denying the motion
to quash.
In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), defendant claimed not merely
that administrative officials had systematically excluded Negroes from juries, but
also that the provisions of the Mississippi constitution and statute prescribing the
procedures for qualifying electors and jurors (only electors being competent jurors)
were
but a scheme on the part of the framers of that constitution to abridge the
suffrage of the colored electors in the State of Mississippi on account of the
previous condition of servitude by granting a discretion to the said officers
as mentioned in the several sections of the constitution of the State and the
statute of the State adopted under the said constitution, the use of said [sic:
214

which] discretion can be and has been used in the said . . . County to

the end complained of.
Id. at 214. It was alleged that the constitution was drawn by a constitutional convention of 133 white and one Negro members, which refused to submit the new
constitution to popular vote for adoption, because of the heavy preponderance of
Negro voters qualified under prior law; and that the legislature acted immediately
under the new constitution, with a purpose to discriminate against Negroes in the
franchise, by passing a statute which gave local election managers wide discretion
in judging the qualifications of persons registering to vote. Motions to quash the
indictment and for removal were made and denied. Williams was convicted; the
Mississippi Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.
Sustaining denial of the motion for removal, the Court began by quoting from Gibson
the standard paragraph from Neal, text accompanying note 212 supra; it noted that
no claim was made that the Mississippi constitution or statute was discriminatory
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21
in 1906, is the Court's most recent,217
Kentucky v. Powers,
and most restrictive, construction of the removal section. Following
three trials for murder in a Kentucky court, each resulting in conviction reversed on appeal by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Powers
prior to his fourth trial filed his petition for removal. The petition
alleged (1) that the killing with which he was charged had occurred
during the course of a factional dispute, accompanied by widespread
political excitement and animosity, involving contested elections for
all of the major state offices; (2) that Powers had been the Republican
candidate for secretary of state; one Taylor the Republican candidate
for governor; and Goebel, the man with whose murder Powers was
charged, the Democratic candidate for governor; (3) that Goebel's
killing aroused intense hostility toward Powers on the part of Goebel
Democrats and inflammed them against him; and that this hostility
continued throughout his three trials and still existed; (4) that in
each of Powers' three trials the sheriff and deputies charged with jury
selection, all being Goebel Democrats, connived with the trial judge to
violate the regular state procedures for selecting juries, and instead
systematically excluded Republicans and Independents from the jury
panels and selected Goebel Democrats for the purpose of assuring
Powers' conviction; (5) that the judge at each trial denied Powers'
requests that the jury be selected equally from both political parties
(approximating the roughly equal popular vote each had polled at the
last election), or that the jury be selected without reference to party,
and overruled Powers' objections to jurors selected by systematic exclusion of Republicans and Independents; (6) that on each appeal, by
force of a Kentucky statute which made certain trial court rulings
unreviewable, the Kentucky Court of Appeals had held it had no

on its face; and it concluded that the well-pleaded factual averments of the defendant's
motions failed to present "sufficient allegation of an evil and discriminating administration" of the State's laws. 170 U.S. at 222. On these grounds, the motion to quash,
as well as that for removal, was held correctly denied.
Obviously, as a technical matter, none of these cases held or could hold anything
on the question of construction of the removal statute. Each case came to the Supreme
Court from state court judgments of conviction (see note 211 supra); in each, the
same jury-exclusion claim which was the basis for a removal petition was, on an
identical record, the basis for a motion to quash or other attack on the grand or
petit jury; where (as in all cases save Bush) the Supreme Court affirmed, it necessarily rejected the jury-exclusion claim on substantive grounds and therefore made
it unnecessary to decide whether a valid claim of this sort would sustain removal;
and where (as in Bush) the Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the substantive
claim supported a motion to quash, rejection of the removal claim was equally
unnecessary to decision. Technical niceties apart, however, it is clear that by 1898
the Court supposed it had long ago settled that removal under present § 1443(1) was
allowable only on a claim of facial unconstitutionality of a state statute or constitutional provision.
2-16201 U.S. 1 (1906).
2 17
Betveen 1887 and 1964 it was generally supposed that orders of a lower
federal court remanding to a state court proceedings sought to be removed from it
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power to upset the trial judge's rulings on the jurors-which decisions
were the law of the case and as binding on the Kentucky courts as
statutes; (7) that at each trial, Powers had pleaded in bar a pardon
issued to him by Governor Taylor, who at the time of its issuance was
the duly elected and acting governor of the State; that the trial judge
had refused to admit the pardon as a defense (this being the first time
in Kentucky jurisprudence that a Kentucky court refused to give effect
to an executive pardon) ; and that on each appeal the court of appeals
had sustained this ruling-which decisions also were the law of the
case and binding on the Kentucky courts; (8) that Powers was confined in jail without bail awaiting a fourth trial 218 and for all the
foregoing reasons was unable to obtain a fair trial in the Kentucky
courts. 1 9 The lower federal court assumed jurisdiction on removal,
concluding
that the prior action of the Scott Circuit Court denying the
defendant the equal protection of the laws is a real hindrance
and obstacle to his asserting his right thereto in a future trial
therein-just as real as an unconstitutional statute would
be-and that the defendant is denied the equal protection of
the laws in said court, within the meaning of said section, and
entitled to a removal on account thereof. 2
On the State's appeal and petition for mandamus, the Supreme Court
held that this was error, that removal was improper, and it ordered
the case remanded to the state court. The Court noted that, notwithstanding the state court of appeals would not entertain Powers'
claims of error in denial of his federal rights, review of those claims
could be had by writ of error issued from the Supreme Court to the
were not reviewable by the federal appellate courts.

See Act of March 3 1887,

ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553, as amended, Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Star. 435;
discussion in authorities cited note 173 stpra. Preservation of a removal point through
state appeals following adverse final judgment, see note 211 stpra, was generally
bootless, for the reason that it added nothing to other federal claims so preserved.
See the last paragraph of note 215 supra. When the lower courts began to deny civil
rights removal generally on the authority of Powers and its immediate predecessors,
there was therefore no occasion for Supreme Court consideration of the issues decided
below.
218 It is unclear whether Powers made any particular point of his detention
without bail as a ground for removal. The Supreme Court mentions in passing that
he was so detained. 201 U.S. at 5.
219 Although this fact is not mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion, it appears
that each of the previous reversals of Powers' convictions by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky had been by 4-3 vote of that court; that, following the third reversal,
one judge who had on each occasion voted to reverse retired from the bench, and was
succeeded by the judge who had presided at each of Powers' first two trials. See
Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452, 458-59 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd, 201 U.S. 1

(1906).
220

139 Fed. at 487.
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And as the Court read its earlier

expressly held that there was no right of removal under
section 641, where the alleged discrimination against the
accused, in respect of his equal rights, was due to the illegal or
corrupt acts of administrative officers, unauthorized by the
constitution or laws of the State, as interpreted by its highest
court. For wrongs of that character the remedy, it was held,
is in the state court, and ultimately in the power of this court,
upon writ of error, to protect any right secured or granted
to an accused by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and which has been denied to him in the highest court
of the State in which the decision, in respect of that right,
could be had.2 2'
Before and following Powers, the lower federal courts have consistently held that unless a state constitutional or statutory provision
unconstitutional on its face is alleged to deprive a defendant of his federal rights, removal under present section 1443 (1) is unauthorized2 2
201 U.S. at 31.
222 Hull v. Jackson County Circuit Court, 138 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1943)
221

(alternative ground) (prejudiced judge in state postconviction proceeding, semble) ; Maryland
v. Kurek, 233 F. Supp. 431 (D. Md. 1964) (denial of speedy trial) ; North Carolina
v. Alston, 227 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1964) (trespass charges unconstitutional
under equal protection clause as applied to sit-ins; state supreme court has previously
rejected this claim); City of Clarksdale v. Gertge, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2363 (N.D.
Miss. Dec. 23, 1964) (prosecution of civil rights worker for taking photographs in
city hall without mayor's permission is designed to harass voter registration; hostile
and racially discriminatory state courts; Negro exclusion from juries and from
electorate electing state judges); In re Kaminetsky, 234 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.
1964) (state contempt proceeding will compel self-incriminating testimony) ; Arkansas
v. Howard, 218 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ark. 1963) (hostile and racially prejudiced
prosecutor and community; discriminatory prosecution; Negro jury exclusion; offense
charged for conduct protected by federal court order) ; City of Birmingham v. Croskey,
217 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ala. 1963) (state policy of racial discrimination; Negro
exclusion from juries and electorate electing state judges; jury hostility; charges
void for vagueness and unconstitutional as applied, semble on first amendment and
equal protection grounds); Van Newkirk v. District Attorney, 213 F. Supp. 61
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) (trial delay and pretrial hospital commitment without hearing);
Petition of Hagewood, 200 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (prejudiced jury and trial
judge; discriminatory enforcement of recidivist statute; various procedural errors) ;
Rand v. Arkansas, 191 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (prejudiced jury); Hill v.
Pennsylvania, 183 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (alternative ground) (denial of
speedy trial); Louisiana v. Murphy, 173 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. La. 1959) (charge
under licensing statute discriminatorily administered) ; Texas v. Dorris, 165 F. Supp.
738 (S.D. Tex. 1958) (prosecutor, judge, and jury controlled by complainant) ; California v. Lamson, 12 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Cal.), petition for leave to appeal denied,
80 F.2d 388 (Wilbur, Circuit Judge, 1935) (prejudiced jury) ; New Jersey v. Weinberger, 38 F.2d 298 (D.N.J. 1930) (prejudiced trial judge) ; California v. Chue Fan,
42 Fed. 865 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890) (discriminatory enforcement of lottery statute);
Ex parte Wells, 29 Fed. Cas. 633 (No. 17368) (Bradley, Circuit Justice, 1878)
(politically and racially hostile legislature, prosecutor, and jury; Negro exclusion
from jury pursuant to statute allowing commissioners discretion for the purpose of
facilitating Negro exclusion). Claims that the statute under which the defendant was
charged was facially unconstitutional were held insufficient to support removal in
Snypp v. Ohio, 70 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1934) (alternative ground) (Blue Sky law), and
North Carolina v. Jackson, 135 F. Supp. 682 (M.D.N.C. 1955) (statute requiring racial
segregation on buses), on the ground that it was not shown that the state courts
would not fairly entertain the federal claim.
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C. Possible Constructions of the Language
1. Subsection 1443 (1): Inability To
Enforce Federal Rights
Subsection 1443 (1) poses two principal problems of construction.
First, what federal rights, privileges, or immunities are protected by
the statute: that is, what kind of "right" must a removal petitioner
show he is denied or cannot enforce in the state courts in order to
sustain removal? This difficulty arises from the circumlocution: "a
right under any law providing for . . . equal civil rights ....
"
Second, what must the removal petitioner show, before state trial, to
demonstrate that he "is denied or cannot enforce" his protected rights
in the state courts? This difficulty is inherent in a statute which
appears to require (but not to guide) a pretrial inquiry into how the
state courts likely would respond to the protected federal claims if the
case were left in the state courts. Exegesis fitly begins with the
decisions from Strauder and Rives to Powers, which constitute the
Supreme Court's whole corpus juris on these questions.
(a) The cases barely advance inquiry on the first question, as
to the nature of the "right" whose denial or unenforcibility in the
state courts will sustain removal. Strauder apparently holds that a
right of equality in the judicial proceeding sought to be removed,
given by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is this kind of "right," 223
but none of the decisions reflects on the more important issue whether
constitutional or statutory rights whose gravamen is other than
equality also come within the removal provision.22 4 I shall postpone
2
= Strauder bases the right of a Negro defendant not to be tried by a jury from
which Negroes have been systematically excluded upon the equal protection clause
and R v. STAT. §1977 (1875) (now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958)), which codified §1
of the First Civil Rights Act of 1866, note 81 supra.
22
4 In each of the cases from Strander and Rives to Powers, the only ground
seriously put forward for removal was systematic exclusion of a class from the grand
and/or petit jury. In Powers, the additional claim was made that the state courts
were denying Powers the benefit of a state-granted pardon; but this claim, which
was dressed out in equal protection garb by allegations of discriminatory nullification
of the pardon, was treated by the Court as an equal protection clause contention (to
the extent that it was other than frivolous), and so adds nothing to the Court's
disposition of the cognate jury-exclusion equal protection clause claim. In Gibson
the jury-exclusion equal protection clause contention was embellished by the argument
that the jury selection statute under which the discrimination was practiced was also
applied ex post facto in Gibson's case, since Gibson's charged offense predated the
statute. The Court properly treated this ex post facto claim as extravagant on the
merits, and additionally said that it did not come within the protection of the removal
section, apparently for the same reason that Gibson's jury-exclusion claim itself did
not-that is, because neither attacked the face of the statute. 162 U.S. at 585-86.
I do not find in Gibson support for the view taken by Judge Friendly in New York
v. Galamison, Nos. 29166-75, 2d Cir., Jan. 26, 1965, at s.o. 990, see note 312 infra, to
the effect that Gibson excludes ex post facto claims, as a class, from the scope of

§ 1443(1).
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further consideration of this issue to pp. 863-74 infra, and assume for
present discussion that all fourteenth amendment civil rights are
protected by subsection 1443 (1).
(b) Taken at its word, Strauder supports the view that whenever
a state statute on its face (by which I mean in every possible application to a statutorily defined class) deprives a class of persons of
federal rights protected by subsection 1443 (1), those persons may
remove their prosecutions without making any showing beyond the
face of the statute itself that the state courts are likely to sustain the
statute against the federal claim. Negroes prosecuted under a statute
requiring segregated seating on busses and penalizing seating in
violation of the segregation pattern could therefore on this ground
alone remove the prosecution under 1443(1); for, although it is
true that the Strauder statute deprived Negroes of equal protection
in a matter of trial procedure, while the bus segregation statute deprives them of equal protection in the out-of-court conduct which is
the subject matter of the prosecutions sought to be removed, this
appears a distinction without a difference. Conviction in either case
denies the defendants their federally guaranteed right; in both cases
it is the facially unconstitutional statute which dictates to the state
courts the illegal conviction.2 5 Under the same theory, and on the
assumption made in the preceding paragraph that subsection 1443 (1)
protects due process as well as equal protection guarantees, the prosecutions of my hypothetical Mississippi defendants for parading without a
license and for conspiracy to commit an act injurious to public morals
(pp. 795-96 supra) are eo ipso removable if the federal courts agree
with me that these statutes are void respectively under the firstfourteenth amendments and for vagueness; and, of course, the same
preliminary ruling which establishes federal removal jurisdiction on
this ground effectively terminates the prosecutions by laying a foundation for the defendants' immediate motions to dismiss. In a number
of unreported decisions, district courts have remanded such cases; 226
but I do not see that these decisions can stand if Strauder is still
the law.22
(c) Indeed, I think it tenable to argue under Strauder that each
of the other charges against the Mississippi Negroes--obstructing the
=But see North Carolina v. Jackson, 135 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.C. 1955) (disallowing removal in a bus-segregation statute case like the one hypothesized in text),
note 222 supra.
226 E.. , several of the cases presently consolidated in the pending appeal in
Brown v. City of Meridian, No. 21730, 5th Cir.
227That is, of course, assuming that § 1443(1) protects due process claims,
see pp. 863-74 infra, and that the claims of facial unconstitutionality of the statutes
involved in these several cases are correct on the merits.
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sidewalk, resisting arrest, creating a disturbance, pp. 795-96 suprais removable on the theory that the statutes on which these charges
are based, although not facially unconstitutional, have the same effect
as facially unconstitutional statutes in denying the defendants their
protected federal rights. It is tenable to claim, that is, that these
prosecutions are removable once it is shown that the application of
the statutes to defendants' conduct would be unconstitutional. For is
not the Strauder test of removability whether state statutory law
directs the federally unconstitutional result complained of, so that
that result is produced by statute and not simply by state judicial
action unconstrained by the State's legislation? If this be so, it
should not matter whether the state statute involved is unconstitutional
on its face (i.e., in all applications to a described class) or unconstitutional as applied (i.e., insofar as it condemns particular defendants'
federally protected conduct): in both cases, equally, it is the statute
which compels the state courts to the constitutionally impermissible
result and thus brings it about that the defendant "cannot enforce in
the courts of [the] . . . State" his federally protected rights.

True,

the decisions from Rives to Powers seem to require a facially unconstitutional state statute to support removal. But each of these cases
involved claims of denial of federal rights by reason of an unconstitutional trial procedure: specifically, systematic exclusion in the selection
of jurors. In none of the cases did the defendant claim that the substantive criminal statute on which the prosecution was bottomed was
invalid, either on its face or as applied, by reason of federal limitations
on the kind of conduct which a State may punish. This latter sort
of claim asserts that, under the Constitution, no matter what procedures may be forthcoming at trial, the State cannot 'constitutionally
apply the statute relied on to the conduct with which the defendant is
charged. Neal v. Delaware and subsequent cases explain the RivesPowers line as holding that "since [the removal] . . . section only

authorized a removal before trial, it did not embrace a case in which
a right is denied by judicial action during the trial . .

,,

228

But a

defendant who attacks the underlying criminal statute as unconstitutional does not predicate his attack on "judicial action during the
trial." He says that if he is convicted at all under the statute his
conviction will be federally illegal. Nothing about his contention is
contingent upon the nature of "judicial action, after the trial commenced ...

229

228 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1881) ; see, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi,

162 U.S. 565, 581 (1896).
229 Neal v. Delavare, supra note 228, at 387. Of course, the state court may hold
that the statute does not apply, or -may hold it unconstitutional and enforce the de-
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When a statute of the State denies his right, or interposes a bar to his enforcing it, in the judicial tribunals, the
presumption is fair that they will be controlled by it in their
decisions; and in such a case a defendant may affirm on
oath what is necessary for a removal. Such a case is clearly
within the provisions of [present subsection 1443 (1)]
230

Whether this plausible verbalism is acceptable reasoning or a bad
pun depends upon a somewhat more critical examination of Strauder
and the Rives-Powers cases than I have yet made. The cases submit
to examination only with strain, and I cannot be certain that I am not
importing the concerns which I think they display. Still, I can find
no other explanation of them, and have concluded that they possess
the following or none.
The problem with which the cases struggle is that designated
question Second at p. 851 supra: namely, what constitutes an adequate
pretrial showing that a defendant is denied or cannot enforce his
protected rights in the state courts? Properly seen, this inquiry is
the product of three others: (1) what circumstances occurring in the
state court process did Congress envision as amounting to a denial or
inability to enforce protected federal rights; (2) by what degree of
probability must these circumstances appear before state trial; and
(3) what facts, shown before state trial, sufficiently demonstrate the
requisite degree of probability? From the outset, the Court was influenced in its answer to the first subquestion by what it saw as
practical limitations on the possible range of answers to the third:
that is, it took the view that Congress could not have meant to authorize removal in prospect of any circumstances of the state trial
process which could not practicably be proved before state trial. This
was wrong reasoning, as a matter of statutory construction, for the
authority to remove whenever a defendant is "denied or . . . cannot

enforce" his federal rights in the state courts was given by the First
Civil Rights Act of 1866; 23 that act allowed removal either before
trial or after judgment; " and although the procedure of postjudgment
removal was not carried forward in the Revised Statutes section which
came before the Court in Strauder and thereafter, the Revised Statutes
fendant's federal claims. But it is always possible that a state court may do these
things, and if the possibility precludes removal, the removal statute is read entirely
off the books. This would require repudiation of Strauder and rejection of the
assumption on which the Rives-Powers line of cases was decided: that if an unconstitutional state statute were found, removal would be proper.
3o Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 321 (1880).
23 See pp. 810-11 supra.
=2See note 201 mipra.
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did continue the authorization to remove whenever a defendant is
"denied or . . . cannot enforce" his federal rights, apparently with

the same meaning that phrase had had in 1866. The result of this
initial error was that the Court began by assimilating and ended by
confusing the distinct questions what state court conditions warrant
removal, and how those state court conditions may sufficiently be
proved. For, whenever the Court found a particular mode of pretrial
proof inconvenient, it comfortably concluded that Congress had not
meant to allow removal under the circumstances proved by this mode.
All of the Court's cases involved the jury-exclusion claim. Now,
the appropriate method of approach to a removal petition making this
claim would evidently be, as indicated above: (A) to determine
whether this was one of the sorts of claims whose denial by the state
courts was intended to furnish a ground of removal under present
subsection 1443(1); (B) to determine what degree of probability of
the claim's denial by the state courts was intended to be sufficient for
removal-(the issue necessarily being posed as one of probabilities
under the pretrial removal practice of the Revised Statutes) ; 2 and
(C) to determine whether the particular petition stated facts from
which a court should infer that the requisite degree of probability
existed that this petitioner would be denied the jury nondiscrimination
right by the state courts. In passing on question (C), the court might
legitimately consider not merely the probative value of the facts alleged
by the petitioner, but also the convenience or inconvenience of permitting proof of the requisite degree of probability to be made in the
fashion in which the petitioner sought to make it, in light of the
relative availability and desirability of other means of proof. The
probability being proved is itself, of course, a compound, comprised of
the probability that Negroes will be systematically excluded from the
panels and of the probability that the state courts will leave this
illegality uncorrected. Concern about a facially unconstitutional state
statute first entered the Court's opinions as an evidentiary consideration
pertinent to both of these last questions of probability. Confusion of
proof with what is being proved then erected the facially unconstitutional statute into a requirement for removability on a jury exclusion
claim.
Strauder, it seems clear, held that the jury exclusion claim was
one for whose protection removal was authorized. Assuming that
233

Under pretrial removal procedure, the removal petition is sufficient, if ever,

before state trial; before state trial it can never be shown, save as a matter of greater
or smaller probability, that the defendant will be denied his federally protected rights
in the state court process; if probability is insufficient basis for removal, removal
can never be allowed.
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both state jury-selection officials and state courts would prefer an
unconstitutional state statute to the Constitution, Strauder further
held that the existence of such a statute sufficiently demonstrated
probable exclusion and probable refusal of the state courts to correct it.
The removal petition in Rives stated no facts supporting the inference
of either probability, and the Court, adverting to Strauder, suggested
that involvement of a facially discriminatory statute would have aided
the petitioner in both regards. As an evidentiary matter, this is
plausible, though not compelling, logic: for although state officials
and judges might avoid unconstitutional state legislation, they were
unlikely in 1879 to do so easily-and this unlikelihood was thought in
Strauder and Rives sufficient to support pretrial removal.
True, Strauder might instead have been put on the ground that
a statute had some innate efficacy to deny a defendant's rights irrespective of the probability that it would be applied in his case. But Neal
v. Delaware and Bush v. Kentucky ' refute or repudiate this conception; for Neal declined to give Strauder-like effect to state legislation that predated the federal constitutional provision which rendered it void; and Bush, to state legislation that a state court had
declared unconstitutional prior to the filing of the removal petition.
These decisions confirm the principle of Strauder that the touchstone
of removability is the likelihood that state courts will disregard the
guarantees of federal law which the removal statute protects. At the
same time, the opinions in Neal and Bush stand this principle on its
head by reading the discussion in Rives-which asserts the evidential
value of a facially unconstitutional state statute in proving that state
courts will likely disregard federal guarantees-as though Rives stated
that the only sufficient evidence of this likelihood was the existence
of a facially unconstitutional state statute. And in Powers, where the
lower federal court reasonably found a clearly demonstrated probability that the state courts would deny defendant's federal rights-a
probability every bit as great, that court expressly said, as an unconstitutional state statute could have created-the Supreme Court
quoted its Neal-Bush dicta and applied Rives in the teeth of the
Strauder-Rives rationale.
This result can be supported neither as a matter of substantive
law nor as a matter of evidence. Substantively, the limitation of
removability to cases in which state legislation denies federally protected rights finds no basis in the text of the removal statute; 235
See note 215 supra.
statute speaks generally of a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce
his rights in the state courts; it shows no concern for the agency of the denial or
unenforceability.
234

235The
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rather it affronts that text as originally written.238 It affronts whatever can be gleaned from the legislative history; 237 indeed, the statute
as construed in Powers works precisely arsy-varsy the manner in
which the manager of the 1866 bill explained its operation to the
Senate in an important speech.'
The suggestion in the Court's
opinions that nonstatutory denials of rights occur only after trial has
begun, whereas statutory denials predate trial,2 3 9 is patently absurd
(whether law be conceived as a brooding omnipresence or a prediction
of what courts will in fact do)-save as this suggestion reflects an
estimate of probabilities. And, as the facts of Powers demonstrate,
unconstitutional state legislation has no monopoly of the probability
that federal rights will be disregarded. To support the Powers doctrine as an evidentiary principle, it is necessary to make one of two
untenable assumptions: that state judges are unlikely to be hostile to
federal rights unless a state statute tells them to be (an assumption
particularly alien to the thinking of the Congresses which created the
civil rights removal jurisdiction 240), or that no form of proof except
positive law will sustain a relatively sure prediction of judicial conduct
(an assumption which belies common-law tradition and daily legal experience). Indulging these assumptions defeats the principal purposes
of the removal jurisdiction. For, certainly, the case in which there
exists a state statutory or constitutional provision barring enforcement
of a federal right is the case in which removal to a federal trial court is
least needed. The existence and effect of such an obvious, written
obstruction of federal law are relatively easily perceived and coped
with on direct review of a state court judgment by the Supreme Court
of the United States.2 4 ' Where removal is most needed is the case
236 See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
237 See text accompanying notes 90-108 supra.
238 See note 87 supra; text accompanying note 106 supra. Senator Trumbull's
speech assumes postjudgment as well as pretrial removability. See note 201 supra.
239 See text accompanying notes 212, 228 supra.
240 See text accompanying notes 68-149 supra.
241 The Supreme Court's jurisdiction on direct review was mandatory in such
cases under the First Judiciary Act, of 1789, and continued so under the 1867 amendatory act. See note 111 supra. Since the Act of Sept 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat.
726, the Court has mandatory jurisdiction by appeal to review the judgment of the
highest court of a State in which decision can be had in any case in which that court
sustains a state statute against federal constitutional challenge, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)
(1958) ; the Court's jurisdiction to review cases in which a state court has rejected
a federal constitutional claim not involving challenge to a state statute is limited
to certiorari, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958). Under this pattern, there is all the more
reason why a state criminal defendant who demonstrates that there exists a nonstatutory bar to effective enforcement of his federal rights in the state courts should
be permitted removal; unlike the defendant whose claim of deprivation of federal
rights is directed against a state statute, he has no review as of right by the Supreme
Court if he remains in the state system. (These practical workings of the Supreme
Court's appeal and certiorari jurisdiction, dating from 1916, were given significant
consideration by the Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 412-13 (1963), in applying
1867 habeas corpus legislation.)
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in which the impingement on federal rights is more subtle, more immune against appellate correction, as where state court hostility and
bias warp the process by which the facts underlying the federal claim
This is the case where local prejudice, local resistance,
are found."
pitch the risk of error, always incident in fact finding,2" strongly
against federal contentions; it was to meet such situations that Congress
had utilized removal prior to 1866 244 and utilized it in civil rights
2 45
cases in and after that year.

So the rule of Powers has no very obvious justification. Yet it
is not inexplicable. Perhaps it draws altogether the wrong line;
nevertheless, the need for drawing some line is clear. The problem
lies in litigating the intractable issues of probability described in the
preceding paragraphs. Where removal is sought on the claim of an
unconstitutional trial procedure (e.g., jury exclusion), pretrial inquiry
must be made into the probability that the conditions giving rise to
the claim will occur (i.e., that Negroes will be excluded), and into the
probability that the state courts will reject a valid claim (i.e., overrule
objections to the juries). The inquiry needs be made because unconstitutional trial procedures may occur in any case; if the mere
possibility sustains removal, all state cases are removable. But this
sort of inquiry is inconvenient and judicially embarrassing in the
extreme: inconvenient because the complex factual issues underlying
the questions of probabilities must be tried in advance of the state
trial; embarassing because, unless the involvement of the federal claim
in a state case is taken eo ipso as presenting sufficient risk of its denial,
one of the questions to be litigated is the probability of its actual
improper denial in the state courts-an issue which smacks of trying
the loyalty of the state judges to their constitutional obligations.
Disinclination to disrupt and delay the state proceedings by preliminary
factual litigation in the federal courts 246 and unwillingness to adjudicate the loyalty of the state judiciaries doubtless pressed the Court
strongly toward development of an easily administrable and relatively
impersonal test for removability. Facial unconstitutionality of a
State's written law provided such a test and-because the Court had
242

See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text.

243

See note 193 supra.

244

See notes 55-64, 68-74 supra and accompanying text.

245

See notes 75-148 supra and accompanying text.

246 Prior to 1948, litigation of the issue of removability in the federal court did
not automatically require a stay of the state proceedings. See note 211 supra. However, a state court would ordinarily find it inexpedient to proceed while its jurisdiction was being litigated in the federal courts. Since 1948, state proceedings are
stayed automatically pending disposition by the federal district court of the issue of
removability. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446-47 (1958).
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made the mistake of supposing that Congress defined the conditions
of removability with pretrial administration alone in view 247 -administrative practicality was allowed in Powers to determine the removal
statute's construction.
I shall return later to the question of the continuing viability of
the Powers rule. My purpose at the moment is to determine
whether, accepting the rule and the foregoing explanation of it, 48
Powers' requirement of a facially unconstitutional state statute to
support removal on a trial-procedure claim necessarily compels the
same requirement to support removal on a claim of unconstitutionality
of the underlying criminal charge. I conclude that it does not; that,
consistently with Powers, the federal unconstitutionality of the underlying charge as applied suffices for removal under subsection

1443 (1) .248

As I have pointed out, the statutory issue whether a defendant is
denied or cannot enforce his federal rights in the state courts subsumes
decisions (1) whether the right he asserts is one which Congress
meant removal to protect; (2) what degree of probability of its denial
See text accompanying notes 231-32 supra.
I have heard it suggested that the Rives-Powers line is explicable principally
as a reflection of the restricted concept of state action held by the Court at the turn
of the century, see, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904), and that
the subsequent demise of that concept undermines Rives-Powers. If the RivesPowers doctrine began with the Powers case, the explanation might be tenable; but
the Rives opinion itself is the classic exposition of the principle that the fourteenth
amendment reaches state executive and judicial action, and I cannot imagine that
cases purporting to follow Rives on its own immediate issues forgot that lesson.
Compare Texas v. Gaines, 23 Fed. Cas. 869 (No. 13847) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874).
Besides, Strander put the federal jury exclusion claim not merely on the fourteenth
amendment, but on the codified provisions originating in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which was thirteenth amendment legislation. In all, I think the explanation
of Rives-Powers offered in text accompanying notes 246-47 supra is the correct one.
248a Rachel v. Georgia, No. 21354, 5th Cir., March 5, 1964, so held. That decision, handed down after this Article was set in type, allowed removal under § 1443(1)
of Georgia trespass prosecutions which the removal petitioners asserted could not be
maintained consistently with the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, §§ 201-03, 78 Stat 243, as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
85 Sup. Ct 384 (1964). The Rachel opinion, conformably to the conclusions reached at
pp. 852-61 & p. 910 infra, demanded as a condition of removability neither the
facial unconstitutionality of the trespass statute nor any showing that the Georgia
courts would not likely fairly entertain petitioners' claim that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. It was sufficient that the Federal Civil Rights Act forbad
application of Georgia's statute to the conduct for which petitioners were charged.
Congress, while carving out rights and immunities in the area of civil
rights, has provided a jurisdictional basis for efficiently and appropriately
protecting those rights and immunities in a federal forum. The provision of
this protective forum is not limited by the States' obligation, under the
Supremacy Clause, to protect federally guaranteed civil rights as zealously
as would a federal court That there is such an obligation on State tribunals
is true, and vital, but it is irrelevant here. Theoretically, there is no need for
any federal jurisdiction at all-except that of the Supreme Court-because
State courts are required to protect federally created rights. Nevertheless,
the power of Congress to provide a federal forum also to protect such rights
is undoubted. Such power was exercised in enacting § 1443(1).
Rachel v. Georgia, supra at s.o. 14.
247
248
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justifies pretrial removal; and (3) what sort of factual showing sufficiently demonstrates that degree of probability. Powers (1) accepted
the Strauder decision that jury exclusion was a protected claim;
(2) decided, as regards this claim, that the mere probability of its
involvement in a state case did not constitute sufficient probability of
its denial to warrant removal; but that a showing was to be demanded
that the claim would likely be improperly rejected by the state courts;
and (3) for administrative reasons refused to permit this latter likelihood to be proved in any other way than by the showing of a facially
unconstitutional state statute. But nothing in the case or in its predecessors suggests that, with respect to all claims that pass muster as
protected under subquestion (1), the same degree of probability of
denial is required to support removal under subquestion (2). Various
federal rights differ in their importance within our pattern of constitutional liberties and in their vulnerability to destruction by state
process. Differentially, as regards different rights, the risk that they
will not be recognized amounts to the right's practical destruction.
These differences must necessarily be taken into account in construction of 1443 (1), which speaks generally of the denial of or inability
to enforce various rights. So too must differences in the amounts of
disruption of state proceedings which are caused by making the
inquiry whether different federal rights are colorably involved in
those proceedings. Disruption occasioned by inquiry may preclude inquiring into every case, yet not preclude inquiring into a more limited
class of cases presenting special justifications for the inquiry.
The claim that a federal guarantee of civil rights immunizes
the defendant's conduct against state criminal charges can colorably
be made in a far smaller number of cases than that in which a guarantee regulating the States' criminal procedure can colorably be
invoked2 49 Accepting arguendo the judgment made in Powers and
its predecessors that these latter, federal trial-procedure claims would
be too numerous to take wholesale into the federal courts without preliminary inquiry concerning both the probability of their arising and
the probability of their being improperly rejected in the state courtsand too numerous to justify the disruptions and delays incident to
factual inquiry concerning these probabilities in connection with all
such claims-I think that that judgment does not compel a like one
249 This is obviously true today. It was probably thought to
during the period of development of the Powers doctrine following
Bush in 1883. Neither the substantive nor the procedural impact
amendment had yet been much explored at that period, but the
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), did not augur extensive
the substantive side.

be true, as well,
Neal in 1881 and
of the fourteenth
Slaughter-House
developments on
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with respect to claims of immunity against the state criminal charge.
Instances where claims of immunity have enough paper substance to
call for factual hearing will likely be infrequent: free speech and
religious freedom cases, cases involving the few nonfrivolous claims of
"substantive" equal protection and the "substantive" due process
rights of individual liberty.2 50 Hearings on these claims to determine
whether the facts on which the criminal charge is based do colorably
support the claim would not disrupt the bulk of state criminal litigation.
And if these claims are colorable in fact, the relative importance and
vulnerability of the rights involved justify allowance of removal
without the further inquiry (which would be no less politically impractical in these cases than in trial-procedure cases) concerning the
probability of improper state court rejection. The federal substantive
guarantees, unlike trial-procedure rights, are principally aimed at
prohibiting the States from repression of certain kinds of conduct.
Their design is immediately to allow, to liberate from state inhibition
and deterrence, the conduct which they protect; they are not meant
merely to restrict the forms through which state procedure may abut
at judgment. Federal trial-protection rights are ordinarily sufficiently
protected if they are ultimately recognized in the criminal process, if
convictions got without observing them are finally disallowed. But
the very maintenance, the mere pendency, of criminal proceedings
directed at substantively protected conduct has repressive force
anterior to and independent of final judgment; and the risk that
prosecutions may succeed deters the substantively protected activities
which the Constitution has resolved shall not be deterred.2 51 For these
reasons, peculiar to substantive claims of immunity, it will not do to
conceive the federal constitutional right-for example, freedom to conduct a protest demonstration-merely as a right to a favorable judgment at the conclusion of a state prosecution for demonstrating. The
right is the right of freedom to demonstrate, nothing less: an immunity against, not an indemnification for, repressive state process.
As to that right,25 2 the right on the streets where it counts, it may
fairly be said that the pendency alone of the state court prosecution
for protected conduct denies the demonstrator his right, and makes
him unable to enforce that right, within the meaning of 1443 (1).
This argument is the stronger where, as in the case of the
Mississippi Negro defendants, pp. 794-96 supra, first-fourteenth amend250 See note 41 supra.
251 See pp. 796-802, 823-25, 836-38, 840-42 m.pra.
252

1 have used the term "right" in this discussion because it is the term used in

§ 1443(1). I do not think it worth the effort to maintain Hohfeldian rectitude for
present purposes.
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ment freedoms of expression are in issue. The Supreme Court has
traditionally accorded those freedoms a constitutionally "preferred
position." 2"3 It has recognized that "the threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." 254 Touching these freedoms particularly, the Court has
been concerned with the danger of biased fact findings by the state
courts: 55 a danger which not only threatens to destroy the federal
protections of those criminal defendants who actually go to trial, but
also--through the knowledge that effective freedom of expression is
committed largely to the unreviewable power of state magistrates and
judges-tends broadly to deter its exercise in the service of locally
unpopular causes. Finally, the Court has seen the need for early,
quickly effective federal judicial remedies in first amendment cases,o 6
lest state repression even during brief periods render speech valueless
as an instrument of democratic political action. These principles
solidly support a construction of the removal statute to hold that a
defendant is denied or cannot enforce his first-fourteenth amendment
freedoms whenever he is prosecuted in a state court for conduct colorably protected by the amendments.
(d) With regard to various trial procedure claims-systematic
jury exclusion, trial before judges elected by an electorate from which
Negroes have been systematically excluded, etc.-I see no tenable
way to take the case of the Mississippi Negro defendants out of the
operation of the Powers rule. Removal sought on the basis of these
claims alone would therefore fail, unless the claims could be referred
to a facially unconstitutional state statute.25 Technically, the argument is open that in none of the decisions from Rives to Powers were
253 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558, 562 (1948) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (dictum) ; see
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). For a demonstration
of the consensus of the Justices in this preference, notwithstanding disputes about
terminology, see McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1182 (1959).
254NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); cf: Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-70 (1963) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278, 286-88 (1961) ; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
255 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Lewis The Sit-In
Cases: Great Expectations, [1963] SUPREME COURT REv. 101, 110; Note, 109 U. PA.
67 (1960).
L. REv.
25
6 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964), rejecting an abstention
contention in a federal suit for declaration of the first-fourteenth amendment unconstitutionality of a state loyalty oath statute. The Court said that abstention would
work to delay "ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time,
a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Ibid.
27 Under Louisiana v. United States, 33 U.S.L. WEEx 4262 (U.S. March 8,
1965), it appears that the Mississippi legislation fixing the qualifications of electors
is unconstitutional on its face. See note 1 supra. See also the excellent Case Note,
113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 587 (1965). If this legislation falls, it carries down the jury
qualification legislation as well, for in Mississippi jurors must be either qualified
electors or resident freeholders. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1962).
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substantial allegations made of state judicial hostility, and that such
allegations might supply the place of a facially unconstitutional statute
in demonstrating before trial that the defendant will likely be unable
to enforce his protected rights in the state courts. Technically, also,
it may be urged that a facially unconstitutional state statute is sufficiently implicated for Rives-Powers purposes if, although it does not
control the issues dispositive of the prosecution, it tends to create an
atmosphere of hostility against the defendant sufficiently strong that
the state judges and juries are likely to be carried along in the statewide swell 3
(The Mississippi statute books, of course, are honeycombed with facially unconstitutional racial legislation." 9 ) But in
view of the purposes of the Rives-Powers doctrine as I see it,260 these
somewhat more sophisticated modes of trying the loyalty of the state
judiciary ought not be allowed unless and until the doctrine as a whole
is reexamined and repudiated.. 6'
2. Subsections 1443(1) and (2): Protected Rights and Acts Under
"Any Law Providing for .

.

. Equal Civil Rights"

I return to explore the assumption which I have previously
made,26 that the civil rights removal statute protects all civil rights 263
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Subsection 1443 (1) allows
removal by a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce in the state
courts "a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction
thereof." 264 This language first appears in substance in the Revised
Statutes of 1875.165 Several courts have said that it means nothing
more than equal protection of the laws, and that removal is unauthorized unless the petitioner can show that a constitutional right
of equality is withheld in the state courts. 66 This seems incredible:
the text is "a right under" any law providing for equal civil rights,
etc.; the twenty-five word phrase surely goes to unreasonable lengths
258 Cf. the first paragraph of Senator Trumbull's speech set out in note 87 upra,
which does not appear to refer to legislation having the pervasive atmospheric effect
which I suppose. Compare the approach in the cases collected in note 7 supra.
259 See the partial collection in United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925,
984-85 n.33 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (three-judge district court) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 33 U.S.L. WEEiK 4258 (U.S. March 8, 1965).
260 See pp. 854-59 supra.
261 See pp. 911-12 infra.
262 See text following note 224 supra.
263 See note 41 supra.
264 The statute is set out in text at pp. 842-43 supra.
265 See REv. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148 supra (discussed at text accompanying notes 281-319 infra).
266 Steele v. Superior Court, 164 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.) (alternative ground), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948); Hill v. Pennsylvania, 183 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Pa.
1960) ; Maryland v. Kurek, 233 F. Supp. 431 (D. Md. 1964).
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Since these cases offer no
to say "equal protection of the laws."
supporting reasoning, I think they deserve no further concern.
A more redoubtable effort to identify the range of rights protected by section 1443 is made in New York v. Galanison,26 7 in the
Second Circuit, the first major decision by a federal appellate court
exercising the jurisdiction given by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
review remand orders in civil rights removal cases.2 s . Galamison
presented an attempt to remove prosecutions under a miscellany of
state charges (disorderly conduct, simple assault, nuisance, unlawful
assembly, loitering at a school building, inducing truancy, etc.) growing out of car and subway stall-ins, city hall sit-ins and schoolyard
leafleting to protest racial discrimination. Judge Friendly, who wrote
the principal opinion for the majority disallowing removal, found the
facts alleged in the petitions raised colorable claims that federal freespeech protection immunized the petitioners' conduct from the state
charges. Removal was sought to be sustained solely under subsection 1443(2), on the ground that the prosecutions were for acts
"under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights." 269 The language "any law providing for equal rights" in
subsection 1443(2) clearly means the same thing as the longer expression in subsection 1443(1), "any law providing for the equal civil
rights of citizens . . . or of all persons ..
,",
270 and the court
was asked to hold that petitioners' prosecutions for protests against
discrimination came within the statute on the theories (a) that free
speech conduct was per se conduct under color of authority of law
providing for equal rights (namely, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment or statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 21 and 18 U.S.C.
267

Nos. 29166-75, 2d Cir., Jan. 26, 1965.

268 See notes 173, 217 supra.
269 The statute is set out in text at pp. 842-43 supra.
270 As will appear below, the concept of a law providing for equal civil rights
originated in the codification of the removal statutes by § 641 of the Revised Statutes
of 1875. In that section, which is set out in note 148 supra, the removal provision
extended to any person who could not enforce in the state courts "any right secured
to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and to officers
or persons charged with wrongs done under color of authority "derived from any
law providing for equal rights as aforesaid." These two removal authorizations
(now respectively subsections (1) and (2) of § 1443) appeared in the 1911 Judicial
Code, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096, exactly as they had appeared in the Revised Statutes, with
the "color of authority" passage referring explicitly back to the "aforesaid" laws
described in the "cannot enforce" passage. Omission of "as aforesaid" in the 1948
revision effected no substantive change, for as indicated by the reviser's note, supra
note 2 150,
the 1948 revision intended only "changes . . . in phraseology."
71
Rzv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), provides that any person
who, under color of state law, subjects any citizen or person to "the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," shall be
liable to the injured party in a legal or equitable action or other proper proceeding
for redress. The section originates in § 1 of the Third Civil Rights Act, the Ku
Klux Act of 1871, set out in text accompanying note 141 supra.
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§ 242,272 creating civil and criminal liability for deprivation of due
process rights); or (b), more narrowly, that at least the exercise of
free speech to protest racial discrimination came under color of authority of such law (namely, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and statutes2

73

implementing it) .274

Judges

Friendly and Kaufman rejected the second theory on the ground that
the equal protection provisions of the Constitution and statutes did
not give color of authority to protest discrimination (a ground I shall
discuss at pp. 879-80 infra), and rejected the first theory on the same
ground, as respects due process guarantees, and also on the alternative
(hence unnecessary 275) ground that "§ 1443 (2) applies only to rights
that are granted in terms of equality and not to the whole gamut of
constitutional rights." 276 The latter holding, which affects sub272 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958) is the criminal parallel to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, note 271
supra. The section originates in § 2 of the First Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866,
ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, and § 17 of the Second Civil Rights Act, the Enforcement
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 144.
273 REv. STAT. §§ 1977-80 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985 (1958); 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1958). Present 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is the recodified form of § 16 of the Second
Civil Rights Act, the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144,
which extended to "all persons" most of the rights of equality given to "citizens"
by § 1 of the pre-fourteenth amendment First Civil Rights Act, set out in note 81
supra. Present § 1982 codifies the remaining equal rights of "citizens" originating
in the 1866 act. Present § 1983 is described in note 271 supra. Present § 1985, giving
a civil right of action for damages against persons who conspire to deprive "any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws," derives from § 2 of the Third Civil Rights Act,
the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. Present 18 U.S.C.
§ 241, the criminal parallel of § 1985, has the same derivation.
274 The removal petitioners in Galamison made no allegation of discriminatory
enforcement of the criminal laws under which they were charged; they did not,
that is, assert that New York prosecuted Negroes for offenses for which it would
not have prosecuted whites similarly circumstanced, in order to deprive Negroes
of the "right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of
speech . . . protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953).
Doubtless the allegation was not made because the fact could not be
proved: discrimination exists, of course, but it is discrimination between privileged
groups on the one hand and underprivileged groups (including Negroes) on the other,
and enforcement discrimination is unprovable because the privileged groups do not
(and do not have to) engage in the protest demonstrations in which the underprivileged groups engage. See pp. 800-01 supra.
275 It is not my purpose here to criticize the prevailing Galamison opinion; I
should ordinarily regard disagreement with Judge Friendly as the best evidence that
my position was untenable. Nevertheless, the range of unnecessary discussion in
the opinion seems exceptionable, particularly because it has the effect of truncating
important congressional legislation. Disposition of the removal petitioners' claims
on the ground that the conduct for which they were prosecuted was not "under
color of authority" of any federal law, within the meaning of § 1443(2), ends the
case; the alternative ground, involving the meaning of "any law providing for equal
rights," reaches out to affect § 1443(1) as well.
276 S.O. at 992. See the court's conclusion, s.o. at 995:
When the removal statute speaks of "any law providing for equal rights,"
it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such as the
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section 1443(1) as well as subsection 1443(2), is placed in part on
statutory language and history and in part on the view that federalism
will be wounded if federal courts are permitted to enforce too many
federal rights too early. Let us explore these concerns in order.
(a) On its face the phrase "any law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within
the jurisdiction thereof" might mean by "law" only federal statutory
law, or both federal statutory and constitutional law. In either case
it might refer (i) to certain specific statutes (and/or constitutional
provisions), such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871
(and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments); or (ii)
generically to statutes (and/or constitutional provisions) explicitly
guaranteeing equality of rights; or (iii) generically to statutes (and/or
constitutional provisions) whose purpose was to protect the Negro
and assure him in his civil rights, whether or not the statute (or
constitutional provision) speaks explicitly in terms of equality; or (iv)
generically to statutes (and/or constitutional provisions) protecting
civil rights universally (ergo, "equally" to all). The petitioners in
Galamison appear to have stood on constructions (i) and (iv), including within each the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
section 1 of the Third Civil Rights Act, the Ku Klux Act of 1871,
present 42 U.S.C. § 1983,7 which protects all fourteenth amendment
civil rights,"7 among them the first amendment freedoms of ex7
pressionY.1
The majority of the court rejected construction (iv) as
rendering the word "equal" tautological; and I find this reasoning
plausible enough. But the court also rejected the inclusion of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 within construction (i), saying that it did so for the
same reason that it rejected construction (iv) ."
This is wholly inplausible. "Equal" may be tautological if read to include all universally
given civil rights; it is not tautological if read as limiting section 1443
to protection of the several Civil Rights Acts, including that of 1871,
comprising present 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court then settled on construction (ii), preferring it to construction (iii), which the court
did not explicitly consider. I see no reason for this preference. As
historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws,
of which the due process clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient examples,
that confer equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing
them upon all.
277 See text accompanying note 141 supra;note 271 supra.
278 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ; note 41 supra.
27
o Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1943) (relief denied on other grounds); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 518, 527 (1939) (Stone, J.).
280 See s.o. at 985.
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a matter of language, constructions (i), (ii), or (iii) are equally
probable; and it is equally probable, also, that "law" means statute or
that it means statute and Constitution.
(b) Historically, the language referring the scope of section 1443
to laws providing for equal civil rights is the product of the Revised
Statutes of 1875. Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had
created original and removal jurisdiction in cases affecting or against
persons who were denied or could not enforce "any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act," and additional removal
jurisdiction in suits or prosecutions for trespasses or wrongs under
color of authority derived from the 1866 act or the Freedmen's Bureau
Act of 1865, "and all acts amendatory thereof." 281 The first section
of the 1866 act declared the Negroes citizens and gave all citizens the
same rights as whites in specified regards; 282 the Freedmen's Bureau
Act of 1865 28" created for the duration of the war a bureau to supervise abandoned lands and control "all subjects relating to refugees
and freedmen from rebel states," "' the bureau being empowered,
inter alia, to convey abandoned or confiscated lands to the refugees and
6
freedmen; 285 the Amendatory Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866,28
inter alia, continued the 1865 act for two years; 287 confirmed certain
sales of land and directed others by federal tax commissioners to the
freedmen;"8 3 and provided that, until the restoration of the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings and resumption of constitutional relations
with the central Government (including the seating of Representatives
in Congress) in any State in which these had been disrupted by the
war, the identical rights enumerated in section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 should be secured to all citizens without respect to race
or color, and the President through the Bureau should "extend military
protection and have military jurisdiction over all cases and questions
concerning the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights." 289 The
Second Civil Rights Act of 1870 extended to "all persons" the guarThe section is set out in text at pp. 810-11 supra.
The section is set out in note 81 supra.
283 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507.
2 84
Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, § 1, 13 Stat. 507.
285 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, § 4, 13 Stat. 508.
286 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173. The act was H.R. 613 of the
Thirty-ninth Congress. A predecessor bill, S. 60, was introduced by Senator Trumbull
and reported by the Senator from the Judiciary Committee contemporaneously with
S. 61, which became the Civil Rights Act of 1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 129 (Jan. 5, 1866), 184 (Jan. 11, 1866) ; see note 103 supra.
287 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 1, 14 Stat 173.
288 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, §§ 6-7, 14 Stat. 174-75.
289 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 176.
281

282
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antee of equality in most of those enumerated rights secured to "citizens" by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Amendatory Freedmen's
Bureau Act; 2 9 to protect the new guarantee, the 1870 act adopted by
reference the procedural provisions (including removal) of the 1866
act. m' Section 1 of the Third Civil Rights Act of 1871-the genesis
of present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 ---provided that any person who deprived another, under color of state law, of "any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution" should "be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress," the proceeding to be prosecuted in the federal courts
"with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and
other remedies" of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, "and the other
remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable
in such cases." 23 Codifying the civil rights removal jurisdiction,
section 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1875 allowed removal by any
defendant who was denied or could not enforce "any right secured to
him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States," and also by any defendant sued or prosecuted for trespasses
or wrongs under color of authority derived from such law. 4
Against this background, how do the various verbally possible
constructions of the statute fare? Alternative (i), referring section
1443 only to certain specific provisions of law enacted prior to 1875,
emerges as quite plausible, and the most likely statutory references are
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 alone. These were the only
precodification statutes unambiguously allowing removal in civil rights
cases; the 1866 act assured the equal rights of "citizens" and the 1870
act, those of "persons." -95 It is possible, though less plausible, that
the 1871 act was also meant to be included. Because its first section
speaks in terms of liability, I would tend to read the "other proper
proceeding for redress" which it allows to persons deprived of any
constitutional civil right, with the remedies given by the 1866 act, as
limited to original civil actions. But it would not be unreasonable to
read the section as authorizing removal, under the 1866 procedures,
whenever state suits or prosecutions deprived the state defendants of
See note 273 supra.
See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
292 See note 271 supra.
293 The section is set out in text at note 141 supra.
294 The section is set out in note 148 upra.
295 The plausibility of this construction is enhanced by the marginal references
to § 641 appearing in the print of the Revised Statutes. These cite the 1866 and 1870
acts, with their procedural precursors and amendments, exclusively.
290

291
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constitutional rights,"8 and the revisers may have so read it. Or the
Revised Statutes may have been intended to allow removal under the
1871 act, although not theretofore allowed, on the theory that the
codification should make uniform the remedies for rights given under
statutes having a common purpose to protect the Negroes." 7 If such
an expansion of the removal jurisdiction was intended, it is also
plausible to read "law providing for . . . equal civil rights" as in-

cluding the post-War amendments, particularly the fourteenth, whose
principal purpose was to validate and constitutionally enshrine the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. m
The court in Galamison, however, rejects theory (i), I think
correctly. The provisions of the pre-1875 civil rights acts were all
carried forward in sections of the Revised Statutes, and if the removal section were meant to refer exclusively to specific provisions of
law so codified, explicit cross-reference by chapter and section could
have been employed (as it was, for example, in codifying the federalofficer removal provisions) ."
Instead, generic language was used:
indeed, generic language so awkward that I cannot suppose it was
preferred over a simple cross-reference without conscious choice to
generalize. Like the Galarnison court, I would give it generalized application. The problem is to determine the appropriate principle of
generalization.
It would not be implausible to conclude that the revision adopted
the same principle of generalization that the fourteenth amendment had
followed in constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866; hence,
that that amendment and its implementing statutes are the measure of
the "laws" referred to in section 1443. This conclusion, which abuts
at alternative construction (iv), involves the difficulty stated above of
nullifying the word "equal." Galamison rejects it for this reason and
296 The court in Galamison summarily rejects such a reading on the ground that

"when Congress wished to expand the removal provisions, it used much more explicit
language, as in the Act of Feb. 28, 1871, § 16, 16 Stat. 438." S.O. at 987 n.12. This
generalization is incorrect, for the Civil Rights Act of 1870 obviously expanded the
removal provisions of the 1866 act merely by a general reference. See text accompanying notes 136-40, 291 supra. Moreover, the question is not how the 1871 act
alone should be construed, but how the revisers and Congress in 1875 might have
construed it.
297 See note 314 infra and accompanying text.
298 See authorities cited in note 84 supra.
299 See s.o. at 990:
We do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that the cross-reference
today covers only those equal rights laws that existed in 1866. As Congress
enacts new laws relating to equal rights, the cross-reference in § 1443 takes
them in; unquestionably the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a law providing for
equal rights within the removal statute.
300 REv. STAT. § 643 (1875). Such explicit cross-references are common in the
judiciary title of the Revised Statutes. See, e.g., REv. STAT. § 629, sixth, eleventh,
seventeenth, nineteenth (1875).
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for others that I find less persuasive. First, it is said (in accord with
the canons) that substantial effect in altering prior law should not be
given to a codification, that Congress "was so intent on avoiding substantive alterations that it designated a lawyer for the purpose of eradicating any such changes made by the codifying commission." 301 This
surely proves too much: under the Galamison court's own construction
(ii), referring section 1443 to "all laws stated in egalitarian terms," 302
Congress' lawyer did a strikingly poor job; for the construction very
substantially adds to the pre-1875 civil rights removal jurisdiction, as
the same Congress which was shortly to enact the egalitarian Civil
Rights Act of 1875 would not have failed to see. The lawyer did a
still worse job with other civil rights provisions of the revision. The
Revised Statutes in unequivocal terms broadened civil remedies for
civil rights violations."' It broadly rewrote the criminal statute punishing rights violations under color of state law, extending its coverage
beyond deprivations of egalitarian rights under the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1870 to reach deprivations of "any rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws." 304
Moreover, Galamison'sreasoning that construction (iv) would attribute
to the revision a "drastic . . . alteration in judicial jurisdiction" 0'

leaves out of account that the habeas corpus act of 1867 had given
the federal trial courts jurisdiction coextensive with the federal constitution and laws to abort state criminal trials, and that they were using
their jurisdiction in precisely that fashion prior to the date of the
revision.3 6 Second, Galamison argues, the "Reconstruction Congress
knew how to speak more broadly" 307 when it wished to protect all
fourteenth amendment rights: witness the first section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.30 Perhaps, but the Reconstruction Congress also
knew how to speak more specifically of equality when that was all it
meant to protect: witness the second section of the same act.30 9 These
arguments boil down to the proposition that the removal statute, present
section 1443, is far from lucid, a proposition no one disputes. Gala301 S.O. at 988.
302

Ibid.

203 Compare § 1 of the Third Civil Rights Act of 1871, note 141 .npra and ac-

companying text, protecting deprivation of rights secured by the "Constitution," with
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), protecting deprivation of rights secured by the "Constitution and laws."
304 Compare the provisions cited in note 272 mipra, with REv. STAT. § 5510

(1875).
305 S.O. at 988.
306 See notes 386-91 infra and accompanying text.
07 S.O. at 989.

308 See note 141 mipra and accompanying text.
309 See note 273 .nepra.
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mison's best comparative argument against construction (iv) is that
one of the Revised Statutes' judiciary provisions, section 629, sixteenth,3 10 does seem to distinguish rights secured by the Constitution,
on the one hand, from rights "secured by any law providing for equal
rights," on the other. Though this is not compelling,"1 ' it is a
point of some weight, and together with the inclusion of the word
"equal" in section 1443, leads me to agree with the court in rejecting
construction (iv).1'
It does not follow that the court's construction (ii), referring section 1443 to laws stated in egalitarian terms, is correct. There remains construction (iii), not considered in the Galainison opinion,
extending the section to laws whose purpose is egalitarian. The historical arguments which the court advances to support preference of
construction (ii) over construction (iv) provide no basis for choice
between constructions (ii) and (iii). Construction (ii) is narrower;
the court's general penchant for giving as slight effect as possible to
the revision does favor its adoption. For the reasons set out in the
preceding paragraph, however, I think that that penchant is a fundamentally unreliable basis for interpreting the statute. And I find in
history some affirmative cause to prefer construction (iii).
810oREv. STAT. §629, sixteenth (1875), gives the federal circuit courts jurisdiction of all suits authorized by law to be brought to redress the deprivation, under
color of state law, "of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution
of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights
of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States."

31 1 REv. STAT. § 629, sixteenth (1875), quoted in note 310 supra, governed the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The parallel jurisdictional provision for the district courts, REv. STAT. § 563, twelfth (1875), covered suits authorized by law to
be brought to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, "of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any
right secured by any law of the United States to persons within the jurisdiction
thereof." Applying the same logic to this section that Galantison applies to § 629,
sixteenth, one concludes that Congress must have distinguished rights secured by
the Constitution for whose redress suits were authorized by law, and rights secured
by law. This seems to me improbable; I prefer to recognize what is obvious to
any reader of the post-War Civil Rights Acts: that they were obscurely and sloppily
drafted, and obscurely and sloppily codified, and that close intersection comparison
provides at best slight illumination.
B12 Galatnison purports to rely on authority as well as reason in rejecting construction (iv). I think its authorities unpersuasive. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565 (1896), is discussed in note 224 supra; in addition to what is said there,
I doubt that the Gibson court thought of an ex post facto claim as depending on
the fourteenth amendment. Steele v. Superior Court, 164 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948), is disposed of in the text accompanying note 266.
The argument from Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), supposes
that the Supreme Court had the civil rights removal statute in mind when it decided
that injunction case; I am unwilling to make the assumption. Nothing in the case
was calculated to call attention to that statute, which had been a dead letter for
better than thirty years prior to 1943. Its inconspicuousness is indicated by the
slight notice given it in, for example, the exhaustive FRANKFURTER & LAN IS, THE
Busixss OF THE SUPEME COURT 62 n.22 (1927).
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Under construction (ii), the revision took out of the removal jurisdiction certain sorts of cases previously within it, those under the Freedmen's Bureau Act. That act had authorized the conveyance of abandoned lands to the freedmen and, assuming the correctness of the
construction put on subsection 1443(2) at pp. 874-80 infra, state
prosecutions arising out of their self-help efforts to defend such property against its pre-War title-holders would have been removable under
the 1866 removal section.3 13 The Freedmen's Bureau Act had expired,
of course, and most of the land had been restored to its pre-War
owners prior to the date of the revision. But the act demonstrates that
Congress had seen the utility of legislation which was not explicitly
egalitarian to protect the Negro following the War, and that Congress
had employed removal jurisdiction in connection with such legislation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, whose first section is present 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, was an instance of protective legislation of this kind; 314 the
due process clause of the fourtenth amendment was another.3 15 Practically, as I have tried to show at the beginning of this Article, 1 6 the
civil rights guaranteed by the clause and the statute all amount in
essence to a guarantee of equality. It is difficult to imagine that the
revisers of 1875 did not take account of the ordinary and necessary
flexibility of legislative means, and in their concern for statutes protecting "equal civil rights," did not understand that there had been
and doubtless would continue to be statutes of egalitarian purpose which
nevertheless did not proceed to their purpose simply by providing that
A's treatment should be equal with B's. The issue is not easily resolved, but on the whole I find more tenable that construction of
313 I refer to self-help resulting in personal injury to an attempted dispossessor.
See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869).
314The opinions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), canvass the legislative
background of the statute. Its second section is egalitarian in terms, within the
requirement imposed by Galamison, and if I were disposed to accept the court's
construction of § 1443 as requiring explicit egalitarianism, I might nonetheless conclude that § 2 of the 1871 statute qualified the entire enactment as a law providing
for equal civil rights.

315 The amendment

ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States (evidently referring to the newly made citizens . . .).

It ordains that no State shall

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the
same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed,
that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color ?
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
816 See pp. 800-02 supra.
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section 1443 which refers removability to laws of egalitarian purpose,
not merely those of egalitarian terms.
However-and again the issue is not easy-I think that the "law"
to which section 1443 refers is statutory law alone, not statutory and
constitutional law. Strauder seems to take this view, 17 and the use
of the term "law" with the clear meaning of "statute" in several cognate
judiciary provisions of the Revised Statutes tends at least slightly to
support it."" Prior to the revision, removal jurisdiction had been
used exclusively to implement specific congressional programs, and I
see no evident reason for the revisers to go beyond this use. Section 1
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, present 42 U.S.C. § 1983, gives statutory
protection to the constitutional guarantees of civil rights 319 which were
the Reconstruction Congress' concern; considerations touched in the
next paragraph counsel caution against going beyond the statute the
length and breadth of the fourteenth amendment.
(c)

Galamison fears the "effects

.

.

.

on federal-state rela-

tions" 32 of construing section 1443 to reach other federal guarantees
than those of equality. In view of the protean developments of the
due process clause during the last century, I share the court's reluctance to allow removal in the service of all due process claims. But I
do not think restriction to claims of equality is the appropriate limiting
principle. In the first place, that restriction is less effective than the
Galamison majority appears to believe. The equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment-which the Galamison opinion expressly
allows is a law providing for equal civil rights 3 2 1 -has its history of
imperialisms too. Even Mr. Justice Holmes could not resist finding
some of Spencer's Social Statics within it; " and several of the
frightening examples which Galamison displays of cases not to be
removed without destruction of federalism-Sunday law prosecutions,
prosecutions for practicing a profession without a license 3--present
as colorable equal protection as due process claims.3 24 Second, the due
317The

Court in Strauder was not content to rest on the equal protection clause

of

the fourteenth amendment, but placed removability on denial of a right under REv.
STAT. § 1977 (1875), the successor to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See note

223 supra.

318 See Rsv. STAT. §§ 1979, 5510 (1875) (discussed respectively in note 271 supra
and text accompanying note 304 supra) ; notes 310-11 supra.
319 See note 41 supra.
32 0 S.O. at 992.
321 Id. at 982.
322-See McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).

3= S.O. at 992-93.
324 The Supreme Court's treatment of the equal protection claims in McGowan

v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and companion Sunday-law cases, demonstrates
that commodity discrimination may in some circumstances support a colorable equal
protection claim. And to allow removal of Sunday-law prosecutions on the equal

874

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113:793

process guarantees of individual liberty, although not expressly egalitarian, have substantial egalitarian effect, 323 and among them are some,
principally freedom of expression, in which the need for a removal
jurisdiction is particularly strong.3 26 I think the desired limiting principle is best supplied by the construction of "law providing for . .
equal civil rights" suggested in the immediately preceding paragraphs:
statutory law whose purpose is to protect minority groups in their
equal enjoyment of civil rights. This construction reaches so much
of the due process and equal protection clauses as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
implements: namely, rights "of personal liberty not dependent for
[their] . . . existence upon the infringement of property rights."

327

3. Subsection 1443 (2): Acts "Under Color of Authority" of
Civil Rights Law
Although subsections 1443(1) and 1443(2) both concern federal law protecting equal civil rights, the subsections operate on different principles. To support subsection 1443(2) removal, a state
defendant need not show that he is denied or cannot enforce his protected rights in the state courts; it is enough that he colorably ' 28 show
he is protected by federal law. However, the federal law must protect
him in the conduct underlying the prosecution, not merely in some
protection ground would, of course, carry considerably broader implications for
the removability of prosecutions under state regulatory legislation generally than
would allowance of removal in the Sunday cases on religious freedom grounds. As
for prosecutions under state professional licensing statutes, Galamison cites Hornsbyv. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964). See
s.o. at 993. Hornsby holds arbitrary denial of a liquor license unconstitutional on
alternative due process and equal protection grounds; the equal protection claim is
better grounded, I think, than is civil rights jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958). See text accompanying note 327 infra.
=-3See pp. 800-02 supra.
326 See notes 253-56 stpra and accompanying text
327 See note 41 supra.
328 Doubtless a state defendant petitioning for removal under § 1443(2) would
not be required to show that he is protected by federal law: that question is the issue
on the merits after removal jurisdiction has been sustained. On the preliminary
question of jurisdiction, it should be sufficient to show colorable protection. This is
the rule in federal-officer removal cases, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257,
261-62 (1880) ; Potts v. Elliott, 61 F. Supp. 378, 379 (E.D. Ky. 1945) (civil case);
Logemann v. Stock, 81 F. Supp. 337, 339 (D. Neb. 1949) (civil case); Ex parte
Dierks, 55 F.2d 371, 374 (D. Colo. 1932), mandamus granted on other grounds stb
nora. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); Colorado v. Maxwell, 125 F. Supp.
18, 23 (D. Colo. 1954), leave to file petition for prerogative writs denied sub non.
Colorado v. Knous, 348 U.S. 941 (1955), and it was so held under the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 removal provisions, see text at notes 68-70 supra,
on which the Civil Rights Act of 1866 removal section was based. See Hodgson v.
Millward, 12 Fed. Cas. 285 (No. 6568) (E.D. Pa. 1863) (civil case). The facts
of the case appear in Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant (Pa.) 412 (Strong, J., at nisi
prius, 1863), and Justice Grier's decision is approved in Braun v. Sauerwein, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 218, 224 (1869).
Galamison takes this view, in dictum, under
present § 1443(2). S.O. at 976. Compare Arkansas v. Howard, 218 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ark. 1963), where defendant was unable to make a colorable showing.
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matter of trial procedure: 329 the language of the subsection allows
removal "for any act under color of authority derived from any law
providing for equal rights." 330 In this phrase it is the concept "color
of authority" which presents a number of constructional difficulties. 38
(a) The District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
has recently held that in order to bring himself within subsection
1443(2) a removal petitioner must show that "the act for which the
state prosecution is brought was done in at least a quasi-official capacity
derived from a law providing for equal rights." 32 This narrow view
of "color of authority" is frequently urged against the removal jurisdiction in cases of the sort described at the beginning of this Article.3 3
The Galamison opinion flirts with it, but after a few overtures leaves
the question undecided."'
As a matter of language, subsection (2) might mean to cover
(i) only federal officers enforcing laws providing for equal civil rights;
or (ii) federal officers enforcing such laws and also private persons
authorized by the officers to assist them in enforcement; or (iii) the
preceding class and also all persons exercising privileges or immunities
under such laws. 335 Construction (i) is a horse shortly curried: the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 allowed removal of suits and prosecutions
"against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest
or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or
under color of authority derived from . . ." the act or the Freedmen's
Bureau legislation; 336 this "officer . . . or other person" formula
survived successive codifications 837 until 1948; all words limiting the
nature or character of the petitioner were then dropped,3 38 the reviser's
note disclaiming substantive change. 339 Alternative construction (ii)
329 Denial or inability to enforce protected civil rights in trial procedure is, of
course, a ground for removal under present § 1443(1), as Strauder held.
330 The statute is set out in text at pp. 842-43 supra.
331 Present § 1443(2) has never been before the Supreme Court.
Galantison
and a sequel, Board of Educ. v. City-Wide Comm. for the Integration of Schools,
No. 29501, 2d Cir., Feb. 18, 1965, are the only court of appeals decisions which
have yet construed the subsection. The only reported district court decisions appear
to be Arkansas v. Howard, 218 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ark. 1963), and City of
Clarksdale v. Gertge, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2363 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 23, 1964).
332 Ibid. The facts of the case are set out in note 222 supra.
333 See pp. 794-96 ,ipra.
334 S.O. at 976-80.

335 Private persons not authorized by federal officers to enforce federal laws
could not claim "color of authority derived from" such laws in any other manner
than by exercising privileges or immunities given them by the laws.
336 (Emphasis added.)
The statute is set out in text at pp. 810-11 supra.
337 See REV. STAT. § 641 (1875), note 148 supra; Judicial Code of 1911, ch.
231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096, note 150 supra.
338

The statute in its present form is set out in text at pp. 842-43 supra.

339 See note 150 supra.
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takes color from the "arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs"
phraseology of 1866, language which at first blush seems more plausibly directed to law enforcement activity than to activity in the exercise
of rights given by the law; 40 and the plausibility of the construction
is strengthened by the observation that this language is lifted virtually
verbatim from the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863,'41 where
it pretty clearly was addressed to actions arising out of injuries inflicted
by Union officers and persons acting under them.3 42
However, the modeling of the 1866 statute on that of 1863 (whose
procedures the later statute also adopted by reference) does not seem
to me to compel congruent readings of the provisions. The wording
used is closely similar, but it is in each case general language which
necessarily takes its meaning from the context of the respective laws.
These were very different in their substantive provisions and purposes.
The 1863 legislation was concerned principally with empowering military arrests and imprisonments during the War, and with protecting
properly authorized Union officers in these activities. It gave no
privileges or immunities to private individuals. The Civil Rights Act
of 1866 did grant extensive private privileges and immunities, including some whose exercise would foreseeably provoke state-law charges
of trespasses and wrongs. Section 1, for example, gave all citizens
the equal right to acquire and hold real and personal property and to
full and equal benefit of all laws for the security of person and property.34 3

In the exercise of ordinary self-help measures to defend their

property or resist arrest under the discriminatory Black Codes, freedmen asserting their equal rights under these sections would likely
commit acts for which they might be civilly or criminally charged in
the state courts. I think the "color of authority" clause of the removal
340 Section 5 of the 1866 act authorized United States commissioners to appoint
private individuals to execute warrants and other process in enforcement of the act,
and these latter persons were authorized to call the bystanders or posse comitatus
of the county to their aid. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 5, 14 Stat. 28.
341 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
342 Section 4 of the 1863 act, 12 Stat. 756, pp. 808-09 mupra, provided that any
order of the President, or under his authority, made during the rebellion, should be a
defense to any suit or prosecution for any search, seizure, arrest or imprisonment
done, or acts omitted to be done, under the order or act of Congress. Section 7,
12 Stat. 757, provided a two-year statute of limitations for any suit or prosecution
for any arrest or imprisonment or other trespasses or wrongs done, or act omitted,
during the rebellion under presidential order or act of Congress. Section 5, 12 Stat.
756, authorized removal of suits or prosecutions against any officer or other person
for any arrest or imprisonment or other trespasses or wrongs done, or act omitted,
during the rebellion, by virtue or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under presidential order or act of Congress. These provisions were
obviously an integrated packet, and the Court in Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
339 (1869), held that actions of ejectment were not removable under the 1863 act,
but that the act reached only actions for personal wrongs.
843 The section is set out in note 81 supra.
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section, present subsection 1443(2), covers such cases in terms; that
by the clause Congress meant to authorize removal of the cases without
requiring the state defendant to demonstrate in addition that he was
denied or could not enforce his equal civil rights in the state courts,
within the meaning of the "denial" clause which is now subsection
1443 (1). The "denial" clause covers deprivations of rights in state
trial procedure. Its broad terms also reach deprivations of substantive
rights, but its primary concern is procedural: literally denial or obstruction of federal rights "in the courts of [the] . . . State."

The

"color of authority" clause isolates and separately treats cases involving substantive federal claims. Here, for reasons stated above, 44 there
is imperative need for an immediate and noncontingent federal jurisdiction, and for the confidence given by the assurance of such a jurisdiction, lest exercise of the federally guaranteed substantive rights be
deterred by fear that those rights may later have to come to the test
in an unsympathetic state court. Like the freedoms of speech and
protest today, the privileges given the freedmen in 1866 to have an
equal enjoyment of property and to move about unconstrained by
racially discriminatory regulations 341 would have been seriously impaired if the freedmen had thought that they could be haled before the
state courts in the first instance on charges of exercising those freedoms. 34 6 Exercise of the freedoms was, I think, within congressional
contemplation an act "under color of authority" of the Civil Rights Act.
In rejecting the more restrictive construction (ii), I take some
support from three technical considerations. First, the "color of
authority" clause of the 1866 act applies to "persons" without explicit
limitation to persons acting under federal officers. The same Congress
which passed the act put such an explicit limitation in the "authority"
344 See

pp. 859-61 supra.
845 The freedom of movement which the act of 1866 intended to assure the
freedmen against the "pass" system of the Southern States is perhaps the closest
1866 analogue to the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition which the Court has
increasingly protected during the last thirty years. Senator Trumbull persistently
recurred to the evils of the "pass" system, in debate on the civil rights bill, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866), 1759 (April 4, 1866), and on the
amendatory freedmen's bureau bill, id. at 941 (Feb. 20, 1866).
346 Under Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), pp. 843-44 supra,
a case for pretrial removal under present § 1443(1) would be made by a showing
that discriminatory state laws denied a freedman the right to hold property or to go
abroad without a pass. But it is highly probable that the Thirty-ninth Congress,
unlike the Strauder court, thought that unconstitutional state legislation would not
eo ipso sustain removal under' the "denial" clause. See Senator Trumbull's speech
set out in note 87 supra. I cannot believe that Congress intended the freedmen
to go to state court trial in such cases. Cf. CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 320
(Jan. 19, 1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull on the amendatory freedmen's bureau
bill). But unless the "color of authority" clause was intended to reach the cases,
they could not have been removed.
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clause of the revenue-officer removal statute of that year.8 47 Although
I do not expect verbal tidiness of the Reconstruction Congress, I think
the comparison has some persuasive force. Second, the "color of
authority" provision of 1866 was carried forward with the "denial"
provision in section 641 of the Revised Statutes.34s Other removal
provisions applying to federal officers and persons acting under themincluding the provisions of the 1871 amendatory act to the Second
Civil Rights Act 84 9-- were carried forward in section 643.35
I think
that this is some evidence of a relatively contemporary understanding
that, unlike the section 643 provisions, the "color of authority" clause
of the civil rights removal section applies to persons who are neither
federal officers nor acting under federal officers. Finally, I see some
evidence of a similar congressional understanding in the continuation
of the civil rights "color of authority" section in subsection 1443(2)
in 1948. The 1948 revision of title 28 of the United States Code
expanded the earlier revenue-officer removal statutes to cover in section
1442 (a) (1) all suits or prosecutions against any federal "officer . . .
or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office." 351
If subsection 1443 (2) reaches only federal officers and persons acting
under them, it is wholly tautological in the 1948 Code. I would not
reason from this that the Code should be given the effect of creating
a civil rights removal jurisdiction broader than that theretofore given.
But in view of the ambiguities in language and history of prior law,
I think that the desirability of giving subsection 1443(2) some meaningful place in the context of present judiciary legislation ought be
given weight.352
347 See text accompanying note 74 .rpra. The same limitation is found in
the revenue-officer removal statute of 1815. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
The revenue-officer statute of 1833 has no similar limitation. See text accompanying
note 60 supra.
348 The section is set out in note 148 supra.
349 See note 144 supra and accompanying text. The 1871 provision does not
contain the limitation found in the statutes cited in note 347 supra, probably because no such limitation was required. The 1871 act, like that of 1863, purported
to create no private privileges or immunities.
350 Rm,. STAT. § 643 (1875).
351 See note 196 supra.
352
In Galamdson judge Friendly suggests several points which I have not heretofore considered in favor of construction (ii). He asks why, if the "color of
authority" clause of the 1866 act were intended to reach persons acting other than
under federal officers, the clause enumerated "any officer . . . or other person" instead of merely repeating the term "persons" used in the denial clause. I think the
answer is twofold. First, the "color of authority" clause is lifted practically unchanged
from the 1863 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Second, in view of the language of
the denial clause, "arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs," the use of the
phrase "any officer . . . or other person" more strongly conveys coverage of nonofficer persons than might the words "any person" standing alone. Judge Friendly
also says that "since the first [denial) clause was directed only toward freedmen's
rights, symmetry would suggest that the second clause concerned only acts of enforcement." S.O. at 977. I have suggested elsewhere the improbability of finding sym-
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(b) The Galarnison court reserves the question whether subsection 1443(2) ever reaches wholly unofficial conduct and assumes that
it does. But the majority holds that a civil rights demonstrator's free
speech conduct is not within the subsection, because neither the first
and fourteenth amendments nor the federal civil and criminal statutes
which impose liability for deprivations of first-fourteenth amendment
freedoms give the demonstrator "color of authority" to speak. The
subsection "refers to a situation where the lawmakers manifested an
affirmative intention that a beneficiary of such a law should be able to
do something and not merely to one where he may have a valid defense
or be entitled to have civil or criminal liability imposed on those interfering with him." "' What the court must mean by this is that "color
of authority" is not made out unless federal civil rights law directs
the state defendant to act, as distinguished from guaranteeing him freedom to act if he chooses."5 4 In no other sense do the first and fourteenth amendments, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 neglect to
manifest "an affirmative intention" that speech be free.?55
To support this construction, the court says that "color of authority" in subsection 1443(2) must have a narrower meaning than
"a right under" in subsection 1443 (1), "since otherwise, in almost all
cases covered by the first clause . .

.

, the requirement of showing

denial or inability to enforce would be avoided by resort to the second." 3" But under any construction of "color of authority," subsection (2) has a narrower reach than subsection (1); the "act"
requirement of subsection (2) limits that subsection to cases presenting
substantive federal claims. The court's argument therefore has several
weaknesses. First, its phrase "almost all cases" makes the extraordimetry in reconstruction civil rights legislation; but, in any event, sufficient symmetry
appears in the design of the statute to cover only substantive federal claims in the
"color of authority" clause, but to reach procedural claims in the "denial" clause.
Finally, Judge Friendly makes the point that original and removal jurisdiction are
conferred by the "denial" clause, and only removal jurisdiction by the "color of
authority" clause. This is said to be explicable on the ground that freedmen would
require the aid of federal courts both to enforce and to defend claims, whereas
federal officers and persons acting under them would require only defensive assistance.
S.O. at 978. The argument leaves out of account the unique importance of a noncontigent federal defensive jurisdiction in encouraging self-help; federal enforcement

jurisdiction need be less imperative to serve its functions.
35 S.O. at 995.

354The court's qualified language appears designed not to exclude public accommodations cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from the scope of § 1443 (2).

But, I think, in view of the issues posed in Galamison, that its "color of authority"
holding necessarily excludes those cases.
355 It is patent that the civil and criminal liability of the federal statutes is
designed in principal part to deter state interference with the constitutional rights
which it protects. And particularly in the case of free speech is the guarantee
destroyed if it is construed as a guarantee of success in a lawsuit sometime following
repression.
86 S.O. at 981.
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narily implausible assumption that the incidence of colorable substantive
due process and equal protection claims far outstrips the incidence of
colorable procedural claims. Second, subsection (2) might well be
designed precisely to avoid "the requirement of showing denial or
inability to enforce" in the case of substantive claims, for good and
sufficient reason357 Third, as Judge Marshall's persuasive dissent
points out, 358 the majority's insistence on a statutory directive wholly
defeats its assumption that subsection 1443 (2) may reach private, unofficial action. I know of no federal law providing for equal civil rights
(however that phrase be construed) which directs anyone other than
a federal officer to do a protected act. It is the characteristic of these
laws to promote freedom, not command conduct. Hence, the majority's assumption-and my conclusion above-that "color of authority"
derived from equal civil rights law protects private individuals compels
a conception of "authority" as "authorization," "license," "protection"
-entirely natural meanings of the term. The majority also says that
because in the cases "at which § 1443(2) was primarily aimed and to
which it indubitably applies-acts of officers or quasi-officers," the
removal petitioner would have acted "on a specific statute or order
telling him to act," a "private person claiming the benefit of § 1443 (2)
can stand no better; he must point to some law that directs or encourages him to act in a certain manner . . . . 35 Again I find Judge
Marshall's response compelling: "The manner in which a private person acts under the authority of a law need not be the same as that of
an officer." M The law applies to each according to his nature; the
assumption or conclusion that it applies to private individuals at all
precludes the holding that it applies only when a private individual
meets some condition which private individuals never meet.
(c) There remains the question of the requisite relationship between the conduct which a removal petitioner can show is colorably
protected and the act on which the prosecution is based. Subsection
1443(2) allows removal of prosecutions "for" protected conduct.
Clearly, the relationship is satisfied in the case of the Mississippi defendants who are charged with parading without a license and obstructing the sidewalk: 361 federally protected acts are here asserted by the
State to constitute the operative elements of offenses. 62 Doubtless it
57 See pp. 859-61, 876-77 supra.
358 S.O. at 1006-07.
359 S.O. at 981.
300 S.O. at 1006.
3n See pp. 795-96 supra.
362 It makes no difference, I think, that the federal law upon which the peti-

tioners rely does not immunize them absolutely against any and all state charges,
but only against the charge in fact made-that my juvenile petitioners, for example,
might be forbidden access to the streets under another type of regulatory legislation
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is also satisfied in the case of the charges for creating a disturbance by
loud and offensive talk, notwithstanding the defendants so charged deny
that in fact they said anything loudly or offensively. Here again the
state charge is referable to a factual situation in which the defendants
exercised federal liberties and did nothing beyond the scope of those
liberties; removal cannot be defeated by the State's allegation that that
situation was other than in fact it was. 3 The problem becomes more
difficult if the defendants, en route to the registrar's office, are arrested
and charged with a status crime like vagrancy, which in Mississippi
makes punishable all persons capable of working who have no reasonably continuous lawful employment for reasonable compensation.8 64 It

becomes more difficult still in a case where a voter registration worker
for a civil rights organization is charged with drunk driving while
returning home after dinner, or where the leader of a local civil rights
movement is charged with illicit possession of beer or making indecent
proposals to a minor. 6 ' If this last sort of charge is removable, every
state prosecution is subject to delay while a federal court inquires into
the motives of the prosecutor. If it is not, the States are left with large
66
resources for harassment.
I do not raise this issue here in order to resolve it even tentatively.
Some measure or measures of proximity between the State's charge
and the removal petitioner's federally protected activities will have to be
developed, but it is too early-in advance of any significant twentieth
century federal appellate development of the other issues under section
1443-to suggest appropriate lines of development. Obviously, treatment of the proximity issue will be affected by the decision whether the
Rives-Powers doctrine, whose mainspring seems to be reluctance to
disrupt state trials by preliminary federal factual inquiry into issues
not unlike that of the prosecutor's motive, should be continued, limited,
or overruled. It will be affected by the scope of removal allowed under
subsection 1443 (1) on the ground of state procedural impediments
to enforcement of federal rights, because if that subsection is given
than the parading without a license ordinance. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944). Federal guarantees generally operate in this partial manner, depriving the States of power to move in certain ways against individual conduct,
rather than affirmatively sanctioning the conduct. This was true of the rights to
equal treatment conferred by § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act: the States were left
free to regulate contractual capacity, capacity to hold land, to sue, etc., on any other
ground than race.
S63 Cf. Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 32-33 (1926) (considered
dictum), a federal officer case arising under the statute authorizing removal of
prosecutions against officers "on account of any act done under color of . . . office
or of [specified federal] . . . law."
864 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2666(c) (1956).
865 See Henry v. Mississippi, 85 Sup. Ct. 564 (1965); Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
366 In a federal-officer case, apparently, this sort of harassment prosecution
would not be removable. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926).
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ample ambit, many cases in States where harassment is a serious problem will be removable on other grounds than harassment. It will be
affected by the development of presently embryonic areas of substantive
federal constitutional law: particularly, development of the question
when, if ever, the federal constitution precludes state conviction on a
well-founded and otherwise unassailable state charge by reason of an
illicit purpose of the prosecutor to harass persons for the exercise of
federal liberties. It will be affected by the development of other protective federal procedures, particularly the injunction.3
These matters can only be left to the future.
D. Choosing Among the Possible Constructions
In this part III, I have tried to identify the critical issues of construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1443, to explicate critically the few pertinent
judicial decisions, and to explore the range of possible constructional
choice. I have rejected several possible constructions, and elsewhere
indicated some preference among constructions none of which I could
conclusively reject. Further refinements of choice must wait upon
discussion of an alternative remedy to removal: federal habeas corpus.3 "
IV.

HABEAS CORPUS

3 69

A. The Statute 37o
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3)

(1958),

containing the recodi-

3 67

See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. The injunction is, in some
regards, a more likely remedy for the drunk-driving or possession-of-beer type of
harassment prosecution than is removal. Substantiation of the substantive claim of
harassment will ordinarily be difficult to make without showing a pattern or practice of prosecution, and if this is shown, class relief seems appropriate. On the other
hand, there are obvious problems in putting state officials under injunction in respect
to enforcement of a state's general drunk driving law.
368 See pp. 908-12 infra.
369 Federal habeas corpus is an original civil proceeding technically independent
of the state criminal prosecution whose validity it questions. The action is brought
by the criminal defendant, as petitioner, against the state official who has him in
custody, as respondent, to challenge under federal law respondent's authority to
detain petitioner. Respondent returns the state charges against the petitioner as
justification for the detention; the only issue tried in the habeas proceeding is the
validity of those charges against petitioner's federal law claim. If the claim prevails, the federal court orders petitioner discharged, and the prosecution is thereafter
barred; if the claim fails, petitioner is remanded, and the State may proceed to
trial in the state courts. Thus, unlike removal which transfers the entire state proceeding to the federal court for trial on all issues, habeas corpus isolates and provides an anticipatory federal trial of the state defendant's federal defenses. See
AmSTDAM,
201-20. This sort of habeas corpus jurisdiction, exercised under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1958), and which I shall call anticipatory habeas corpus, should
be distinguished from the employment of habeas corpus cum causa under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(f) (1958) incident to removal. The latter is merely a mechanism by which
a federal court takes from state custody the body of a prisoner whose prosecution
has been removed under one of the removal statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958),

discussed in part III mipra.

370 Habeas corpus power is conferred on the federal courts and judges by 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1958), and the procedure in habeas corpus regulated by 28 U.S.C.
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37

1

provisions of the Act of February 5, 1867, chapter 28,372 em-

powers the federal courts and judges to discharge a prisoner when:
"(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." Unlike the removal statute, this provision does not wear its troubles on its face. There is some question
what is meant by "custody," particularly as applied to a bailed defendant, 7M but that problem is largely" tangential to my purpose and
I shall not treat it here. As a matter of mere language, I suppose there
might also be some question whether a state criminal defendant is held
"in violation of the Constitution" when he is held for a trial at which
he will have the opportunity to make his constitutional defense to the
charges against him. But the Supreme Court has long held that the
habeas corpus statute empowers pretrial release of prisoners held on

charges which the State cannot constitutionally apply to their conduct; 375 as a matter of language read in context and historical perspective, the Court could not have held otherwise. 6 Subsection
2241 (c) (3), then, clearly authorizes a federal habeas court to discharge my hypothetical Mississippi arrestees3 " The sole difficulty in
the case arises from a doctrine promulgated by the Court without
§§ 2242-54 (1958). Section 2241 has five subdivisions which codify the four principal habeas corpus enactments, of 1789, 1833, 1842, and 1867. Some cases within
the scope of this Article may be reached by § 2241 (c) (2), the descendant of the
1833 Force Act, see notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text, which now authorizes
release of persons "in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act
of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States." But virtually all such cases will also fall within the broader provisions of § 2241(c) (3) and, because the problems under the subsections are not
dissimilar, I shall discuss only the latter.
371 See notes 149-50 supra.
372 See notes 109-34 supra and accompanying text.
373 The older cases hold that bail status is not custody. Johnson v. Hoy, 227
U.S. 245 (1913) ; Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920) (alternative ground).
An argument that these cases have been sapped by Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236 (1963), is made in AmSTmEDAm 221-37.
374 If bail status is not recognized as "custody," a state criminal defendant otherwise able to secure release on bond following his arrest will be required to remain
in jail as the price of invoking the anticipatory federal jurisdiction. Such a requirement would pose a serious practical obstruction to the efficacy of the anticipatory
habeas remedy in many cases, but the obstruction is not insurmountable. Since the
habeas corpus court has discretion to bail the petitioner, see Johnson v. Marsh,
227 F.2d 528 (3d Cir., 1955), and the order in In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35
(1962), the time he is required to remain in jail need not be longer than a few days.
375 In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890) ; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (alternative reliance on the 1833 and 1876 habeas corpus statutes); Hunter v. Wood, 209
U.S. 205 (1908) (semble) (same); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245-50 (1886)
(dictum); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892) (dictum); Whitten v.
Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 241-42 (1895) (dictum); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284,
290 (1898) (dictum).
370 See notes 57-134 supra and accompanying text; notes 379-85, 469-77 infra and
accompanying text.
377 See pp. 794-96 supra.
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78
statutory basis: the doctrine of Ex parte Royall,3 decided in 1886, re-

quiring that the exercise of the federal habeas corpus authority be
stayed until a state prisoner has exhausted his available state judicial
remedies.
B. The Cases
1. Development of the Exhaustion Doctrine
Habits of thought generated by three-quarters of a century of
application of the exhaustion doctrine make it difficult for American
courts and lawyers today to conceive of federal habeas corpus as
anything but a postconviction remedy.3 9 The nineteenth century
Congresses which expanded the habeas corpus jurisdiction to its
present scope thought in no such terms. Prior to the twentieth century,
postconviction use of the writ was rare though not unknown; 380 the
English courts had early used it in its various forms "for removing
prisoners from one court into another, for the more easy administration
of justice"; 11 common-law habeas corpus ad subjiciendun, the great
878

117 U.S. 241 (1886).

379 Postconviction development of the writ is discussed in the sources cited in
note 174 supra.
380 Examination of the texts clearly indicates that in England the writ was most
commonly used, and thought of, as pretrial, not postconviction process. E.g., 3
ComyNs, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 454-55 (1785); 2 HAL., PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 143-47, 210-11 (1st Am. ed. 1847). See generally 4 BACON, A NEW
One of the relatively infrequent instances
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 563-605 (1844).
of its postconviction use is the celebrated Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 6 How. St.
Tr. 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), discharging petitioners from a contempt
commitment. Several of the precedents cited in Bushell's Case similarly involve
summary commitment.
In this country the Supreme Court of the United States early employed the
federal writ in behalf of persons committed for trial, to release them on bail, United
States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), or to discharge them for want of
probable cause, Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) ; but in Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830), the Court held that where the respondent's
return to the writ showed that the petitioner was held by virtue of the judgment of a
court having jurisdiction, the inquiry on habeas corpus ended and no reexamination
would be made of the lawfulness of the judgment. See Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 330 (1915). Watkins thus restricted postconviction use of habeas corpus
to a very narrow compass; it was only with Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163 (1873), that expansion began via the "jurisdictional" fiction, and only with
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), that federal habeas corpus emerged from
the fiction in its modern role as a postconviction remedy. See sources cited note 174
supra. The state courts, too, generally disallowed postconviction use of the writ
prior to the twentieth century. See cases collected in Thompson, Abuses of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. L. REv. 1, 17-18 n.1 (1884). See also Oaks, Habeas
Corpus in the States, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 258-64 (1965).
381 3 BLACKSTOsE, COMMENTARIES *129. Blackstone refers in this passage to
other forms of the writ than habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. See Fox, Process
of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L.Q. Rxv. 46 (1923); Jenks, The -Story of
the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. Rxv. 64, 67-68 (1902).
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writ, developed principally as a remedy against executive detention
2 and the celebrated Habeas
without, or prior to, judicial trial; ..
ConCorpus Act of 1679 3 authorized exclusively pretrial relief.3
sistently with this background, the several congressional statutes extending federal habeas corpus to state prisoners were clearly designed, in
the classes of cases with which each was principally concerned, to give
prisoners held by state authorities in advance of state court processes
an immediate federal judicial proceeding to secure their release.3 "
The broad scope of the habeas corpus jurisdiction conferred by
the 1867 act-intended, as its House manager said, to be "coextensive
with all the powers that can be conferred upon" the federal courts "6
was immediately recognized by the Supreme Court in the McCardle
decision of the following year.3 87

"This legislation is of the most

comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or
laws." 3"8 Ironically the act was invoked in McCardle's case not by a
state prisoner complaining of state restraint in violation of federally
guaranteed freedoms or federally protected interests, but by a Union
army prisoner held for trial before a military commission. His habeas
corpus petition challenged the validity of the federal Reconstruction
Acts, and Congress, fearing that the Supreme Court would void the
3 82

See 9 HOLDSWoRTH, A
sources cited note 381 supra.

HISTORY OF ENGLISHr LAW

383 31 Car. 2, ch. 2.
3843 BLACKSTONE, CommENTAmES

*137;

112-25 (3d ed. 1944);

COMYNS, op. Cit. supra note 380, at

455. Section 3 of the act is explicit on the point. For the act's history, see CHAFEE,
How HUMA RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 57-61 (1952).
885 See notes 57-134 supra and accompanying text. On the 1867 act, with which we
are principally concerned, see Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners:An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 426 (1961). My conclusion in part III
supra that the 1866 Civil Rights Act authorized broad federal removal jurisdiction
gives no ground for reasoning that the 1867 habeas corpus statute was not designed
for similar pretrial relief. The removal provisions of the 1866 act protected only
the rights given by that act; the habeas corpus jurisdiction covered the whole
breadth of the Constitution and laws. The Reconstruction Congress had, in any
event, a precedent in the Force Act of 1833, see text accompanying notes 67-74
supra, for the creation of both habeas corpus and removal jurisdiction to protect
federal interests threatened by local resistance. The removal legislation of 1863
and 1866 was patterned on that of 1833. See CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1387 (March 14, 1866) (remarks of Representative Cook). But removal proved
in practice an insufficient protection against hostile state courts; subjection of defendants to the initial stages of state process offered large opportunities for harassment in the vindication of federal rights. See notes 117, 129 supra. See also CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1526 (March 20, 1866) (remarks of Representative
McKee of Kentucky), 1527 (remarks of Representative Smith of Kentucky), 2054
(April 20, 1866) (remarks of Senator Wilson). It was with this knowledge that
the legislators of 1867 acted.
386 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
s8EX parte McCardle, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868).
88 Id. at 325-26.
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legislation, immediately withdrew its appellate jurisdiction in cases
(including McCardle) arising under the 1867 habeas statute.m This
left the lower federal courts, during eight years until Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction was restored,3 90 to construe the new habeas
corpus grant without Supreme Court guidance. Significantly, these
contemporary lower court decisions viewed the 1867 statute as imperatively demanding federal discharge of state prisoners held for
trial or after state trial-court conviction, notwithstanding the availability of still unexhausted state remedies. 9 ' Particularly, in a series
of cases arising out of prosecutions under legislation by which the
Pacific Coast States and municipalities sought to discriminate against
the immigrant Chinese, federal district and circuit courts, striking down
the legislation under the fourteenth amendment, released their habeas
corpus petitioners in advance of state trial or immediately following
summary conviction. 3" Some of these holdings (particularly those in
which federal judges voided municipal ordinances as ultra vires state
enabling legislation) were received with consternation by the legal
profession, and that consternation promoted the reestablishment of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases in 1885." The
consternation is quite understandable, in view of the extravagant substantive constitutional rulings in a few of the cases, 39 4 and may have
played a part in the Royall decision in 1886.
38 9
Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44; see Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
300 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
391Ex parte McCready, 15 Fed. Cas. 1345 (No. 8732) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874)
(pretrial discharge); Ex parte Bridges, 4 Fed. Cas. 98 (No. 1862) (C.C.N.D. Ga.
1875) (discharge following trial court conviction); Ex parte Tatem, 23 Fed. Cas.
13759) (E.D. Va. 1877) (pretrial discharge); see note 407 infra.
708 3(No.
92
In re Parrott, 1 Fed. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (discharging petitioner held to
answer a complaint for violation of a California statute forbidding corporations to
employ Chinese; statute voided under the fourteenth amendment and Burlingame
Treaty) ; In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (discharging petitioner
arrested on a justice's warrant for violation of a San Francisco laundry-licensing
ordinance; ordinance voided under fourteenth amendment and perhaps under Burlingame Treaty); In re Lee Tong, 18 Fed. 253 (D. Ore. 1883) (discharging petitioner arrested on warrant for violating an ordinance forbidding, inter alia, carrying
on games of tantan; ordinance held ultra vires its enabling legislation, hence violative
of due process of law); In re Wan Yin, 22 Fed. 701 (D. Ore. 1885) (discharging
petitioner convicted by police court of violating a laundry-licensing ordinance; ordinance held ultra vires its enabling legislation, hence violative of due process of law) ;
Ex parte Ah Lit, 26 Fed. 512 (D. Ore. 1886) (discharging petitioner convicted in
police court of violating an ordinance prohibiting smoking of opium; ordinance held
ultra vires its enabling legislation, hence violative of due process of law); In re
Tie Loy, 26 Fed. 611 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (discharging petitioner held on charge
of violating an ordinance prohibiting operation of laundries in the city; ordinance
voided under the fourteenth amendment) ; see note 407 infra.
393 See ABA, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH" ANNUAL MEETING 12-44 (1884).
394 It is surely extreme to suppose, as the district court in Oregon held, see
note 392 supra, that a municipal ordinance which falls without the municipality's
state-delegated legislative authority per se offends the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
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Royall, an attorney, was arrested in June 1884 on warrants issued
upon indictments by a Virginia grand jury charging him with violations of state statutes, enacted in March 1884, forbidding certain
dealings in Virginia bond coupons without payment of a special license
tax. After being released on bond for almost a year, he surrendered
into custody and filed petitions for habeas corpus in the federal circuit
court at the end of May 1885, challenging the Virginia statutes under
article I, section 10, of the federal constitution as impairing the obligation of contracts. The circuit court dismissed the petitions for want
of jurisdiction and Royall duly appealed to the Supreme Court under
the recent statute of March 3, 1885, allowing such an appeal. 9 5
Royall's contracts clause case was unarguably within the broad jurisdictional language of the 1867 statute, but it had none of that urgency
about it which had moved Congress in 1867 to create the summary
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for state prisoners. Not only did
it present substantive issues far wide of the Reconstruction Congress'
concerns, but the timing of the litigation gave every appearance that it
was a test case gotten up by the habeas corpus route for the purpose
of obtaining the fastest possible Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the new-born Virginia bond legislation. The Court
refused the bait and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
It did not hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.'
It
ruled explicitly to the contrary, "that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction
. . . to inquire into the cause of appellant's commitment, and to dis-

charge him, if he be held in custody in violation of the Constitution." "7
395
Act
398

of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
In its subsequent opinions the Court has consistently recognized that the
exhaustion doctrine is a matter of federal judicial judgment as to appropriate
forum, and implies no lack of power in the federal courts to anticipate state judicial
proceedings by habeas corpus. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 289 (1891) ; Cook v. Hart,
146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892) ; New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 92-95 (1894) ; Whitten
v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 241-42 (1895); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290-91
(1898); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 186 (1899); Davis v. Burke, 179
U.S. 399, 402 (1900) ; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 501-02 (1901) ; United
States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1906); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203
U.S. 192, 201 (1906); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1907); United
States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 18-19 (1925); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 204-05, 210 (1950); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1952);
Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1959); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 414-20

(1963).

307117 U.S. at 250.
In holding Royall's claim cognizable on habeas corpus,
the Court talks the "jurisdictional" language then in use in both federal and state
prisoner cases. Compare Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885), with Ex Parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). Compare In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891), with
Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). This concept that the inquiry on habeas
corpus is limited to "jurisdictional" questions has long since been abandoned, see
authorities cited note 174 supra; it was earlier abandoned in pretrial than in postconviction cases, see In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The concept, which concerned the sort of substantive claim a habeas court could entertain, should not be
confused with the exhaustion doctrine itself, which concerns a matter of timing.

888

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l13:793

"The statute evidently contemplated that cases might arise when the
power thus conferred should be exercised, during the progress of
proceedings instituted against the petitioner in a State court . . . on

account of the very matter presented for determination by the writ of
habeas corpus." 8's But said the Court, the habeas corpus statute does
not "imperatively require the Circuit Court .

.

. to wrest the peti-

tioner from the custody of the State's officers in advance of his trial
in the State court." "' A federal court retains "discretion as to the
time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it," 4oo

a discretion which permits it to abstain from entertaining the habeas
corpus petition until the state courts have had an opportunity to pass
upon the petitioner's federal contentions. "That discretion should be
exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of
government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the
States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that
those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." 41 The discretion should "be subordinated to any special
None existed in
circumstances requiring immediate action." 40
Royall's case, and the Court-exercising the discretion which the
circuit court possessed but had not exercised-affirmed dismissal of
the petition.
Thus, in a contracts clause case, in the post-Reconstruction calm,
the exhaustion doctrine was born. Like Royall, the many cases which
soon followed it in refusing federal habeas corpus to a prisoner in
advance of his state trial involved claims which (where not altogether
frivolous

40 3 )

either did not implicate the post-War amendments 404

Supreme Court opinions sometimes confounded the doctrines, e.g., In re Duncan,
139 U.S. 449 (1891), before the opinion in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117-18
(1944), dearly distinguished them. Similarly, there was for a time in the postconviction cases considerable confusion between the exhaustion doctrine and a doctrine
best described as forfeiture. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), distinguished these
two doctrines and severely restricted the latter.
398 117 U.S. at 248-49.
399 Id. at 251.
400 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
402 Id. at 253.
403 The frivolous category includes the cases making claims of illegal extradition,
Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1892) ; United States ex rel. Ham v. Chapel, 54 Fed. 140
(D. Minn. 1893); In re Moore, 75 Fed. 821 (D. Ore. 1896); Ex parte Glenn, 103
Fed. 947 (C.C.D. W. Va. 1900), claims of double jeopardy, Whitten v. Tomlinson,
160 U.S. 231 (1895); Moss v. Glen, 189 U.S. 506 (1903) (per curiam); United
States ex rel. Weisman v. Brown, 281 Fed. 657 (8th Cir. 1922); cf. Ex parte
Shears, 265 Fed. 959 (W.D. Wash. 1920), and assorted other like claims, Ex parte
Roach, 166 Fed. 344 (N.D. Iowa 1908); Veach v. Smith, 42 F. Supp. 161 (M.D.
Pa. 1941); Pebley v. Knotts, 95 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. W. Va. 1951).
404 This category includes commerce clause cases, United States ex rel. Silverman v. Fiscus, 42 Fed. 395 (W.D. Pa. 1890); In re Alexander, 84 Fed. 633
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or saw the fourteenth amendment invoked against state regulatory
legislation by economic interests apparently able to bear the burdens
of protracted state-court litigation.40 5 Royall was not contemporaneously viewed as disallowing anticipatory federal habeas corpus in
cases raising significant fourteenth amendment claims: the lower
federal courts continued in a few cases to protect the West Coast
Chinese against discriminatory legislation,0 ' and the Supreme Court
itself seems to have approved this use of the writ in a case decided
shortly after Royall4 7 In repeated applications, however, the doctrine requiring exhaustion came to be more inflexibly, more automatically invoked. The Court soon made clear what its holding in
Royall foreshadowed: that the "discretion" of which its opinion spoke
was not a "discretion" in the federal trial judge, but in the Supreme
Court. And the Court began ordinarily to reverse a district or
circuit judge who did not abstain from the anticipatory exercise of his
habeas corpus power.4" Abstention was required not only prior to
state trial, but following state conviction and prior to state appeal, 409 or
4 10
prior to available state collateral attack proceedings.
(W.D.N.C. 1898); Ex parte Martin, 180 Fed. 209 (D. Ore. 1910), cases in which
the petitioner claimed that his offense was within exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction, New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894) ; In re Bradley, 96 Fed. 969 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1898); cf. Cunningham v. Skiriotes, 101 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1939), and the
class of federal officer cases cited note 62 supra, of which United States ex rel
Drury
v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906), is representative.
40 5
Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898) ; Ex parte Bartlett, 197 Fed. 98 (E.D.
Wis. 1912).
406In re Sam Kee, 31 Fed. 680 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) (discharge following
justice of the peace conviction) ; In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890)
(pretrial
discharge).
407
Wo Lee v. Hopkins, reported with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (reversing circuit court's refusal to discharge a habeas petitioner convicted
by a San Francisco police court of violating a laundry-licensing ordinance discriminatorily applied in violation of the equal protection clause). In discussing this case
and the cases cited notes 391-92, 406 supra, I have not distinguished between cases
in which federal habeas corpus was allowed to vindicate a substantive federal claim
(a) prior to any state trial, and (b) after a magistrate's conviction, but before
pursuit by the convict of any review in a state court of record. Prior to the enactment of present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) in 1948, see text accompanying notes 41517 infra, there seems no reason to draw the distinction. The Supreme Court
shortly following Royall extended the exhaustion requirement to state appeals from
conviction even in a court of record, Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886); it re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 (1891), and a fortiori, on the principles of Royall, a state
magistrate's rejection of a substantive federal contention should not affect the
willingness of a federal court to entertain the contention before its consideration by
the higher state judiciary.
408 See, e.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); Moss v. Glenn, 189 U.S.
506 (1903) (per curiam). More recently, the Court has shown some deference to
the "discretion" of a circuit court of appeals, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952),
but on the whole it is apparent that the "discretion" of the Royall doctrine is a
discretion in the federal judicial system, rather than in the trial judge.
409 See note 407 supra.
410 E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114 (1944).
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With the expansion of the due process clause as a limitation upon
state criminal procedure and the consequent expansion of federal
habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy,4 ' the focus of litigation
under the Royall doctrine became the question of exhaustion of state
collateral remedies for federal constitutional violations in the trial
process.4 m In these cases exhaustion was rigorously demanded of
fourteenth amendment claimants-possibly because the need for immediate federal intervention seemed less compelling where the nature
of state judicial proceedings (rather than the power of the State to
proceed at all in a prosecution) was challenged; possibly because no
federally protected conduct was jeopardized with state repression during the abstention period; possibly because the long-term state prisoners
involved (who could ordinarily be retried if their federal claim succeeded) seemed to have relatively little to lose by delay; more probably
because the Royall principle was carried over unthinkingly from
contracts clause and commerce clause cases to fourteenth amendment
cases having no smack of urgency about them, and thence to all
fourteenth amendment cases, 41 3 subject to a qualifying "special circumstances" doctrine which I shall shortly discuss.4 14 In the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code, Congress, concerned apparently only with the
postconviction cases,415 enacted present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958),
adopting the Royall doctrine.4 16 Section 2254 provides that a state
See note 174 supra.
See discussions in Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The
Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 96-103 (1964); Note, Exhaustion of State
Remedies Before Bringing Federal Habeas Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code Section 2254, 43 NEB. L. Ray. 120 (1963). See also Annot., 97 L. Ed. 543 (1952),
and earlier annotations referred to therein.
413 See, e.g., Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
414 See text accompanying notes 421-62 infra.
415 Section 2254 was included in the Code at the instance of the Judicial Conference. Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1948). Chief Judge Parker, chairman of
the Judicial Conference Committee which recommended the section, later described
it as responsive to concerns unique to postconviction federal habeas corpus. Parker,
Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949). The House report
on the bill which became the revised Code said of § 2254 only that it was declaratory
of the rule exemplified by Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), a postconviction
case. H.R. Ris,. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947). The Senate Judiciary
Committee amended the House bill by rewriting § 2254 for the express purpose,
inter alia, of assuring that pretrial cases were not covered by its terms. See note
417 infra.
416
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967. The Supreme Court has construed § 2254 as a codification of the preexisting decisional law of exhaustion.
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210-14 (1950); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404-05
(1959) ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963). I find this construction somewhat
questionable. The reviser's draft of the section, incorporated in the House bill, was
accompanied by a reviser's note which states the purpose of the section to codify
prior law. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947). But the Senate
Judiciary Committee substantially rewrote the section into its present form, see note
417 infra, and that committee's report is unclear as to whether it intended the better
411
432
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postconviction prisoner 41 shall not be granted the federal writ unless
he has theretofore exhausted available state corrective process, or
unless there exist "circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner." The statute appears to demand
exhaustion (except in the "circumstances" described) irrespective of
the nature or source of the federal right sought to be vindicated in the
418
habeas proceeding. Applying it recently in Application of Wykcoff
and Brown v. Rayfield41 9 to petitions filed following summary state
convictions but prior to state appeal for trial de novo, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has sustained refusal of a Mississippi
federal district court to entertain, on habeas corpus, claims that the
conduct for which petitioners were prosecuted was protected by the
first and fourteenth amendments, and that the prosecutions were intended to harass them for the purpose of furthering state policies of
racial discrimination. Wykcoff involved the breach-of-the-peace prosecution of a freedom rider arising out of her refusal to leave a segregated bus terminal waiting room in Jackson; Brown, the prosecution
under a Jackson parading-without-a-license ordinance of two pickets
protesting racial discrimination. Following the Fifth Circuit decision
to reflect or to change the court-made doctrine. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1948). Some indication of purpose to change the doctrine may be found
in the Senate Committee's express exclusion of pretrial cases from § 2254, with the
explanation that if they were included federal habeas corpus relief for federal officers
held on state charges would be hampered. See note 417 infra. No such exclusion
was necessary unless the section altered prior law, for prior law allowed the writ
to go without exhaustion in federal officer cases. See note 62 stpra; text accompanying notes 425-27 infra. In any event congressional intent to adopt the Royall
doctrine in its general outlines is obvious.
417 Section 2254 applies only to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court." The legislative history makes clear what the language suggests
(particularly when compared with that of 28 U.S.C. §2253 (1958)): that the
phrase "judgment of a State court" was chosen to cover postconviction habeas
cases and to exclude cases in which federal habeas corpus was sought in advance
of state trial. The original section in the House bill which became the 1948 Code
required exhaustion of available state remedies by any habeas petitioner who was
"in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court or authority of a State
officer." See H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2254 (1947). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary rewrote the section to make several changes, among them
omission of the phrase: "or authority of a State officer." The Committee report
explains the purpose of the change to
eliminate from the prohibition of the section applications on behalf of prisoners in custody under authority of a State officer but whose custody has
not been directed by the judgment of a State court. If the section were
applied to applications by persons detained solely under authority of a State
officer it would unduly hamper Federal courts in the protection of Federal
officers prosecuted for acts committed in the course of official duty.
S. Rm,. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948).
418 196 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Miss.), petition for immediate hearing of appeal
and for leave to proceed on original papers denied, 6 RAcE REtL. L. REP. 793 (5th
Cir. 1961).
419 320 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 902 (1963).
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in the former case, Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Clark
concurred, refused on exhaustion grounds to entertain an original petition for the writ.4 20
2. The "Special Circumstances" Exceptions
As conceived in Royall, the exhaustion principle was to be "subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action." 421
That conception has been repeated throughout the history of the
doctrine, 2 and finds expression in the broadly drawn "circumstances"
proviso to section 2254. The Court's opinions have stressed the flexibility of the "special circumstances" exception," but doctrine has
4
solidified in three areas which deserve notice here.
(a) Dictum in Royall recognized that special circumstances are
presented in cases "of urgency, involving the authority and operations
of the General Government." 425 The classic case is In re Neagle,42 1
where the Court affirmed the discharge of a federal deputy marshal
committed for examination on a California murder charge for killing
David Terry in defense of Mr. Justice Field. Neagle is ordinarily
followed in federal officer cases, 4 27 but its principle has been carried
further."
A particularly pertinent application, for present purposes,
420

Application of Wykcoff, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 794 (Black, Circuit Justice,

1961).
421117 U.S. at 253.
422 See the authorities cited note 396 supra. All are dicta on the point.
42
3 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210
(1950) (dictum). Both are postconviction cases under § 2254. See note 416 mipra.
424 The "special circumstances" language in Royall seems to have been used
to denote only "particularizing circumstances." But "special" is a uniquely selfprophetic word, and the phrase has now come to mean "extraordinarily rare." See
text accompanying notes 464-68 infra. The doctrine has had little play outside the
three areas discussed below.
425 117 U.S. at 251.
426 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
427 See note 62 supra. See also Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899)
(writ
issued after state justice of the peace conviction, prior to state appeal); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) (writ issued following state contempt commitment,
prior to state appeal). The federal officer cases might have been put on the ground
that they arise under the 1833 as well as the 1867 habeas corpus act. But the Neagle
opinion does not suggest any such rationale, and United States ex reL Drury v.
Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906), indicates that the exhaustion principle has some application to the 1833 act.
428 In Ex parte Wood, 155 Fed. 190 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1907), the circuit court
entertained a habeas corpus petition, following conviction in a police justice's court
but prior to state appeal, of a railroad ticket agent charged with selling tickets at
rates in excess of those fixed by a statute whose enforcement the circuit court had
earlier preliminarily enjoined. The court found that state authorities were willfully
and openly flouting the injunction, that the dignity of the federal court was thereby
affected, that the statute was unconstitutional; and it discharged the petitioner. The
Supreme Court cited Neagle and affirmed. Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1908).
Ex parte Conway, 48 Fed. 77 (C.C.D.S.C. 1891), discharged the foreman of a gang
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is In re Loney,42 9 affirming the federal circuit court's discharge of a
habeas petitioner held under a state arrest warrant charging him with
perjury in giving his deposition before a state notary public in the
case of a contested election of a member of Congress.
(b) Special circumstances have been found by lower federal
courts in cases where their habeas petitioners are held for petty offenses,
and numerous prosecutions for those offenses are likely to be pressed
in the state courts. An excellent opinion by Circuit Judge (later Mr.
Justice) Brewer in Ex parte Kieffer,4 30 explains that in such cases the
burden of trial and appeal is ordinarily greater than the penalty imposed for conviction, 431 hence that testing of unconstitutional state
legislation by the state appeal route will often be eschewed, although
widespread prosecution under the legislation may deter federally protected conduct 32 This reasoning may account for a considerable line
of district and circuit court decisions in the 1890's discharging peddlers
engaged in interstate commerce from prosecution under state license
tax regulations. 4 33 The decisions were ignored and their authority
clouded by Minnesota v. Brundage,434 in 1901, where the Court reversed release on habeas corpus of a petitioner convicted in a Minneapolis police court for violation of a statute forbidding sale of colored
oleomargarine, and rejected the argument that the general repressive
effect of the statute on interstate commerce justified anticipation of
state appeals by federal habeas corpus. But Brundage was undoubtedly
engaged in constructing telegraph lines under authority of a federal statute from
arrest on state charges of obstructing a public road. See also Wildenhus's Case,

120 U.S. 1 (1887), an alien case coming under both the 1842 and the 1867 habeas
corpus statutes.
429 134 U.S. 372 (1890).
43040 Fed. 399 (C.C.D. Kan. 1889), discharging after police court conviction
but before appeal for trial de novo a petitioner charged with violation of meat inspection ordinances which the court held invalid for obstructing interstate commerce.
Judge Brewer was apparently more willing to entertain the petition following the
justice trial than before it, id. at 400, a position with which I disagree. See note
407 supra.
431 Accord, It re Ah Jow, 29 Fed. 181, 183 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
432
The need for expeditious determination of an issue arising in a large number
of state prosecutions was the critical factor relied on by the circuit court of appeals
in Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 468 n.1 (6th Cir. 1951), to excuse a habeas petitioner from the requirement of exhausting state postconviction remedies. The Supreme
Court accepted this exercise of the circuit court's judgment. Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952). Compare Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), with United
States ex rel. Tulee v. House, 110 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1940).
433 Discharge following justice court conviction but prior to appeal to court of
record: In re Kimmel, 41 Fed. 775 (D. Minn. 1890) ; In re White, 43 Fed. 913
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1890); In re Houston, 47 Fed. 539 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1891); In re
Nichols, 48 Fed. 164 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1891). Discharge before justice court trial:
In re Spain, 47 Fed. 208 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1891); see Ex parte Jervey, 66 Fed. 957
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (coasting trade seamen). See also the West Coast Chinese
cases cited notes 392, 406 supra.
434 180 U.S. 499 (1901).
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affected by the Court's unexpressed view that the petitioner's claim on
the merits was unsound (as the Court held three years later) ."'
Certainly Brundage was not a case in which the petitioner's claim had
evident merit, or where a state statute was being made the basis of a
substantial number of clearly unconstitutional prosecutions. In the
latter case the justification for anticipatory federal habeas corpus is
particularly strong for several reasons. First, the willful flouting of
federal constitutional guarantees is itself a matter of grave federal
concern, touching the authority of the federal government no less significantly than the Neagle prosecution and its like.438 Second, the
prospect of appellate reversal is obviously proving inadequate in these
cases to deter state authorities from pressing prosecutions destructive
of federal guarantees. Third, considerations which ordinarily militate
against federal anticipatory intervention have slight force here: there
is by hypothesis no problem of premature federal constitutional decision,437 and the legitimacy of the State's claim against interruption of
its criminal law processes diminishes proportionately to the clarity with
which the processes are being used unconstitutionally in a substantial
class of cases. Notwithstanding Brundage, the federal courts have
continued to use the writ without requiring exhaustion in these
cases.

438

(c) Where procedural obstructions make theoretically available
state processes ineffective to protect the habeas petitioner's rights, he
has not been required to resort to those processes.439 The development
of this principle has come chiefly in the postconviction cases, and
exhaustion has been excused only on a showing that the state procedural obstacles are nigh overwhelming: for example, state court
fees beyond petitioner's means,440 or the scheduled execution of a death
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
436 Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377

435

U.S. 218 (1964).
437 No new constitutional law will be made in these cases. Compare Cunningham
v. Skiriotes, 101 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1939). And, insofar as concern with premature
constitutional decision is concern for the frequency of resort to the Constitution for
day-by-day regulation, precisely such resort is necessitated by the prosecutorial policy
here.
438Ex parte Edwards, 37 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Fla. 1941) ; Ex parte Green, 114
Fed. 959 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1902) (principal alternative ground). Both cases allow
the writ prior to appeal from a state justice court conviction; in each, a state licensing
statute is voided as applied to interstate peddlers.
439 See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949), echoing the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947).
440 Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1951)
(considered dictum);
United States e.x rel. Farnsworth v. Murphy, 358 U.S. 48 (1958) (per curiam)
(by implication) ; see, e.g., Robbins v. Green, 218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954) ; United
States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
915 (1958); United States cx rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12, 16 n.4 (3d Cir.
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sentence too early to permit application for appellate review. 44 The
question whether substantial delay involved in exhausting state
remedies presents "special circumstances" justifying federal habeas
corpus inquiry in the case of a petitioner who would otherwise have
to remain in custody throughout the period of the delay was reserved
by the Court in 1898; 442 it was presented, coupled with a problem of
possible mooting effect of the delay, in Markuson v. Boucher,"4 the
following year. The Markuson petition alleged that even if the petitioner had sufficient financial means to obtain state appellate review
of his contempt commitment-which he did not-the case could not be
carried through the state system to the Supreme Court prior to the
expiration of sentence. But the Court affirmed denial of the writ for
nonexhaustion without discussion of the issues of delay or threatened
mootness. Probably it never reached those issues; if the Court in
those pre-poverty-conscious days accepted the view that a pauper's inability to appeal was no justification for habeas corpus, the case was
thereby decided, and petitioner's poverty allegation pleaded him out
of court on all other matters. As indicated above, Markuson was
later overruled on the poverty point; 4" the lower federal courts thereafter split on the question whether habeas corpus is available in advance
of state appeal where, by reason of the shortness of sentence, the case
will be mooted on its expiration before appellate decision can be had.4 4
Encouragingly, the Supreme Court appears to have decided this last
question in the affirmative in In re Shuttlesworth,4 46 in 1962, at least
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 945 (1962); Dolan v. Alvis, 186 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 906 (1952); Geaminea v. Nebraska, 206 F. Supp. 308
(D. Neb.), dismissed as moot, 308 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1962). Jennings, the leading
case, was decided five years prior to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
441E.g., United States ex rel. De Vita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954);
Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931) (alternative ground); Thomas
v. Duffy, 191 F.2d 360 (Denman, Circuit Judge, 1951), approved in Thomas v.
Teets, 205 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1953) (alternative ground). (For purposes of this
footnote, Federal Supreme Court review of state judgments is considered a state
remedy, as it was prior to Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
See also Ex parte Bartlett,
442 Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1898).
197 Fed. 98, 101 (E.D. Wis. 1912).
443 175 U.S. 184 (1899).
444

Markuson was followed in United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S.
13, 19 (1925) (alternative ground). Both decisions were overruled sub silentio by
Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
445 Boyd v. O'Grady, 121 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1941), holds the writ available.
United States ex rel. Avasino v. Kross, No. 28669, 2d Cir., Feb. 18, 1964, is to the
contrary.
446369 U.S. 35 (1962).
Shuttlesworth was convicted of disorderly conduct
arising out of efforts to test the constitutionality of the Birmingham transit system
and was sentenced to pay $100 and costs or serve eighty-two days. His conviction
was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Appeals without consideration of the merits
of his challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied, because his filing
of the transcript of evidence was untimely under Alabama practice. The Alabama
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Shuttles-
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7 Negawhere substantial federal equal protection issues are raised."
tive answer would permit the state courts to violate the Constitution
with impunity by imposing short sentences and denying bail pending
appeal. The question of the effect upon the exhaustion doctrine of
denial or unavailability of bail where mootness is not threatened-as
in the case of a pretrial petition raising substantial federal constitutional
defenses to the charge on the merits and alleging appreciable pretrial
delay-remains unresolved. Brown v. Rayfield indicates that even
extended delay will not excuse exhaustion where a habeas petitioner
is able to make bond; 448 and Brown (and perhaps Wykcoff) reject
claims of "special circumstances" bottomed on allegations of state
court hostility and commitment to a state policy of racial repression.4 49

C. Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine in Civil Rights Cases
1. The "Special Circumstances" Exception
In differing degrees the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine support anticipatory habeas-corpus in the hypothesized
Mississippi cases, pp. 794-96 supra:
worth then filed his habeas corpus petition in the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. That court denied relief on the ground that by untimely filing
of the transcript on the state appeal he had forfeited the constitutional claim. Without reaching this question, Judge Rives denied a certificate of probable cause on the
ground that state collateral relief by habeas corpus or coram nobis appeared to be
available. The Supreme Court, by per curiam order, vacated Judge Rives' denial and
remanded to the district court with directions to hold the matter while Shuttlesworth
pursued his state collateral remedies; but if the state courts should neither grant
him relief nor release him on bail within five days following his application for bail
in the state collateral proceeding, the federal district court "may then consider all
state remedies exhausted and proceed to hear and determine the cause, including any
application for bail pending that court's final disposition of the matter." Ibid. Applications for bail were made to and denied by the state courts, and thereafter the
federal district court fixed bond and set the petition for hearing on the merits.
Shuttlesworth v. Moore, 7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 114, 121 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
47In
the Dresner case, note 192 supra, the Fifth Circuit followed and extended
Shuttlesworth, directing the district court to deem state remedies exhausted if the
state courts did not release petitioners absolutely or on nominal bail within three
days.
448Petitioners in Brown, see text accompanying notes 419-20 supra, sought to
state a case of "special circumstances" by allegations (1) that all Mississippi public
officials were committed to a policy of racial discrimination, as demonstrated by
Mississippi's massive resistance legislation; (2) that judges of the various state
courts (all elected officials) gave tacit if not open support to the segregation policy
in their election campaigns, and that the policy was reflected in their judicial decisions
and opinions; and (3) that, by reason of the congestion of civil rights prosecutions
in the Mississippi courts, and delays compelled by Mississippi trial and appellate
procedures, the June 1961 freedom-rider cases had not yet been disposed of by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in June 1963, and a like or greater delay was in prospect
for the petitioners. By the time the habeas proceeding reached the Fifth Circuit,
the petitioners had made bond in the state court and, in view of this circumstance,
the Court of Appeals found no sufficient reason to excuse petitioners from the exhaustion requirement.
449 As to Brown see note 448 supra. In Wykcoff the scope of the Fifth Circuit's
holding is unclear, because the district court, following a hearing, found some of the
petitioner's allegations unproved, including perhaps general allegations of state court
hostility.
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(a) As Loney's case suggests, nothing more substantially affects
"the authority and operations of the General Government" than matters
touching the very voting process by which officers of the national
government are elected. Upon the fair and effective operation of the
voting process, including voter registration, depends the democratic
character of the government established by the Constitution. That this
is not a matter of mere private rights has been legislatively determined:
Congress has authorized suit by the Attorney General in the public
interest to protect the franchise. 450 And Congress has explicitly declared the policy that the federal district courts are the appropriate
forum for the litigation of matters affecting the right to vote "without
regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have exhausted any .
Under the statutes the Court of Appeals
other remedies . . .,
for the Fifth Circuit has given the United States standing to enjoin
Mississippi's prosecution of a civil rights organization voter registration worker where the Government alleged that the prosecution was
calculated to harass the worker and intimidate Negroes attempting to
register. 45" The prosecutions I have hypothesized have the same design
and effect. Giving heed to the congressional grant of a primary jurisdiction to the federal district courts in voting cases," 5 I think the
argument is strong that, in all the hypothesized cases, federal habeas
corpus need not bide exhaustion of the state criminal processes.
So to conclude, of course, a court would have to take a somewhat
broader view of the relations between the federal government and the
States than was necessary in Neagle and Loney. Prosecution of a
federal officer, or a witness in a federal proceeding, is an immediately
evident intrusion into federal affairs. Doubtless, harassment prosecution to enforce racial discrimination in voter registration is as significant an intrusion, but the process by which its significance is appraised calls for more complex judgments. Areas of federal concern
must be identified, and the connection between that concern and the
conduct for which prosecution is brought must be litigated. This
complexity itself may make the exercise of such judgments and the
trial of such issues an undesirable basis for the definition of an antici450 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131, 71 Stat. 637, as amended, Civil Rights Act
of 1960, § 601, 74 Stat. 90, as amended, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat. 241,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c) (1964).
451 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131, 71 Stat. 637, as amended, Civil Rights Act
of 1960, § 601, 74 Stat 90, as amended, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat. 241,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(d) (1964).
452United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
850 (1962).
453 See text following note 492 infra.
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patory federal jurisdiction.4 54 Though the principle of Neagle and
Loney carries beyond the federal officer, federal witness cases, administrative practicality may require that the exception be confined to such
cases.

4 55

I weigh the administrative consideration heavily, but do not find
it necessarily conclusive. Litigating the connection between the petitioner's conduct and an identifiable sphere of federal concern is commonplace even in the federal-officer cases. 458 As for identification of
the spheres of federal concern, it is possible to recognize that certain
categories of cases clearly present sufficient federal government involvement and yet refuse to inquire on a more particularized plane outside
those clear categories. If this last approach is taken, the category of
cases involving attempted voter registration is one of the most compelling for exception from the exhaustion rule.
(b) The Kieffer principle supports anticipatory habeas corpus
directed to the parading-without-a-license charge,4 57 which, ex hypothesi, rests on a clearly facially unconstitutional ordinance. In such
a case a federal court may give relief without an evidentiary hearing
and with relatively little other burden to itself; the State's interest in
the uninterrupted administration of a statute which it can never constiof case in which the intertutionally apply is minimal; and the 5class
4 8
ruption is authorized is self-defining.
(c) Shuttlesworth and its Fifth Circuit sequel, Dresner,59 suggest
that if the hypothesized Mississippi defendants are denied or cannot
make bail on any of the charges to which they have colorable federal
constitutional defenses, anticipatory habeas corpus may be allowed.
454

See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.

455 In a federal officer case the mere appearance of the United States Attorney

as counsel for the petitioner relieves the court in some measure from the necessity
for independent determination that the case touches federal concerns. But see note
456 infra.
458 See United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906); cases cited
note 62 supra.
457 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
458 If the Kieffer principle is the only one on which anticipatory habeas corpus
lies in the hypothetical Mississippi situation, and the parading-without-a-license charge
is the only offense against which the writ runs under Kieffer, a doctrinal problem
arises in the case of any state defendant held under the parading charge and another
charge or charges. Habeas corpus lore as developed in its postconviction usage
holds that, because the writ's sole function is to release the petitioner from custody,
it cannot be employed to challenge only one of two concurrent sentences. Should
such a challenge succeed, it would not result in the petitioner's release; ergo, the writ
will not lie. E.g., Wood v. Crouse, 327 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1964). Accepting this,
I think the pretrial situation, in some instances at least, distinguishable. If a defendant is held in default of bail and bond has been fixed cumulatively on separate charges,
each exerts an independent restraining force which should be assailable by the writ.
Even where bond has not been set cumulatively, other restraining incidents of a
criminal charge, see AmSTRDAm 232-36, may attach separately to the separate charges.
459 See notes 192, 447 mtPra.
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Shuttlesworth and Dresner do not themselves go so far. Both are
postconviction cases challenging short sentences; each involved the
risk of mootness if exhaustion were required. But it is not clear that
the threat of mootness was dispositive of the cases. The mootness
argument bootstraps considerably: unless a petitioner has some "rights"
against detention for the duration of his short sentence, state process
which fails to release him before sentence expires can hardly be said to
be "ineffective to protect [his] . . . rights." 460 It is a rather dubious

ground for immediate federal judicial relief that, if relief is not immediate, it will not be needed. Shuttlesworth and Dresner seem to me
to respond principally to the practical consideration that, if no federal
relief is given in the situations they present, a State may mock the
Constitution through the device of short sentences and dilatory process.
It can do the same thing, of course, by arresting a defendant and
detaining him for the period pending a trial at which it cannot constitutionally convict him: the defendant is no less punished for, and
deterred in the exercise of, his federal constitutional freedoms when he
is held without bail, or on bail he cannot make, during x days pending
trial, than when he is sentenced to x days and his sentence runs. To
the extent that this is so, Shuttlesworth and Dresner have implications
for pretrial detention; it is perhaps significant that neither order
speaks of mootness and that both hold state remedies ineffective for
inaction during a time far short of the period required to moot the
litigation.
However, if the cases are concerned only with the evil of state
detention, anticipatory habeas corpus inquiry (i.e., the federal court's
entertaining the underlying federal claim on the merits in advance of
state process) seems an unnecessary and inappropriate remedy. Adequate relief could be afforded by the federal court's admitting its
petitioner to bail, or releasing him on recognizance, pending the conclusion of state proceedings. The remedy is within the habeas court's
power 46 1 and would ordinarily be less intrusive than the exercise of
4
the anticipatory jurisdiction.

12

2. Displacement of the Exhaustion Requirement
Cases falling outside the logic of the several categories of established "special circumstances" call for more radical reconsideration of
460

1 use the terminology of § 2254, text following note 417 supra, despite the

obvious
4 6 Hohfeldian objection.
1 Tinkoff v. Zerbst, 80
habeas corpus as a bail writ
339-70.
462
See pp. 830-38 supra.

By "right," the statute and I mean immunity.
F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1935). For discussion of federal
in connection with state prosecutions, see AMSTERDAM
But see note 183 supra.
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the exhaustion doctrine. Whether anticipatory habeas corpus is sought
in such cases on a theory which expands the "special circumstances"
exception or on a theory which retracts the exhaustion requirement
without reference to the "special circumstances" rubric, the same concerns should be dispositive.463 Nevertheless, the direction from which
one comes to confrontation of those concerns in a particular case is
not without importance. To proceed by accepting the exhaustion
requirement as a limitation coextensive with the habeas corpus jurisdiction and by throwing the burden on the habeas petitioner to demonstrate "special circumstances" which take his case out of the rule is
to slide easily enough into the attitude expressed in one postconviction
case: "The district court had undoubted jurisdiction to entertain the
writ but the situations in which it is proper to exercise it are so rare
that the effort almost never succeeds." 464 To proceed conversely by
inquiring whether in a particular case or class of cases justification
exists for a federal court's declining summary exercise of a congressionally given summary jurisdiction is to put the leaden boot on quite
another foot. I recognize that the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have long taken an approach to the exhaustion doctrine
which more nearly approximates the former than the latter method of
proceeding. 46 5 But this approach itself grew up in the postconviction
cases involving claims of unconstitutional trial procedure,466 where it
is perhaps explicable on the ground that this class of case does generically present strong affirmative justifications for requiring exhaustion.4 7 Even when limited to these cases the approach has been rightly
condemned; 46 ' extended beyond them, it is unsupportable.
It bears reiteration that the exhaustion doctrine is a judge-made
decision to refuse to hear cases over which Congress unmistakably gave
463 These concerns, of course, will also play a role, within somewhat narrower
compass, in determining the scope of the recognized categories of "special circumstances." Compare text accompanying note 497 infra, with text accompanying note
458 supra.
464United States ex rel. Murphy v. Murphy, 108 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 661 (1940).

465 This is most evident in the postconviction cases where the existence of a
state collateral remedy is unclear; in such cases the petitioner has been required to
put the state processes to the test. E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ;
and the line of Illinois cases climaxed by Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951),
and Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). In the lower courts, compare United
States ex rel. Emerick v. Denno, 328 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1964), with United States
Carrol v. Murphy, 334 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1964).
ex rel.
4 66
The uncompromising statements of the exhaustion rule in Davis v. Burke,
179 U.S. 399 (1900), and United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925),
have been often quoted in later decisions and appear to have contributed strongly to
the increasing rigor of the rule.
467 See pp. 830-38 siupra. Compare pp. 859-61 supra.
468 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw
& CONTEmp. PRoB. 216, 230-31 (1948).
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the federal judges jurisdiction.46 9 That decision not only lacked any
statutory basis; it was in flat contravention of the statutory command
that, when presented with a petition for habeas corpus, a federal judge
"shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus," 0 "shall proceed in
a summary way to determine the facts of the case," "' "and if it shall
appear that the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the constitution or laws . . . ,he or she shall forthwith be

discharged and set at liberty." 472 This is the language of the 1867
statute, which also provided that a return to the writ should be made
within three days 3 and a hearing held within five days thereafter. 74
These provisions have no ambiguity; they are patterned on those of
the English Habeas Corpus Act ...and, like the provisions of that act,
are plainly designed to make the writ of habeas corpus an imperious,
expeditious remedy for the relief of illegal restraint. As for the state
courts, "any proceeding against [the] . . .person . . . alleged to be

restrained of his or her liberty in any State court, or by or under the
authority of any State, [pending the habeas corpus proceeding and after
final judgment of discharge]

.

.

.

shall be deemed null and void." 476

As the Royall opinion recognized, "The statute evidently contemplated
that cases might arise when the [habeas corpus] power . . . should

be exercised, during the progress of proceedings instituted against the
petitioner in a State court," 17 and the only congressional resolution of
the conflicts which would thus inevitably arise was to nullify the state
court proceedings.
If, despite the peremptory tenor of the statute, Royall allowed a
federal habeas corpus court "discretion" 478 to delay relief until the
conclusion of state court processes, such discretionary delay was plainly
an exception to the ordinary operation of the legislation. "[T]he
court could not, against the positive language of Congress, declare any
469

Royall and the cases following it have expressly acknowledged this character

of the doctrine. See notes 396-401 supra and accompanying text.
470 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
471 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat 386.
2
47 Ibid.
473 Ibid. The time was three days if the prisoner was detained within twenty
miles of the court, ten days if between twenty and one hundred miles, twenty days if
more than one hundred miles. The analogous provision today requires return within
three days irrespective of distance, unless for good cause additional time, not above
twenty days, is allowed. 28 U.S.C. §2243 (1958).
474 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat 386. The analogous provision today
requires hearing within five days after return, unless for good cause additional time
is allowed. 28 U.S.C. §2243 (1958).
475 See notes 383-84 supra and accompanying text.
476Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat 386. See note 110 supra and accompanying text; notes 489-90 infra and accompanying text
477
478

117 U.S. at 248; see text accompanying note 398 supra.
See text accompanying notes 400-02 supra.
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such exception . . . ; 47' the Justices in Royadl thought the exception
which they did declare "in harmony with what we suppose was the
intention of Congress . .. , 480 This was perhaps permissible judicial license on the facts of Royall itself-a case as clearly without the
concerns of the Reconstruction Congress as it was within the literal
language of the statute.4"' And Royall might support similar license
in other cases where it is consistent with the statutory aim. But to
pass from Royall to an attitude which makes the dilatory exercise of
the habeas corpus jurisdiction a first principle, which reads deference
to the state judiciary into a statute designed to abort state judicial
proceedings, 4 2 is perverse.
Congress has altered the habeas corpus legislation in pertinent
regards since Royall, but I do not think that these changes substantially
affect the character of the writ authorized in 1867 as an immediate,
supervening pretrial federal remedy. The Royall doctrine in its postconviction phase was approved by the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1958), in the Judicial Code revision of 1948. 4 ' But section 2254 was
specifically limited in its operation to postconviction cases; 484 its
enactment responded solely to concern with those cases; 485 and the
perceived evils which generated that concern were so exclusively creatures of the ordinary postconviction case 486 that the congressional
action in 1948 cannot fairly be read as reflecting any judgment relative
to pretrial federal habeas corpus. At most, section 2254 expresses an
attitude of preference for state over federal postconviction processes (an
attitude which is dubiously susceptible of generalization to include the
*.

479EX parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886) ; cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) : "We have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."
480 117 U.S. at 252.
481 See notes 395-407 supra and accompanying text.
482

See notes 109-34, 379-85, 469-77 supra and accompanying text.

483

See notes 415-17 supra and accompanying text.

See note 417 supra.
upra.
486 Chief Judge Parker, whose important role in the enactment of §2254 is
described in note 215 supra, enumerated the following evils of the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction: (1) a flood of litigation in the lower federal courts resulting
from "holding out to convicted prisoners the hope of escaping punishment by making
an attack on the court which has convicted them," Parker, supra note 215, at 172;
(2) "the unseemly spectacle of federal district courts trying the regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of state trial judges appearing
as witnesses in defense of the proceedings had in their courts," id. at 172-73; and (3)
the unseemliness of a single federal district judge being required "to review and pass
upon convictions which had been affirmed by the highest state courts and which the
Supreme Court of the United States had refused to review by certiorari," id. at 173.
These perceived evils have long been the principal grievances lodged against federal
habeas corpus. See authorities cited note 182 supra.
484

485 See note 415
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state trial process) 487 and, more specifically, an attitude of reluctance
to permit the lower federal courts to pass judgment on the state judges
(an attitude having limited pretrial implications to which I shall return
shortly).48
Somewhat more significant as an indication of congressional attitude is the Act of June 19, 1934, chapter 673,4"9 replacing the
automatic stay procedure of the 1867 statute with a provision leaving to
the federal habeas corpus judge discretion to determine whether or not
state prosecution should be stopped pending disposition of the habeas
petition. The 1934 legislation does express congressional unwillingness to see state trials interrupted by the defendant's unilateral act of
filing a federal habeas petition, which might prove frivolous on examination. But the unfettered power left to the federal trial courts to stay

state proceedings hardly suggests a judgment that the right of immediate discharge from unconstitutional confinement given in 1867 was
meant to be broadly subordinated to the State's interest in undisturbed
criminal trials.49 Perhaps nothing was intended but a check upon the
dilatory tactic of the frivolous petition. Perhaps, reading the statute
most expansively, one can find in it a judgment that state trials are
not to be needlessly disrupted. The latter reading gives the Royall
doctrine some congressional support, but is far from a reversal of the
basic determination made by the Reconstruction Congress that fed4 87

The argument in favor of ceding a primary jurisdiction to the state courts
in the ordinary postconviction case, raising claims of constitutional trial error, is
considerably stronger than that for pretrial deference to state process. See pp.
836-38, 860-61, 890 supra.
488 See text accompanying note 519 infra.
48948 Stat. 1177.
490 The House report on the bill which became the 1934 act expressed a purpose
to deprive state criminal defendants of the use of the automatic stay procedure as
"a powerful weapon to delay a trial and possibly defeat the ends of justice." H.
REP. No. 1726, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
As exemplifying the need for the
legislation, the report described a recent "important murder trial," ibid., in Massachusetts in which some of the defendants filed a federal habeas petition during trial;
the federal district judge, after hearing, found the petitioners' contentions without
merit; the petitioners thereupon appealed. "Obviously, it is undesirable that by this
means the defendants should be enabled automatically to procure a stay of the trial."
Id. at 2. The Senate report consisted substantially of a reprint of the House report,
S. REP. No. 1426, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and its language was paraphrased on
the floor by Senator Walsh, whose turn of phrase indicates that he regarded the
Massachusetts petitioners' substantive claim as frivolous. 78 CONG. Rxc. 12366 (June
18, 1934). The bill passed the House without debate, id. at 10755-56 (June 7, 1934),
and passed the Senate following only Senator Walsh's explanation and an obscure comment by Senator Robinson which seems directed to a postconviction proceeding in a
death case, id. at 12366 (June 18, 1934). The only suggestion in the legislative history
of broader reflections pertinent to the exhaustion doctrine is a statement in Attorney
General Cumming's letter to the Chairman of the House Committee that notwithstanding termination of the automatic stay provision, the habeas petitioner's "rights
are safeguarded by the fact that he has an opportunity to secure a review in the
Supreme Court of the United States after exhausting his remedies in the State
courts." H. REP. No. 1726, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 1426, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (again paraphrased by Senator Walsh, 78 CONG. Rxc. 12366
(June 18, 1934)). The statement, of course, refers only to cases in which the federal
habeas corpus judge does not grant a stay; it does not reflect a view as to when the
stay should be granted.
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erally unlawful restraints should be terminated without delay or the
biding of state processes by a federal habeas corpus court.
I conclude, then, that the exhaustion doctrine is not to be viewed
as an inexorable command, subject to rare exceptions in compelling
circumstances. But neither do I think it can be viewed today as a
dubiously allowable judicial shift, destructive of congressional purpose
and rarely to be tolerated. Dubious Royall's case may have been at
the date it was decided, and some of its modern extensions doubtless
threaten to destroy the efficacy of the habeas corpus jurisdiction." 1
Nonetheless, better than seventy-five years of practice and the positive,
albeit limited, endorsements of Congress have given the doctrine substantial credentials. Against this background, I think it appropriate to
come to questions of its application in pretrial cases-where the doctrine remains wholly a judicial creature-without strong disposition
for or against the requirement of exhaustion. The inquiry may begin
with Royall's formulation that the decision whether a habeas corpus
court should anticipate or await state trial ought to be made "in the
light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between
the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not
disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." 492 In appraising these "relations," it is pertinent to examine what specific "rights"
are in issue, what the Constitution and the Congress (by legislation
other than the habeas corpus statute itself) have said about their importance and the usual forum for their enforcement, and, finally, what
the federal and state courts respectively can do and are in fact doing
under their joint obligation "to guard and protect" those rights.
(a) The strongest argument for the exercise of a federal anticipatory habeas corpus jurisdiction may be made in cases where the
petitioner asserts that the conduct for which he is being prosecuted in
a state court is conduct in the exercise of freedoms protected by the
first amendment. I have already discussed the unique importance of
those freedoms to a free society, 498 their particular vulnerability to
destruction by state process, 4

4

the unlikelihood that they will be pro-

tected adequately by the state courts, 49 5 hence the imperative need for
undelayed federal trial court intervention to protect them. 9" Where
491 See the discussion of the Wykcoff and Brown v. Rayfield cases in text accompanying notes 504-07 infra.
492 117 U.S. at 251.
493 See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
494 See notes 254-55 supra and accompanying text.
495 See pp. 800-02, 840-42 supra.
496 See note 256 supra and accompanying text. The decision in Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), disallowing federal injunction of state prosecutions
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the state legislation on which the charge is laid is challenged on its
face, I have pointed out that there exist no considerable justifications
for deference to the state trial process. 497 Where the challenge is to
the application of the legislation, the state's interest in undisturbed
administration of its statute or ordinance is more substantial. But in
these latter cases, where questions of fact are determinative, the importance of assuring a federal trial forum is compelling, if highly valued
liberties protected against the States by the national constitution are
not to be left to the pleasure of state judges and juries." 8 The Supreme Court itself, on direct review of state convictions in these cases,
has engaged in an extraordinary (although necessarily limited) reexamination of factual issues; .. and the Shuttlesworth and Dresner
decisions 500 strongly suggest that a State will not be permitted to exact
the penalties imposed upon such convictions until after the more searching reexamination available on federal postconviction habeas corpus
has been had. Federal intervention into the state process prior to
execution of sentence is probably therefore inevitable-as it should be
-in any case in which the state courts reject a first amendment contention; the only question is whether the intervention comes sooner or
later in the process. Considerations canvassed above demand that it
come at the outset, by way of anticipatory relief. State prosecution is
itself an effective instrument of repression; 501 federal guarantees must
be made immediately felt by the prosecutor and police chief; 101 and
the use of anticipatory federal power in this clearly defined class of
cases threatens no wholesale disruption of state criminal law administration. 0 3
claimed to infringe first amendment rights, may be thought to militate against this
conclusion. I think it does not. First, Douglas is a narrower decision than has
sometimes been supposed; it is supportable on the limited ground, id. at 165, that the
ordinance sought to be enjoined was that same day declared unconstitutional in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and nothing in the Douglas record
suggested that the threat of its enforcement endured a decision of the Supreme Court
striking it down. Second, Douglas was decided in an era when the Court was involved
in developing the first principles of the first amendment's substantive protection and
was yet inexperienced in the problems of subtle procedural encroachments on the
amendment's guarantees. See the subsequent cases cited note 254 supra. The
authority of Douglas may already be substantially impaired, see note 39 supra;
certainly the tenor of the opinion in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), and
the logic of England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964), discussed in note 193 supra, repudiate much of the underpinnings of Douglas;
one may expect, I think, more direct Supreme Court repudiation shortly. See
note 40 supra.
497 See text accompanying notes 457-58 supra.
498 See text accompanying notes 192-93, 255 supra.
499 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana,
85 Sup. Ct 453 (1965).
500 See text accompanying notes 446-47, 459-60 supra.
501 See pp. 796-802, 823-25, 836-38, 840-42, 860-62 supra.
502 See text accompanying note 186 supra.
503 Compare text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
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For these reasons I think the Wykcoff and Brown v. Rayfield
decisions 5" are wrong. It suffices, of course, to distinguish those
cases, that the Fifth Circuit treated them as involving postconviction,
not pretrial, petitions," 5 hence as falling within the terms of section
2254. But even under the regime of the statute, where the courts may
have less freedom than in pretrial cases to displace the exhaustion
requirement," 6 the considerations canvassed in the preceding paragraph
amply establish that first amendment cases as a class present "circumstances rendering [state] . . .process ineffective to protect the rights

of the prisoner."

507

(b) Many of the same considerations press for anticipatory habeas
corpus in all cases where a petitioner claims that the charges on which
he is being prosecuted cannot constitutionally be applied to his conduct
by force of any of the guarantees of civil rights 10s contained in the postCivil-War Amendments. The protection of civil rights, protection of
the liberty of the freedman and the loyal Union man in the South
against persecution and oppression, were paramount objectives of the
Congress which enacted the 1867 habeas corpus statute." 9 I have
previously pointed out that the need for an anticipatory federal jurisdiction to protect substantive guarantees of civil rights is more
demanding than the need for federal anticipatory protection of procedural guarantees,51 ° and that the values of leaving substantive federal
issues to the state courts in the first instance are less than those of
leaving to initial state court disposition even such federal procedural
issues as might practicably be isolated in advance of trial.51 ' The
decision to abstain pending exhaustion of state remedies, "in the light
504
515

n.168.

See notes 418-20 spra and accompanying text.
In this, too, I think the Fifth Circuit was wrong.

See AMSTFMAM 318-19

605 See notes 483-88 supra and accompanying text. The Court's view that § 2254
codified the judicially developed exhaustion doctrine, see note 416 supra, probably
refers to that doctrine in its twentieth-century, postconviction rigor. See notes 465-66
supra and accompanying text.
507 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
Of course the Shuttlesworth and Dreser cases,
discussed at notes 446-47, 459-60 supra and accompanying text, do require exhaustion
of state remedies in postconviction habeas cases raising substantive first amendment
claims. But in neither case do the respective courts appear to consider any question
broader than a contention of "special circumstances" arising from the confinement
of the petitioners under short sentences, coupled with the prospect of delay and
the unavailability of bail in state collateral proceedings. The courts dispose of this
contention in a manner favorable to the petitioners, and I do not think that either
case can be read as passing considered judgment on the larger question whether in
first amendment cases generically the exhaustion of state collateral remedies should
be demanded.
618 See note 41 supra.
509 See notes 76-134, 151-60 supra and accompanying text.
510 See text accompanying notes 249-52 supra.
Z11 See pp. 859-61 supra.
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of the relations existing" 512 between the state and federal courts, presupposes that, in respect of the subject matter of the litigation, the state
courts have a generally primary competence or responsibility-that they
are the ordinary and normal place for such litigation. However this
may be regarding other federal questions, it is clearly not so in matters
of civil rights. This was the fundamental decision made by the Reconstruction Congress,513 and, although extension of anticipatory federal
relief in all cases involving a substantive civil rights claim is not so
clearly demanded as in first amendment cases, I think the reasons for
the broader relief are sufficient.
I am led to this result in part by the absence of feasible alternatives. If it is once decided that federal anticipatory habeas corpus is
necessary and proper in some instances beyond the narrow class of
first amendment cases, it becomes essential to draw a line-and a clear
line 514-defining the appropriate scope of exercise of the anticipatory
jurisdiction. One conceptually possible principle of definition was
offered by the petitioners in Wykcoff and Brown v. Rayfield,51 5 who
argued that, because of Mississippi's statewide policy of massive resistance to federal guarantees of equality, the courts of that State were
unlikely to protect criminal defendants claiming &ose guarantees. 5 8
I agree that the degree of probability that state courts will not fairly
protect federal rights is a pertinent question; indeed, I think that probability by far the most important factor in determining the fit scope of
anticipatory federal relief. But I have already indicated the belief that
that probability is an unfeasible issue to litigate in advance of state
proceedings, both because its factual complexity makes the litigation
impracticable, and because the embarrassing nature of inquiry into a
State's-or its judges'-constitutional fidelity makes the litigation impolitic. 51 7

The Supreme Court's treatment of the removal statute in

the Rives-Powers cases supports this conclusion;" s and the congressional response, by enactment of section 2254, to the perceived affront
of federal district judges trying the state judiciary 519 further confirms
it. Other factors pertinent to defining the scope of anticipatory jurisdiction-the amount of delay likely to be involved if exhaustion is required, the nature and amount of disruption of state processes likely
if exhaustion is not required, the effect on the volume of federal dis512 See text accompanying note 492 supra.
513 See notes 32-33, 47-160 supra and accompanying text.

See
See
See
See
See
519 See
514
515
516
517
518

text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
notes 418-20 supra and accompanying text.
notes 448-49 supra and accompanying text.
pp. 800, 835-36 supra.
notes 235-47 supra and accompanying text.
note 486 supra.
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---seem also impracticable to liti-

gate; and, in any event, these factors could contribute to a satisfactory
definition only if considered in connection with a formula which also
took account of the unlitigable factor of probable state court fairness in
handling a petitioner's federal claim. A more administrable principle
than litigation of these issues is demanded; the allowance of anticipatory
habeas corpus in cases raising claims under the substantive guarantees
of federal civil rights seems to me the best that can be done.
D. Conclusion: Availability of Anticipatory Habeas Corpus and
Removal in Civil Rights Cases
The issues canvassed in this Article are difficult and uncertain
in their resolution. One proposition, however, is clear. There are
ample sources from which federal power may be drawn to abort state
prosecutions which affect federally guaranteed civil rights.
Jurisdiction in habeas corpus is indisputable. Reasonable men
may disagree concerning the appropriate scope of the exhaustion
doctrine and its several exceptions. But the choice to issue the writ
and entertain federal contentions in advance of state trial is manifestly
within the range of judicial propriety. The removal statute does
present troublesome problems of construction. One may agree or
disagree with the Rives-Powers doctrine, with the Galamison reading
of "law providing for .

.

. equal civil rights," with the Mississippi

District Court's restriction of subsection 1443(2) to persons acting
"inat least a quasi-official capacity." Again these are questions which,
after a canvass of the pertinent materials and concerns, may be decided
either way. Choice, and the obligation of choice, remain with the
federal judiciary.
A very considerable range of reasonable options is presented. By
restricting subsection 1443 (2) to "quasi-official" persons and relaxing
the Rives-Powers and exhaustion doctrines only in first amendment
cases, federal anticipatory jurisdiction may be limited to the protection
of freedoms of expression. By insisting inflexibly on exhaustion and
adopting the Galamison confinement of section 1443 to claims under
explicitly egalitarian federal guarantees, the anticipatory protection
may be limited to cases involving facially discriminatory state statutes
(under the Rives-Powers reading of 1443 (1) and "quasi-official" reading of 1443 (2)), or to cases of discriminatory administration of state
law by demonstrably hostile state courts (by overruling Rives-Powers
but adhering to the "quasi-official" reading), or to all substantive equal
52o See text accompanying note 179 supra.
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protection cases (by adhering to Rives-Powers but extending 1443 (2)
to nonofficial persons). The exhaustion rule and application of the
"denial" concept of 1443 (1) may be made to turn on inquiry into the
attitudes of the state judges or the temper of the state juries or both,
or may be made to turn on factors which render actual hostility of the
state judicial organs irrelevant. Federal anticipatory jurisdiction may
be withdrawn entirely save in federal-officer cases; or it may be extended to all cases involving substantive claims, or substantive and
procedural claims, under federal guarantees of civil rights, or, more
broadly, under the Constitution and laws.
All of the options are not, of course, equally desirable for the
effective functioning of a federal system committed to the national
protection of certain individual liberties, nor are all equally supportable
upon the applicable legislative and judicial materials. I have indicated
my own conclusion that federal anticipatory habeas corpus should
extend to all cases in which a state criminal defendant claims that
the charges against him are prohibited by the guarantees of civil
rights found in the post-Civil-War Amendments. This conclusion is
supported, but not compelled, by the technical and doctrinal considerations which I have examined. It is compelled by my evaluation of
what the Royall opinion called the "relations existing . . . between

the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States" in matters of
civil rights.
Federal guarantees of civil rights have their principal sphere of
operation in the protection of interests which the States do not, and
are not likely to, protect. The same generation of legislators which
determined that the guarantees should be given determined also that
national judicial enforcement in the first instance was imperative if
those guarantees were not to be destroyed. Both determinations involved a subordination of substantial state concerns, among them the
state concern for an unhindered criminal process. That concern was
expressly subordinated by the removal and habeas corpus statutes, and
in each case the subordination went the length of those guarantees of
individual freedom which Congress had the constitutional power to
protect.
The need for federal judicial protection has not narrowed. State
criminal prosecutions still threaten the whole register of federal guarantees. They are still "harassing, annoying and even driving out of
the State" 521 persons for whose safe conduct a high national commitment has been made. This harassment is endemic to the popular, localized, politics-dominated state criminal administration. It is worked,
521

See text accompanying note 130 supra.
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for the most part, not by final judgments of conviction but by mesne
process. It can be stopped only by a federal anticipatory jurisdiction
as broad as the evil itself. Unnecessary interruption of state proceedings, of course, should be avoided. Where federal guarantees can be
amply vindicated at the conclusion of state process-as is ordinarily

the case with federal trial procedure guarantees-their vindication may
be left to postconviction stages. But the power of repression by mesne
process allows no such accommodation in the case of substantive guarantees. Here the respective interests of the Nation and the States are
best reconciled by federal intervention at the outset of the prosecution,
delimited, however, in a manner which makes the federal intervention
as little disruptive and as little abrasive as possible. This last objective
is not served by trying the state judiciary in a federal court or by
impracticable inquiries into the probable adequacy of state procedures.
It is served by exercising federal jurisdiction in a class of cases defined
simply by their subject matter.
The same considerations lead me to give the same scope to the
removal statute. I would allow removal wherever a substantive federal civil rights defense is claimed. I would prefer to see this result
rested on subsection 1443 (2),522 which is explicitly limited to substantive claims and naturally lends itself to this construction; but I think
the result can be reached under subsection 1443 (1) as well. True,
under 1443 (2), and perhaps under 1443 (1), defendants having colorable but not necessarily valid federal claims 523 could have their trial in
a federal court of state-law questions not raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding. This seems to me justified by considerations of economy
which lessen the cost to the defendant of invoking federal jurisdiction,5 24 and because it gives desirable "breathing space" 525 by assuring
a federal forum on all issues to defendants prosecuted for the arguable
exercise of constitutional freedoms. But the question is not easy, and
522 1

speak of the "color of authority" clause discussed extensively above.

I

put no weight on the "refusing" clause of § 1443(2), whose legislative history indicates a very narrow purpose touching none of the sorts of cases with which this
Article is concerned. See note 79 supra.
523 This is the test of removability under § 1443 (2). See note 328 supra. It
is less clearly the test of removability under § 1443(1), but I think the interpretation
of that subsection suggested in text accompanying notes 249-52 supra supports the
test in preference to a test which turns jurisdiction on the validity of the federal
claim. Divorce of the jurisdictional question from the merits also seems to me to
make up in ease of administration what it costs in added volume of removable cases.
524 Cf. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
This consideration also tends to support construction of the phrase "criminal
prosecutions" in § 1443 to allow removal of all state criminal charges arising out
of the same series of acts or transactions if any one of the charges meets the requirements of removability. The question of joinder in the removal of multiple-charge
prosecutions is a difficult one, however, and insufficiently central to the concerns of
this Article to justify treatment here.
525 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).

19651

REMOVAL AND HABEAS CORPUS

I would not have strenuous objection to the contrary view that, where
a removal petitioner's federal contention fails, his trial on state law
issues should be remitted to the state courts. The latter result would be
reached if removability were sustained only under 1443 (1) and if that
subsection were narrowly read as turning removal on the showing of a
valid, not merely arguable, federal claim. Such a reading, in any
event, is clearly preferable to disallowing removal and limiting federal
anticipatory relief to the habeas corpus form. Habeas corpus and
removal each have procedural limitations which make extension of the
other necessary for complete relief.526 Habeas corpus may be available
at earlier stages of the state criminal process than removal,52 7 and it will
ordinarily bring the prosecution to quicker final disposition in the
federal court. Removal practice allows the defendant to halt the state
proceedings even though a federal judge may not be immediately
available; .28 and if the "custody" requirement for habeas corpus is not
held satisfied by the conditions of a defendant's release on bail, 529 removal nevertheless reaches his case. In situations where both federal
remedies are available to a defendant, I see no reason why he should
not be given his option; but if this is thought unwise, an accommodation of the remedies is easily made. 30
There remains the question whether anticipatory relief should in
any case be allowed where the defendant asserts no colorable federal
substantive claim, but where it appears probable before trial that he will
be denied a federal procedural guarantee. Habeas corpus in such cases
is difficult to justify doctrinally, 3 ' but subsection 1443 (1) would allow
removal more or less broadly depending upon the continuing vitality
of the Rives-Powers doctrine. There can be no doubt that Congress,
making explicit provision by the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the appeal
of remand orders in removed civil rights cases, expected that the Supreme Court would limit or overrule Rives-Powers.32 I have sug526 Nor do I think that extension of federal injunctive relief in some or all of
the same cases would obviate the need for either habeas corpus or removal. Often
it will be impossible to obtain a temporary restraining order to stop state proceedings
as early as the filing of a removal petition will stop them. And the injunction case
in the federal court will ordinarily proceed more slowly than either a habeas proceeding or a removed criminal trial.
527 See Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107 (1893).
528 See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
529 See notes 373-74 supra and accompanying text.
530For example, habeas corpus may be disallowed where removal would give
the defendant complete relief. See Ex parte Dickson, 14 F.2d 609 (N.D.N.Y. 1926).
There is ample doctrinal support for such a resolution. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951).
53' Ordinarily the State's legal basis for detention of a defendant for trial will
not be affected by procedural illegalities.
532 See, e.g., 110 CoNG. REc. 6551 (March 30, 1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey), 6344 (remarks of Senator Kuchel), 6739-40 (April 6, 1964) (remarks
of Senator Dodd).
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gested a limitation to cases in which only federal procedural claims are
made. The effect of this principle would be to leave intact in such
cases the distinction between Strauder and Rives-Powers, turning removability on the existence of a facially unconstitutional state statute.
I am far from satisfied with that result. For, today, in matters of
procedure as of substance, "by far the most serious denials of equal
rights occur as a result not of statutes which deny equal rights on their
face, but as a result of unconstitutional and invidiously discriminatory
administration of such [sic] statutes." "' Nevertheless, the considerations which supported the Rives-Powers decisions in their time remain
cogent. The register of federal procedural claims which might be
isolated before trial-jury prejudice, denial of speedy trial, coerced
confession, illegal search and seizure, deprivation of counsel at pretrial stages-has expanded considerably; and I think the basic determination in Rives-Powers is sound-that such claims should not support removal without inquiry into the probability of their denial by
the state courts. This is the sort of inquiry I regard as ordinarily
unfeasible. Strauder might perhaps be extended to cases in which the
highest court of a State has previously rejected federal procedural
claims identical to petitioner's, and no intervening decisions of that
court or of the federal courts suggest that the previous ruling will be
reconsidered. Beyond this, I would unhappily let Rives-Powers stand.
33 Id. at 6739.

